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PREFACE 
SDistributed operating system research is in interesting combination of theory 
and practice. Problems are encountered in practice; theory is the tool for provid-
ing . solutions. These solutions are used in system design and implementation. 
Practise needs theory, but theory needs practice too: Practice provides the inputs 
for theory and the feedback for the usability of solutions. 
This thesis reports mostly about theoretical work on distributed systems, but 
this theoretical work had to be inspired by practical work, the Amoeba Distri-
buted Operating Systems Project. Designing and building Amoeba uncovered 
many new research problems and provided a testbed for research results. 
The Amoeba Project has been the project of a team, and if it weren't for the 
members of the team, much of this work could not have been done. I would like 
to thank the students who participated in the project by implementing various 
parts: Dick Biekart and Bram Janssen, who built the Block Server and the first 
of our three File Servers; they discovered that non-blocking transaction calls are 
far from ideal and invented a simple task mechanism. Jos Gutter and Jac-
quelien Jorissen implemented the transaction mechanisms and helped us discover 
many flaws in the initial design; these have been taken into consideration in the 
current design. Theo van der Meer and Carl Welman made a Directory Server 
which allows storage of capabilities in encrypted form. Theo van der Storm and 
Sjoerd Mullender have been working on links between UNIX and Amoeba; Theo 
made UNIX files accessible to Amoeba software, and Sjoerd made UNIX software 
run on Amoeba. 
A few staff members also participated, both at the Vrije Universiteit and at 
CWI: Leo van Moergestel made the hardware work, Dick Grune made a pilot 
implementation of the Amoeba File Server, and Erik van Doorn helped me with 
the mathematics of macro runs; the analysis in§ 5.4.1. is due to him. 
Paul Vitanyi and I did the work on locating ports together. Section 2.6 has 
been adapted from our paper in the 1985 PODC conference. Paul also gave 
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some valuable comments on the presentation of this thesis. 
It was fortunate that David Chaum was a guest at the Vrije Universiteit when 
I was working on the protection mechanisms of Chapters 2 and 3. The ideas 
presented there crystallised in many discussions we had on the subject. 
Evert Wattel combines great skill in the application of mathematical tools 
with an excellent understanding of practical problems in system design. 
Together, we found the Lighthouse Locate algorithm of§ 2.6 and we developed 
the mathematical models used in Chapter 5. 
I would like to thank Peter Weinberger for the work he did as my referent and 
for being my host in New Jersey when we discussed his comments on my thesis. 
Robbert van Renesse's contribution to the Amoeba project cannot be overes-
timated. Robbert implemented the transaction protocol and made it faster than 
any protocol we know. He redesigned and built the Amoeba Kernel which now 
has evolved beyond what is described in this thesis. He suggested many 
improvements to nearly every part of the Amoeba system. I am very grateful to 
him; the Amoeba project would not have been what it is without him. 
Andy Tanenbaum must have suffered terribly under my Ph.D. research. Dur-
ing the first years of my work I took any excuse to program rather than study 
and he often had to prise me loose from the terminal and drag me back to work. 
Fortunately for both of us, Andy gradually managed to teach me that doing 
research and writing papers is fun. He is an excellent writer himself, and, when I 
offered my papers to him for inspection, he would return them covered with 
corrections, suggestions for improvements, and general comments on writing 
style. I managed to maintain a personal touch, however, by using 'spell -b' * on 
my thesis. 
It was Andy Tanenbaum who put me on the trail of 'capability-based communica-
tum' and this has proved a very fruitful research topic. It is a little-investigated 
area, but a very promising one: It provides a protection mechanism that is sim-
ple, easy to understand and requires a Ininimum of protected mechanisms. 
Andy has been an excellent, though very demanding thesis advisor and I con-
sider myself fortunate to have worked under him. 
* Which was done by an American .. . 
1 
INTRODUCTION 
Sllistributed information processing has long been practised by living organisms. 
The human brain, one of the most complicated living organs, functions in a 
highly distributed manner; different parts of the brain have specialised in 
different functions, such as speech and sight. Yet there does not seem to be any 
central control in the brain, 'consciousness' cannot be pinpointed to one specific 
group of brain cells. However, although the human brain is the most sophisti-
cated parallel processor known, it is not the only living organism functioning 
under distributed control. Most life forms use distributed control of some form 
or another. Even simple life forms, such as the one-celled amoeba , which have no 
single 'command centre' to decide where to go and how to get there, are 
somehow capable of co-ordinated action. 
Imitating nature in all aspects, man has finally begun to incorporate the prin-
ciples of distributed information processing in his most complicated artifacts, 
computers. In their desire to construct better, faster and more reliable informa-
tion processing systems, researchers are building networks of many computers, 
co-operating to do their task more quickly and more reliably. The time is right 
for distributed systems research. The price of a powerful microprocessor chip 
will soon be a few dollars. Only a few years ago computers were used by a 
privileged few; today computers are invading our homes and offices to be used 
for a thousand and one different purposes. As computers become more popular, 
the need will grow to share the information and knowledge stored in them. It 
will become necessary to allow computers to exchange programs, documents, to 
exchange knowledge, in short, it has become necessary to connect computers in 
computer networks. 
The technology for connecting computers is available; many varieties of 
local-area networks are on the market, and most are fast and reliable. However, 
the infrastructure which is necessary to manage and control distributed informa-
tion has hardly been developed. The subject of this thesis is the design of such 
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an infrastructure, a model that allows people to understand distributed computer 
systems and describe their actions. 
Distributed computing is a new research area, one that introduces a whole 
range of new problems to be solved, problems of managing information sys-
tems without global and up-to-date information of their state, of finding ways 
to prevent inconsistencies in large bodies of data caused by unsynchronised 
simultaneous changes. Mechanisms for protecting information against unau-
thorised access must be found. The potential in distributed systems of much 
greater reliability must be used by designing services that can survive crashes 
of individual components of the system. For some of these problems, solutions 
had already been found in traditional, centralised operating systems; other 
problems did not even exist before the advent of distributed computing. Here 
these problems and others are examined, and some solutions are proposed. 
This thesis discusses the issues in the design of a distributed information pro-
cessing system. The realisation of distributed control in all parts of the system 
has been a key goal of the research; any centralised part would be a potential 
bottleneck when the system grows, and a liability in the face of crashes. It is 
because of the importance of distributed control that we have named the dis-
tributed operating system emerging from our research Amoeba, after that one-
celled creature using distributed control to move about. 
Distributed control plays a central role in 'avoiding single points of failure. ' 
Specialisation and control cannot be obtained through a simple hierarchical 
structure as exemplified by most armies. Again, the analogy with nature 
teaches us that extensive hierarchical systems can exist with a control structure 
that provides enough redundancy to survive 'simple' failures. 
The material presented here is organised as follows. The remainder of 
Chapter 1 provides the background for this research, and gives an overview of 
related work. Interprocess communication is discussed in Chapter 2. In 
Chapter 3, the service model is introduced. This model provides an infras-
tructure for accessing objects, and for protection and accounting. Chapter 4 is 
about the operating system kernel, present in each host. In Chapter 5 princi-
ples are discussed and an algorithm is developed for scheduling processes in a 
distributed environment. A distributed file server is discussed in Chapter 6, 
and a service to assist users with accounting is the subject of Chapter 7. 
1.1. Current Trends in Computer Systems 
A number of developments in computer science research and in society have 
caused distributed systems research to become increasingly important. In this 
section we shall go into some of these developments and discuss the potential 
advantages of distributed systems over traditional systems. 
1.1. CURRENT TRENDS IN COMPUTER SYSTEMS 3 
1. 1. 1. Developments in Hardware 
The main cause of the impact of computers on society in the past decade has 
been the dramatic drop in cost of computer hardware, combined with an enor-
mous increase in capacity. Today, simple home computers are more powerful 
than the largest computers of 30 years ago. Although most microcomputers do 
not have the capacity of larger mainframes, they are so cheap, compared to 
large computers, that for many applications it is cheaper to use a number of 
microcomputers than one mini or mainframe. Although the cost of electronic 
components will steadily continue to drop, it must be noted that computer sys-
tems are not solely built of chips: terminals, printers, magnetic storage units, etc. 
will remain relatively expensive. 
Traditionally, those devices that were connected to the computer were called 
peripherals, a once appropriate name, since the central computer was the all 
important machine, which was merely assisted by peripherals to obtain its input 
and produce its output. Although this view of computer systems is still firmly 
rooted in the minds of many computer centre managers, there are grounds to 
claim exactly the opposite nowadays. Peripherals are becoming far more expen-
sive than the computers that control them; this is demonstrated already in some 
distributed systems, where sometimes computers are dedicated to controlling a 
single peripheral, just to make it run more efficiently. 
For many peripherals (we shall continue to name them thus for want of a 
better term) there still is a strong effect of economy of scale: One big disk drive 
is cheaper than two small ones. Expensive peripherals, when used privately, are 
often under-used. This will induce users to want to share expensive peripherals, 
such as storage devices, laser printers, phototypesetters, graphic devices, etc. It 
is for this reason, that computer networks will ultimately make computer systems 
cheaper because many devices need not be replicated, but can be shared. 
Already these developments have caused local-area networks to become 
widespread in the last decade. Local networks make it possible to connect 
together large numbers of micros and minis and allow sharing of peripherals, 
and, above all, allow information to be shared between users of different com-
puters. 
An interesting consequence of the introduction of cheap computers has been a 
change in people's attitude towards operating systems. In the dim prehistoric 
days of computer science, operating systems as we know them today hardly 
existed; people used to sign up for an hour or so of computer time and had the 
whole machine to themselves during that period. Naturally, the computer spent 
most of its time waiting for the human programmer to feed it the necessary infor-
mation. Computers were expensive machines in those days, and had to be used 
as efficiently as possible. Consequently, the first batch operating systems were 
soon developed, making it possible to keep the computer much better occupied: 
printing the output of program number one could coincide with running pro-
gram number two, while program number three was already being read in. 
Operating systems grew more and more sophisticated; as computer memories 
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grew larger, and many programs did not need all the available memory to run, 
more and more operations were allowed to overlap so the CPU could be used to 
utmost advantage. 
When computers became somewhat cheaper, some computer capacity could 
be traded for more comfort to the programmer. Time sharing became increas-
ingly popular in the seventies. So popular, in fact, that few, if any, computer 
scientists today will put up with batch systems any more. Time-sharing operat-
ing systems, however, are amongst the most difficult programs to write, debug 
and maintain. It is especially hard to give a maximum number of people rea-
sonable service on a single computer. Vast amounts of money and effort have 
been spent on building time-sharing systems that support as many users as possi-
ble. 
Now, this is also changing. Computers have become so cheap that, in most 
cases, it is no longer worth the effort to get the last grain of performance out of a 
computer. Today, when the capacity of a computer system becomes a problem, 
one simply buys another one. Distributed systems research has already pro-
duced some of the technology that allows computer systems to co-operate and 
share files and devices. This development will continue to the point where all 
users have several CPUS at their disposal. We shall again be able to afford to let 
a single program sit all alone in a computer, doing nothing most of the time. 
The effort of multiprogramming, the risk of crashes of the operating system, of 
bugs causing security leaks, and, in some cases, the absence of hardware that 
supports time sharing, will make it far more attractive to install more computers. 
Right now, distributed systems development is usually confined to local-area 
networks, but a similar development is starting on a wider scale. Wide-area net-
works will allow sharing of information, software and special purpose hardware 
in a manner similar to local-area networks. Users can do most of their work on 
local machines, but occasionally gain access to, for instance, centralised number 
crunchers for solving special problems. At the moment virtually no support 
exists for efficiently exploiting the possibilities of wide-area networks. 
1.1.2. Office Automation 
The computer manufacturers have become increasingly interested in office auto-
mation. If their advertisements can be believed, an office is hardly worth being 
in if it is not equipped with personal work stations, word processors and what-
have-you. Although it is an exaggeration to say that no office should be without 
a secretarial workstation, it is probably fair to say that office automation will 
become an important branch of computer industry, and hence undoubtedly of 
some interest to computer science. 
A typical environment for office automation systems will be formed by a 
cable, running through the office building, with various workstations attached. 
Most workstations will consist of a cpu, a megabyte or so of memory, a keyboard 
and a high-resolution bit-map display. There will also be specialised machines: 
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file servers, printer servers, gateways to other networks, etc. 
In such an environment, it is not possible to rely on the individual operating 
systems in each of the workstations for protection: it is too easy to replace the 
operating system, or even the whole computer, by one without the proper pro-
tection mechanisms. This issue has been an important consideration in the 
design of the interprocess communication mechanisms of Chapter 2. 
The activities in the office environment described above will consist of docu-
ment preparation, electronic mail and various forms of filing activities. Informa-
tion sharing is an important aspect of office systems, so storage facilities must be 
provided that allow sharing of changing data. This requires data base tech-
niques for maintaining the integrity of concurrently accessed, changing informa-
tion. 
1.1.3. On Line Database Systems 
Data base systems form an increasingly important aspect of our computerised 
society. Apart from the social and political aspects of maintaining large data 
bases, there are many unsolved technical problems concerning reliability, 
integrity and accessibility of large data bases. 
Distributed data bases also become more important. Airlines, banks, and 
multinational companies are examples of companies that maintain distributed 
data bases. An airline reservation system can be used to illustrate the problem 
of maintaining a large distributed data base: it is possible to buy a seat on a 
KLM flight from New York to Amsterdam almost anywhere in the world. 
Mechanisms are needed to prevent simultaneously selling a seat to different peo-
ple in different parts of the world, because copies of the data base may not be 
properly synchronised. 
Distributed data base research has provided solutions to some of these prob-
lems, but has also raised many new ones. A distributed data base is potentially 
very reliable, because of the possibility to replicate the information on more than 
one site. Its accessibility can also be much higher than that of a centralised data 
base, because it is unlikely that all sites in a distributed system will be down 
simultaneously. But keeping all replicas of the data in a distributed system con-
sistent is a problem. Efficiently updating information in a shared, distributed 
data base is also a problem. Both these problems receive considerable attention 
in current distributed data base research. 
1.1.4. Specialisation 
As computers are being used for more purposes in different kinds of applications, 
more specialised systems are developed: Huge, super-fast, number crunchers are 
used for weather predictions and for solving the numerical problems of theoreti-
cal physicists and chemists; tiny microcomputers are built into point-of-sale ter-
minals to register what goods leave the shop so it can be quickly restocked; 
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specialised computers are being built to efficiently resolve data base queries; oth-
ers are being designed to do highly parallel searches in large storage systems; 
specialised computers control robots and other fanciful devices. 
In a distributed system, the advantages of specialised systems and general pur-
pose systems can be combined. By itself, a super computer can not be used very 
effectively: it is an inefficient tool for things like program development and edit-
ing. But when combined with a relatively inexpensive system for these things, a 
super computer can be used far more cost-effectively. Distributed systems can 
provide an infrastructure for using specialised hardware for speed, efficiency and 
simplicity in using specialised systems for specialised problems in a general pur-
pose environment. 
1.1.5. Reliability 
In centralised computer systems, a crash of the operating system, a power failure, 
or a hardware glitch in CPU or memory will bring the whole system down. Distri-
buted systems have the potential that a local failure does not affect the system as 
a whole. This possibility receives much attention in distributed systems research. 
Designers of distributed operating systems make an effort to design the pieces that 
make up the system to be crash resistant; that is, to confine the effect of crashes 
as much as possible. 
The components of a distributed system have to be made fault tolerant, that is, 
mechanisms must be built in to recover from the consequences of failures in 
hardware and software. Many different kinds of failure exist : transmitted packets 
may lose some bits due to noise on the cables, disk drives may stop working, 
rendering the information stored in them inaccessible for a period of time, user 
programs (or even whole operating systems) may crash, possibly leaving files, 
databases and other programs in some half-finished state. 
When designing distributed services, it is necessary to keep fault tolerance in 
mind at all times: databases must be updated in such a way that a crash halfway 
through an update does not have disastrous effects on its contents, interprocess 
communication must be arranged in such a way that garbled information is 
detected and retransmitted, when using distributed services, the possibility that a 
crash destroys the expected result must be taken into account. Much of this 
thesis is concerned with these problems. 
1.2. Issues in Distributed Computing 
Some of the potential advantages of distributed systems over conventional, cen-
tralised systems have already been mentioned in the previous section. The few 
years of distributed systems research have led to some general principles that 
designers of distributed systems should follow. Some of these principles are 
vague, and it is not always clear how they should be realised. This section goes 
into the important principles governing distributed systems design. 
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1.2.1. Fault Tolerance 
A potential advantage of a distributed system over a centralised system is that it 
can be made fault tolerant. Failure of a hardware component or a piece of 
software need not bring the system down; in many cases it need not even cause 
any processing to fail. Fault tolerant systems design is a fascinating area of com-
puter science which is only just starting to yield its first results. 
Fault tolerance in case of hardware failures can only be achieved by replicat-
ing hardware. Obviously, a single processor system cannot continue to operate if 
that single processor breaks down. In a multi processor environment, other pro-
cessors can take over when one of them breaks down. 
The same principle applies to data. If the only copy of an important file is 
lost-in a disk crash, for instance-it is lost for ever. If, however, files are repli-
cated, that is, the information is present at several different sites, a single disk 
crash need not cause any files to be lost. 
It must be clear that replication of data has consequences in terms of cost in 
storage and complexity of maintenance of multiple copy files. It is impossible to 
change two copies of a datum at exactly the same moment; there is a short time 
in which the copies of that datum differ, and other users could come to false 
conclusions by observing a datum during that short period of inconsistency. 
An even greater problem with distributed data (plain files, or whole data 
bases), is that failures may occur in the middle of an operation on some data. 
Recovery from such failures is often difficult, because it is hard to tell in retros-
pect just where the failure occurred, which data were affected and which were 
not. For some types of processing recovery is simple. Take, for instance, a com-
piler that crashes half way through a compilation. In nearly all cases, the com-
piler can just be run again, and the only consequence of the crash is some delay 
in producing results. Recovery is simple, because a compilation does not really 
create new information; it just transforms existing information (the program to 
be compiled) into another form (a binary, or a list of errors). In many other 
cases, however, this type of recovery is not possible. The problem of recovering 
from crashes stands out in programs that operate on files or data bases, because, 
in contrast to the compiler example, an update on a datum does add new infor-
mation to the system (and deletes old information). 
Distributed storage systems or data base systems designers usually aim to 
achieve three goals: 
• To the users, replication of data is transparent; that is, all copies of a repli-
cated datum appear to change at exactly the same moment. The user is only 
aware of an utterly reliable file store. 
• The crash recovery mechanisms in the storage system or data base system 
always restore the system to a consistent state after a crash. (This issue is dis-
cussed in detail in Chapter 6). 
• The additional cost of maintaining multiple copies of data and crash recovery 
mechanisms must be small during normal operation. Although crash recovery 
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mechanisms are an essential part of distributed storage systems, crashes are the 
exception rather than the rule, so crash recovery may be an expensive opera-
tion, provided the normal day-to-day operation is only slightly less efficient 
because of anticipation of pos.sible crashes. 
Fault tolerance recurs at every level of the design of a distributed system. 
Every level must cope with the errors and failures that may occur at that level, 
and with the failures that the next lower level cannot cope with by itself. It is 
usually impossible that each layer of a system can recover from each possible 
error in that layer, so every layer must be prepared to do some error recovery 
for lower layers. 
An aspect of distributed systems, closely related to fault tolerance, is that 
events cannot always be immediately observed everywhere in the system. When 
a computer crashes, it takes some time before this is noticed by the other com-
puters of the system. But also, when one server process creates a new file, the 
other servers are not aware of this at the same moment. 
In distributed systems, events are not observed immediately, not all events are 
always visible everywhere, and the order in which events are observed may be 
different in different locations. This can have serious effects on the view 
different processes have of the system, and can it can cause different results in 
different places or at different times that should have been the same. Dealing 
with this problem (often referred to as signal observability) is made easier in a 
fault tolerant environment: the effect of a decision made, based on failure to 
observe some event can often be limited or cancelled using error recovery tech-
niques. 
1.2.2. Availability 
Replication of hardware and software can lead to higher availability; given a 
fault tolerant design, crashed processes or processors need not lead to discon-
tinuation of any services. Although replication of services and data is essential to 
continuous availability in the face of hardware and software crashes, additional 
provisions have to be made in order to ensure uninterrupted service while parts 
of the service are down. 
Even when replicated hardware and software is available it is not trivial to 
provide continued service when parts can crash. No aspect of a service may be 
controlled by a single server, because a crash of that server would render that 
aspect unavailable. It is thus necessary that every resource, be it a physical or a 
virtual one, be controlled by at least two controllers. This principle is referred to 
as distributed control. 
Although it is not difficult to realise the necessity for distributed control, it is 
surprisingly hard to design and build services that use distributed control at all 
levels. Different forms of distributed control exist. At its simplest, distributed 
control can be realised by a form of centralised control, backed up by sleeping 
colleagues; the active controller periodically sends virtual sleeping pills to its 
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colleagues to keep them passive. When it crashes the supply of sleeping pills 
stops, and one of the sleeping controllers wakes up and starts sending sleeping 
pills to the others; after some time, it can be sure the others are safely asleep, 
and it can take over control. This form of distributed control only works if no 
state information is lost in a crash. Many other forms of distributed control 
exist, based on voting;0, 76 token passing;8 timestamps~4 locking;1 etc. 
To ensure the availability of a distributed system, it is usually not enough to 
provide replicated services; accessibility of the information is at least as impor-
tant as accessibility of the services that operate on it. When information is stored 
on just one host, or just one disk, it becomes inaccessible when that host, or that 
disk crashes. In the case of a serious disk crash (e.g., a head crash) the conse-
quences are even worse, the information on that disk is lost forever. 
The only safe way of storing information such that it is not lost when disks 
crash is to replicate the information and store it on different disks, preferably 
attached to different hosts as well. Although this increases the reliability of 
information storage, it does not automatically increase its availability: The algo-
rithms that update replicated information may well require that all copies of the 
information can be accessed simultaneously. Such algorithms, in the worst case, 
could decrease the availability of stored information, because the probability of a 
single host and a single disk drive being up is far greater than the probability 
that all of a number of hosts and disk drives are up. 
Algorithms for handling replicated information must be designed with great 
care. Replication serves two goals: increased reliability and increased availabil-
ity. It is easy to meet just one of these goals, the mechanisms needed to meet 
both are the subject of file system and data base research all over the world. 
What applies to information also applies to hardware: constant availability 
can only be guaranteed by replication. A reliable distributed system needs 
many processors, many disk drives, many terminals, printers, etc. However, the 
available hardware must also be controlled properly to be useful in offering 
better service to its users. A distributed system, made up of many personal com-
puters, or many private workstations, does not appear more accessible to some-
one whose workstation just stopped working: the system does not automatically 
provide a replacement. At the same time, when all works well, the performance 
of such a system is not better than that of a single personal computer or worksta-
tion. Both performance and availability (and also reliability) can be increased 
by pooling resources: all workstations and computers are thought of as being in 
a pool where they are allocated to whoever needs them. When one machine 
crashes, it means that there is just one machine less in the pool; service is 
affected only marginally. Another consequence of pooling resources this way is 
that it lends itself better to the bursty nature of computing: Most users tend to 
need little computing power most of the time, and a lot of it occasionally. 
Dynamic allocation from a pool is efficient for such an environment. Although 
processors were taken as an example of the possibility to pool resources, the same 
advantages hold for printers, disk space, tape drives, and many services. 
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1.2.3. Modularity 
The need for structured design of large software systems cannot be stressed 
enough; 11 in distributed systems design this principle is even more important. 
The interactions between parts of a distributed systems are far less predictable 
than in centralised systems. Parallel processing in distributed systems may cause 
the deterministic behaviour of some processes to be lost. Debugging a distri-
buted application is much more difficult than debugging a centralised one. Dis-
tributed systems must be designed with even more thought to structure and 
modularity than conventional centralised systems. 
Modular design has many advantages; it leads to better understanding of how 
the system works; hardware dependencies can be collected in few places only; 
failures are more easily understood, so recovery is simpler; modules that do one 
thing only can be re-used in other applications; software becomes easier to test 
and debug; the system becomes more flexible and it is easier to change algo-
rithms, or adapt modules to changed circumstances. 
As an example of how a modular design can lead to a system that is easier to 
understand, and simpler to modify and adapt to other environments or applica-
tions, consider a data base system, using a layered structure:" The system con-
sists of four layers or modules: disk service, distributed storage service, data base 
service, and an application process that uses the system. The principle of modu-
lar design has made it possible to separate the issues of replicated storage, con-
currency control, query processing and the application itself. Replicated storage 
is handled transparently by the disk servers, allowing designers of other modules 
to forget about the problems of simultaneously updating two copies of a disk 
block. Concurrency control is handled by the storage servers, so the designers of 
the data base system can concentrate on the representation of the information, 
on query processing, and on data base problems in general, without having to 
concern themselves with thinking about what may go wrong when two updates 
occur simultaneously. data base management is done by the data base service, 
so an application programmer need not think about how the information is 
represented; the application programmer can use the commands provided by the 
data base system, without having to know how these commands are imple-
mented. 
In spite of perfect modular design, the separation of functionality can never be 
totally transparent. It is not always possible for each module to recover from 
every error or failure; some failures must be reported to higher layers to be dealt 
with at another level. As an example, consider concurrency control: the file 
server normally resolves threatening concurrency conflicts, but it cannot recover 
from every conflict without knowledge of the meaning of the update. However, 
the effect of a failure can be minimised and tools can be provided to higher 
layers in the system for efficient and simple recovery from failures. 
• The File Service, described in Chapter 6 provides such layering. 
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A central issue in the research presented in this thesis is the design of an 
infrastructure, the design of tools that facilitate and encourage modular design of 
distributed systems. The paradigms used to describe the interactions between 
modules are the client, service and object. A service is a module that provides a 
set of commands and responses to a client process for accessing and operating on 
objects. The service model can be compared to remote procedure callsr:8 and to 
abstract data rypes'!° but it is not quite the same. The service model is described in 
detail in Chapter 3. 
1.3. Current Research in Distributed Operating Systems 
The volume of research on distributed systems indicates it is a popular subject. 
A large amount of this research concentrates around various aspects of distri-
buted office systems and general purpose distributed systems, the area of this 
thesis. 
The following sections will discuss work currently in progress in this area at 
research sites around the world. 
1.3.1. Infrastructure 
It is vital for the users of an operating system that they perceive an easy-to-
understand interface to the system. The system must be built out of modules, 
each with a simple and straightforward task, that can be logically fitted together. 
There is a trend towards open systems, systems with an operating system kernel 
that is kept as small as possible, most services being provided by user programs. 
Among of the first advocates of such systems were B. W. Lampson and 
R. F. Sproull, who made a plea for open systems in [36]. Open systems have 
many advantages over closed systems; an open system has a smaller kernel, so 
the kernel is often faster, can be debugged more easily, and becomes more port-
able. Most services, traditionally in the operating system, are now provided by 
(privileged) user programs. This makes these services more accessible to mainte-
nance and makes it easier to install new versions, test variants while the system is 
running, and it allows several competing services to co-exist side by side. 
Distributed Systems often use the service model in one form or another. This 
model exists in variations: object modeP,9 abstract data rypes'!° or remote procedure cal/!!8 
The underlying principle is that each object is managed by a server . Client 
processes can only access an object by making a request for an operation on the 
object to its server. The server carries out the request and returns a reply . This 
model is related to abstract data types, because the server defines a set of com-
mands and responses on its objects, much like an abstract data type defines a set 
of operations on data types. It is related to the remote procedure call mechan-
ism, because clients send requests and await replies similar to the remote call 
and return in the remote procedure call mechanism. 
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One infrastructure for supporting this model has been discussed in [79], where 
R. W. Watson and J. G. Fletcher distinguish a four layer hierarchy. At the bot-
tom layer an Interprocess Communication facility is provided. On top of that is 
a Service Support Layer which deals with protection, naming, authentication, 
error control, synchronisation, etc., issues that recur in most services. On top of 
the Service Support Layer is the Service Layer, with system-provided services, 
such as file service, process service, clock service, data base services, etc. The 
highest layer is the Customer Layer; at this layer client processes execute and 
make use of the services provided by lower layers. 
A layered design encourages a modular structure and makes the system more 
understandable. The work presented in this thesis follows Watson and Fletcher's 
hierarchy, although, some aspects (e.g., protection) have been moved to other lev-
els. 
The primitives Amoeba provides to the programmer for exchanging requests 
and replies loosely resemble those of Thoth8 and v? Where Thoth uses .send , 
.receive and .reply, Amoeba has trans, getreq and putrep . Here the resemblance 
stops, the mechanism for addressing services and objects, and the associated pro-
tection mechanism used by Amoeba is radically different. 
1.3.2. Protection 
Most distributed systems provide protection mechanisms to prevent unauthorised 
access to objects and resources. Conceptually, there is a matrix with a row for 
each object and a column for each user. At the intersection of an object's row 
and a user's column the nghts can be found that the user has on the object. 
Each operation on an object is protected by right. A user who has that right 
may carry out the operation; a user who does not have the right is not allowed 
to carry out the operation. 
In a real system this matrix is never represented as such; it is always cut up. It 
can be cut up in several ways. Some operating systems store the matrix row by 
row. Attached to each object would be the row of the matrix, corresponding to 
that object. When a user wished to access an object, the operating system would 
check the user's permission to carry out the requested operation before allowing 
the access. A row of the matrix is called an access control list. Access control 
lists take up much space, but they can be condensed at the cost of some general-
ity: the UNrx* operating system for instance, uses three rights to indicate the 
allowed operations by the owner of an object, users in the owner's group and oth-
ers , requiring nine bits for the access control list. Many other systems use similar 
protection structures. 
The other method is to split up the matrix the other way; that is, the matrix is 
split up in columns, one per user. With this method, the operating system main-
tains a per-user list of objects and rights on the objects, called a capability list.15 
• UNIX is a Trademark of AT&T Bell Laboratories. 
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A capability for an object can be compared to a ticket for a concert: just like a 
ticket gives the holder the right to attend the concert, a capability gives the 
holder the right to carry out the indicated operations on the object. 
Distributed operating systems are more often capability systems than central-
ised systems~1, 78, 53,67 although it is not clear whether this is because they are dis-
tributed systems. 
Usually, capabilities are managed by the operating system to prevent forgery. 
If user processes could store capabilities themselves, it would be easy to modify 
them to include more rights, or to construct new capabilities for objects that the 
user has no right to access. However, it is possible to allow users to manage 
their own capabilities. This requires mechanisms to prevent users from forging 
their own capabilities, such as the mechanism discussed in [ 19]. This method 
uses public key encryption to protect capabilities. In Chapter 3 we shall propose 
another method for protecting capabilities in user space which does not require 
(expensive) public key encryption. 
Protection mechanisms need authentication mechanisms, both when access 
control lists are used and when capabilities are used. In the former case authen-
tication mechanisms are needed for the server, to determine the identity of users 
making requests, in order to find out from the access control lists whether access 
may be granted. In the latter case, authentication mechanisms are necessary for 
the user who does not like to see a capability passed to a server fall in the hands 
of an imposter. 
In most operating systems, the operating system is responsible for providing 
authenticating information: all communication has to pass through the operating 
system kernel which checks permissions and provides authenticating information 
to the communicating peer process. Depending on the communication service, 
provided by the operating system, authenticating information is provided on a 
per-message basis or on opening a virtual circuit. 
1.3.3. The Operating System Kernel 
Most distributed systems have a copy of the distributed system kernel control 
each host. The kernel provides an environment for running processes and imple-
ments the interprocess communication and protection mechanisms. These ker-
nels are usually based on the same design principles as traditional, centralised 
operating system kernels: they provide an execution environment for processes, 
and allow interprocess communication by means of system calls. 
It is not clear whether this type of process environment is suitable for a distri-
buted system. The traditional 'system call model' has some properties that may 
hinder the development of server programs. One problem with the traditional 
process environment is that system calls block. When a process makes a read 
system call, for example, the process blocks until the data is available. Blocking 
is not at all suitable for a server process that handles requests for many clients 
simultaneously. Such a process needs mechanisms that allow it to handle many 
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requests simultaneously. 
A problem of traditional process environments when implementing services is 
that it is not possible to express the multi programmed nature of most services in 
such an environment. Most service processes will handle requests from many 
users simultaneously in an event-driven manner: When the server comes up, it 
waits for its first request. When this comes in, the request is processed to the 
point the server must wait for ii o, or for the reply from a sub-server. The server 
is then free to handle new requests from other users. Eventually, an event will 
signal completion of whatever kept the server waiting on the first request, and 
the server can do some more processing. 
This scenario requires a complicated administration of requests being pro-
cessed, their state, and the pending event. Traditional operating systems provide 
no help in programming such servers; the only choice to be made is to design 
the server as a single-thread program which handles only one request at a time, 
or to design it as a complicated event-driven finite-state machine. 
In Thoth~ teams of processes can be formed, sharing an address space, to 
structure servers that can handle n requests simultaneously as n processes in a 
team. This eliminates the complication of handling many requests simultane-
ously in one process, without the inefficiency of many processes that cannot share 
caches, buffers, etc. The clusters of Chapter 4 are similar to teams, and provide 
a tool for the design of server programs. 
1.3.4. Process Management 
Apart from creating a process environment, a distributed system must also see 
to it that processes are actually run. When using services to model the 
interactions of processes, it seems natural to conceive a 'process service' that 
carries out requests to create and manipulate processes. Few distributed sys-
tems have implemented process service this way, but have implemented pro-
cess management as an operating system function. From a historical 
viewpoint, this can be readily understood: the operating system is responsible 
for providing an execution environment for processes, so it must also be 
responsible for creating and running processes. Process management has many 
aspects, however, and it is not at all natural that every one of these aspects 
must be carried out by the operating system. The operating system should 
provide the mechanisms that allow process execution, but should not contain 
the policy decisions where processes should execute, or how different classes of 
processes should be scheduled. 
Using the same operating system kernel, it should, for instance, be possible 
to implement both the 'Personal Computer Model,' (as exemplified by Xerox 
PARc36), and the 'Processor Bank Model,' (as used, for example, in the Cam-
bridge System50). In the first model, every user has a personal computer that 
can be scheduled as the user sees fit; processes running in these personal com-
puters can communicate with each other and make use of the services 
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provided by the system. In the second model, all processors are pooled, and 
whenever a process is created (or a user logs in, as in the Cambridge system), 
a processor is allocated from the pool for a shorter or longer period. This 
requires a Process Service in the same vein as the Cambridge System's 
Resource Manager; the Process Service is outlined in Chapter 4. 
Process scheduling is another important aspect of process management. 
There is extensive literature about scheduling, but, surprisingly, nearly all 
literature deals with the problems of deterministic scheduling ~6 In deterministic 
process scheduling, it is assumed that the execution times of the processes to 
be scheduled is known in advance. In a general purpose operating system 
this is virtually never the case. Still, the problem of undeterministic scheduling 
has received little attention in the literature, not to mention undeterministic 
scheduling in a distributed system. Scheduling is an important subject and 
still needs much research. Chapter 5 is a start in this direction. 
1.3.5. Distributed File Systems 
The open systems model has encouraged research in distributed file systems; it 
is much easier to design, implement and test a stand-alone file system, than 
one embedded in the operating system. Many file servers have emerged, 
ranging from simple ones, based on one server process and without con-
currency control mechanisms, to very sophisticated ones, with many server 
processes which synchronise concurrent access to files to ensure the integrity of 
the file system. 
Distributed file servers, implementing a concurrency control policy, are, of 
course, most interesting from a research viewpoint. Among these, it appears, 
locking21 is the most widely used concurrency control mechanism? 1, 18, 24 The 
SWALLOW file server55 is one of the few exceptions; it uses timestamps for con-
currency control. Recently, however, optimistic concurrency contro/33 has become a 
popular concurrency control mechanism in data base systems. Although 
optimistic concurrency control has attractive properties for a file server, it had 
not yet been used as the synchronisation mechanism in a distributed file sys-
tem until the work reported in this thesis. 
Few, if any, applications can live without the services of a file system. Dis-
tributed file systems must therefore be designed to be highly reliable and 
crash-resistant. Techniques for replicated storage of data are often used to 
guarantee access to files, even in the face of single-site crashes?7, 45 Manage-
ment of replicated files is a difficult problem, which has been addressed by 
researchers in data base systems~0, 76, 77 
It is unfortunate that these problems have been addressed almost exclusively 
from the viewpoint of data base research. This has led to the development of 
large data base systems that comprise solutions for replicated data manage-
ment, distributed concurrency control, and information management. A much 
clearer view of the problems and their solutions could be obtained if the issues 
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of data base management, the issues of concurrency control, and the issues of 
replication management could be addressed separately. Although this will not 
necessarily lead to a system that is more efficient, it will almost certainly yield 
a system that is more flexible: A distributed file server with concurrency con-
trol is not suitable just for data base applications. It can be useful in a 
source code control system~ or in a text-processing environment. 
Existing file servers have proven to be unsuitable as a basis for data base 
systems?0, 73 When designing a file server, it is therefore necessary to investigate 
the possibilities to separate a database system into a data base layer, which 
contains the management of information , and a file server layer, which manages 
reliable storage of the data needed by the data base layer. Results of this 
research can be found in Chapter 6. 
1.4. Principles of Distributed Operating System Design 
Surveying current research in general purpose distributed operating systems, 
we see some general principles and trends emerging. Principles incorporated 
in nearly every distributed system (in contrast to centralised systems) are to 
allow and encourage parallel processing, to accomplish a large degree of crash 
resistance and provide mechanisms for crash recovery. In realising these prirr-
ciples some general trends can be observed. Most distributed systems rely on 
the service model in one form or another; capability-based systems are becom-
ing more popular; many distributed systems are open systems, that is, services 
are provided by processes running outside the operating system kernel; most 
distributed operating systems provide file service with some form of con-
currency control and have a mechanism for atomic update. These trends 
have emerged through experience with various mechanisms as solid mechan-
isms for reliable fail-safe distributed operating systems. There is no reason not 
to use the service model, or protection with capabilities, or an open architec-
ture. 
However, this by no means implies that these issues form a closed research 
issue. Although mechanisms exist that implement capability based protection, 
file servers exist that use atomic update and provide concurrency control , 
protocols exist for client-server communication, etc., these systems are not per-
fect, and can still be much improved. In the following sections the back-
ground is given for carrying out just this research. 
1.4.1. Protection 
Many existing distributed operating systems rely on a distributed operating sys-
tem kernel for protection. Usually, the kernel manages capabilities81• 78 for user 
processes, to prevent them from being forged. In nearly all distributed systems, 
the kernel handles authenticating information for user processes. 
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Reliance on the operating system kernel for protection has some serious disad-
vantages, however. In an environment with heterogeneous hosts, the operating 
system kernels must all be slightly different, since they all run on different 
hardware; the operating system interfaces may not be exactly the same. Yet, the 
kernels must all provide secure protection mechanisms. If the protection 
mechanisms of just one host can be circumvented, the security of the whole sys-
tem is jeopardised. 
Another, even greater, threat to security in a system that uses the kernel for 
protection, is posed by the impossibility to supervise all the hosts on the network. 
Distributed systems often consist of a cable snaking through an office buiding, 
with a socket in each room into which various hosts can be plugged. It is all too 
easy to take out the official 'approved' operating system and insert a special 
'intruder' system that circumvents the built-in protection mechanisms. Usually 
it means replacing the operating system disk or floppy, sometimes it means 
replacing the operating system PROM or EPROM, or, in the simplest case, it means 
just booting another operating system binary. 
Protection mechanisms that do not rely on the security of an operating system 
kernel have only been investigated as exercises in cryptography!9 but have 
hardly been studied for the purpose of developing a practical protection 
mechanism in distributed operating systems. Chapters 2 and 3 are largely 
devoted to this problem. 
1.4.2. Process Environment 
In an open distributed system, the mechanisms for process interaction form an 
important aspect, because the amount of process interaction is much greater in 
an open system; file access requires communication with the file server process, 
terminal access requires communication with the terminal server, etc. 
Processes, especially service processes, have different environmental require-
ments from processes in a centralised system: In a traditional system, processes 
make requests to the operating system via 'system calls,' comparable to subrou-
tine calls to functions in the operating system kernel. The process blocks until 
the system call has completed. While this is perfectly satisfactory in centralised 
applications, and also for many distributed applications, it is a nuisance in many 
other distributed applications: If server processes would block on disk requests, 
they could not process any requests for other users during the time the disk is 
busy, nor could they have multiple outstanding disk requests, allowing the disk 
server to use an elevator algorithm to reduce disk arm movement. 
A server process usually has to handle requests from many clients simultane-
ously. In a conventional programming environment, this requires an 'event 
driven' programming style: when an event occurs; the program looks up the 
associated client request and acts depending on the state of the request and the 
nature of the event. 
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The process environment, offered by a distributed operating system, must take 
these problems into account, and provide appropriate mechanisms to facilitate 
the construction of server processes. Most distributed systems to date have 
ignored this problem, yet we believe it is an important one. Chapter 4 describes 
an execution environment for processes functioning in a distributed system that is 
more versatile than traditional process environments. It allows both the tradi-
tional style of programming with a single thread of execution, and a new, distri-
buted style of programming, with many execution threads. 
Process management is also a poorly investigated area of distributed systems 
research. Often, each of the constituent operating system kernels making up a 
distributed system does its own process management; the distributed system is 
just a collection of operating systems whose processes co-operate. However, there 
are also distributed systems where process management is viewed as a distributed 
service. The available processors are pooled, and allocated to deserving 
processes. The Cambridge Model Distributed System50 uses a processor pool, 
managed by the Resource Manager. Conceivably, processes can be Inigrated to 
other processors, for instance, to bring relief to a heavily loaded processor, or to 
bring a process closer to the resources it uses. Mechanisms for process Inigration 
have hardly been studied at all. These mechanisms are studied in Chapter 4, 
while scheduling algorithms for an environment where processes are allowed to 
Inigrate form the subject of Chapter 5. 
1.4.3. Distributed File Service 
Fault tolerance is one of the foremost goals of distributed systems design, so it is 
not surprising that research in distributed file systems has been a popular topic : 
magnetic storage devices usually survive crashes, so it is vital that their contents 
can be brought back to a consistent state after a crash. Another reason for asso-
ciating fault tolerance with file system design is that most processing is on files ; 
files are usually the source and sink of information processing. If the information 
on files can be kept consistent in the face of crashes, crash recovery becomes 
much simpler. 
Among all the research being carried out in the area of distributed file sys-
tems, there are still some arid regions in the field, as indicated by two recent 
publications?3• 70 It comes as a surprising realisation that file service as provided 
by many operating systems is too sophisticated. What causes file servers to be 
unusable for some applications is that they give too much service; especially 
database systems suffer from this problem. 
A sumining-up of the problems encountered in many file systems that render 
them unpractical for many applications is given in Chapter 6; a more elaborate 
sumining up can be found in [73]. The Amoeba File Service was 
designed as a distributed file server that does not have these problems. Yet it does 
provide much of the functionality that other file servers offer, albeit in a slightly 
different form. 
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The file server, which is discussed in Chapter 6, uses optimistic concurren0' control, 
a form of concurrency control that had previously only been used in database 
systems. Its version mechanism makes it suitable for a Source Code Control Sys-
tem60 and it can be used on write-once media, such as the optical disk . 
1.4.4. Accounting and Resource Control 
Accounting has never been a popular research area. Perhaps, researchers are 
interested primarily in consuming resources and do not like being confronted 
with the bill. Most operating systems in use today provide some, often primitive, 
accounting and billing mechanisms. These do the accounting of what may be 
termed 'system resources,' such as CPU seconds, memory consumption, or disk 
space. The times are changing, however: Resources that were once expensive, 
such as processor time and memory consumption are now cheap, and resources 
that were never thought of as resources, such as compilers, text processing sys-
tems, etc.- resources that were considered extras that the computer centre's 
management provided to make computer use more attractive-are now the most 
expensive parts of the system. The cost of hardware has dropped at a steady 
rate in the past decades, due to better manufacturing processes, larger quantities 
and advances in VLSI technology. The cost of software has gone up, partly 
because of increased programmer wages, but mostly because of the increased 
complexity and size of most software systems used nowadays. 
In traditional closed systems, all resources were provided by the 'computer 
centre,' so accounting was simply done by the computer centre, tailored to the 
computer centre's needs. In an open system, the computer centre is no longer 
the primary service provider; all users may start offering services to the rest of 
the user population. 
These developments require a fresh look on accounting and resource control 
mechanisms. Accounting mechanisms are needed that allow each user that 
offers a service to have accounting done on the use of that service. Different 
users will want different accounting policies, so the accounting mechanisms must 
be general enough to allow these different policies to be realised. 
Very little research has been done in this area, so the work presented in 
Chapter 7 is original. Only the work being done on the 0sis57 project is 
remotely related: it is an attempt to form an open market for offering and con-
suming services in a wide area network. In Osis bank services are available to 
arrange for payment of service consumption, much like the bank service of 
Chapter 7. However, the philosophy of authentication mechanisms underlying 
Osis is quite different from those in a distributed operating system. 
2 
INTERPROCESS COMMUNICATION 
'.t.he Interprocess Communication Mechanism is a cornerstone of every distri-
buted system and the design of such a mechanism has indeed been a key issue in 
our .research. This has resulted in a capability-based, message-passing service. 
Capabilities are not just used as a protection mechanism between communicat-
ing processes, but find a much wider use to protect all objects, processes and ser-
vices in the system. 
This is an important concept: Objects and services can only be accessed 
through the interprocess communication mechanism, and the interprocess com-
munication mechanism allows communication only with objects or services 
whose names are known. Names are capabilities in Amoeba. An ordinary pro-
cess, computing-say-prime numbers, can never be bothered with messages 
from a nasty neighbour process, unless it makes the name of its port public 
somehow. Other users can never access someone else's private files, unless the 
owner gives away the capabilities for them. 
Putting the protection mechanism in the interprocess communication mechan-
ism in the network has made it possible to allow any processor, with or without 
protection, with or without an operating system, under control of the network 
manager or of a malicious user, to be connected to Amoeba without posing a 
threat for the security of the system. This enables us to connect to Amoeba mul-
tiprogrammed minicomputers or mainframes with a secure operating system on 
the one hand, and cheap micros without memory management, protection 
hardware or a secure operating system on the other. An operating system can 
be simplified significantly because of the lesser demands made on it for protec-
tion and security; breaking the system's security becomes much harder because 
the protection mechanism is beyond the user's reach. 
The interprocess communication mechanism is implemented as a hierarchy of 
layers, each layer augmenting the layers below it. The lowest layer, the physical 
layer, can be csMA/ co, a ring, a mesh net, or almost any kind of other network. 
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On top of this layer is the Port Layer, which provides a simple datagram ser-
vice, with an addressing scheme based on ports. This layer provides the system 
with its protection mechanism. Reliability comes in the Transaction Layer, the 
layer above the Port Layer. The Transaction Layer uses the unreliable (but 
secure) datagram facility of the Port Layer to offer reliable transactions. A 
transaction consists of a request from a client process to a server process, fol-
lowed by a reply from the server to the client. User programs interface to the 
Transaction Layer. For emulation of existing operating systems, or further 
simplification of the user interface, an Emulation Layer can be put on top of the 
Transaction Layer. 
This chapter describes the Port Layer in detail. The Transaction Layer is dis-
cussed in Chapter 3. 
2.1. Naming, Addressing and Routing 
The choice of a naming mechanism in a distributed system is an important one. 
Processes access services and objects through the network, and it is the naming 
mechanism that must see to it that messages addressed to a service, or to an 
object within a service, are delivered to the correct process. 
A mapping is required to map the names of services and objects onto the 
names of service processes, and eventually onto an address of the service process. 
This mapping process is an essential aspect of any naming mechanism, and a 
key issue in the design of a naming mechanism is at what level this mapping 
must be done, where in the network it should be done, whether the mapping has 
to be done in several stages, and how protection of names can be ensured. 
Names form a hierarchy identifying objects at different levels of the system, so 
it is possible that an object is referred to by different names at different levels of 
the system. The network designer's task is to choose simple, convenient and 
efficient names at each level, and, if possible, to reduce the number of levels to a 
practical minimum. At one end of the spectrum, the name of an object could be 
composed of the name of the processor where the object resides, the name of the 
process that manages the object, and a number used by the process to refer to 
the object. At the other end of the spectrum, the name of an object could be a 
character string, chosen by the owner, and interpreted in the owner's environ-
ment. The first example shows a name that can be conveniently used by an 
interprocess communication mechanism. The mapping function is trivial and 
delivery is easy. This scheme, however, has the disadvantage that such an object 
name is inconvenient for human users and that the name of the object changes 
as the object moves around the network, or as the manager process changes. 
The second example shows just the opposite; the name is convenient for human 
users: it can be independent of what service process currently maintains the 
object, and of the location of the object. However, mnemonic names can be 
inconvenient in several ways. Different users will choose the same name for their 
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objects (e.g., 'file' for a file) and mechanisms have to be found to detect name 
clashes, or to give each user a different name space. Furthermore, a mnemonic 
name reveals nothing about the object's location, so mechanisms are also needed 
to find where an object is located when its name is presented. 
In order to understand the issues, associated with naming, it is important to 
see the relation between a name , an address, and a route. A name indicates what 
one seeks, an addres.s where it is, and a route how to get there?•65 The name of a 
service or an object must be mapped onto a network addres.s, and the addres.s 
must then be mapped onto a route. In the most general case these mappings 
are separate mappings. When objects and services move through the network, 
their addresses change; the mapping of a name onto an addres.s has to be 
adapted, but the mapping of addresses onto routes does not change. But when 
the topology of the network changes, or congestion occurs, the mapping of 
addresses onto routes may change, while the mapping of names onto addresses 
remains unchanged. 
The choice of the levels of naming is an important one, and determines the 
usability and efficiency of a distributed system. In most distributed systems there 
is a hierarchy of naming levels. At the highest level we usually find location-
independent, but user-dependent mnemonic names, convenient for human 
beings. At the lowest level we find location dependent, time dependent, machine 
dependent names, often totally unusable for humans. In between, a wide variety 
of naming methods exists. 
It was a starting-point in the design of our naming scheme that there be one 
name space for all objects, services and processes, combined with a straightfor-
ward mechanism for mapping these names onto machine addresses. Techniques 
for mapping machine addresses onto routes are well knownf1, 42 and naturally 
they differ wildly for different network types. If possible, the mapping onto 
machine addresses and routes should be transparent to user processes, but 
without requiring an operating system in each host. Finally the algorithms that 
perform the mapping of names onto addresses must be distributed, avoiding the 
need for global knowledge in order to do the mapping. 
2.1.1. Approaches to Naming and Addressing 
A number of naming schemes are in use in existing distributed systems; some are 
suitable for the needs of systems such as Amoeba, others are not. The most 
important level of naming is formed by the names provided at the interface 
between the system and the user programs; let us call these system names, for 
want of a better expres.sion. Every user proces.s must eventually map its internal 
names onto system names, and the system and network must map them onto 
host addresses and routes. A good choice is important for system naming; both 
the system and the users are affected by this choice, and changing over to 
another naming scheme is hardly feasible. User supplied subroutines, programs, 
or services can be used to convert more convenient or suitable higher level 
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names onto system names, and vice versa. 
We shall present four system naming mechanisms, as an illustration of the 
spectrum of possibilities. They are: 
I. A system name consists ef a host name plus an object name on that host. This rather 
primitive way of naming objects does not allow objects to move through the 
network without changing their name, but greatly simplifies the mapping of 
object names onto host addresses. An example of such a naming mechanism 
can be found in the distributed file system of the RsEXEc?5 which was 
developed more than a decade ago for the TENEX hosts on the ARPAnet. 
2. A system name is a globally unique name ef a process. This naming scheme is 
already much better. User processes may augment system names with port 
names, which can be interpreted by server processes as object names. The 
problem with this method is that a service or an object usually lives much 
longer than a process. On top of process naming, a level of naming is needed 
where service names are mapped onto process names. This solution usually 
leads to a (centralised) name server, which needs a well-known, never chang-
ing process name, since changing the name server's name means that its 
clients are no longer able to address it. If the name server crashes, a new one 
must be created with the same process name; the operating system, which 
gives out process names, must see to this; it has to deal with the name server 
as a special case. 
An example of a system that uses process naming is the National Software 
Works~ Another example is the DCS~3 which is of special interest to us, 
because it uses a mechanism for locating 'ports' that is rather similar to the 
one described in § 2.5.1. 
3. A name is a port that can be allocated to processes by the Operating System. There are 
several examples of distributed operating systems based on this principle. In 
this model, ports can live much longer than processes. Ports can be associated 
with services, and the server processes form the receiving end of such ports. 
When a process crashes, another process can take its place, using the same set 
of ports. Processes wishing to connect to a service, connect to the associated 
port, and transmit requests to whichever service process listens at the other 
end of the port. The name of the service is the name of the port. 
There are several examples of distributed operating systems using this 
model for interprocess communication, as for instance, Trix ?8 which uses 
named streams as interprocess communication primitive. A stream has an 
owner (the service process) and one or more holders (the clients). Holders and 
owners may pass their ends of a stream to other processes. There can be only 
one owner of a stream. A similar mechanism is present in the links of the 
Roscoe distributed operating system~7 the streams of Accent53 and the ports , 
described by Akkoyunlu et al~ 
4. A name is a port, created and managed by user processes. In this model, the processes 
of the system can generate their own ports, with whatever name they care to 
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choose. When a process decides to offer a service to the other network users, 
it generates a port for that service, publishes the port's name for potential 
clients of the service, and starts listening to that port. Clients then send mes-
sages to the service port, which will be received by the server process. When 
a server process crashes, or the work becomes too much for one server process, 
a new server is started, which listens to the same service port. The operating 
system (if there is one) need not do a thing. The network sees to it that mes-
sages sent to a port are delivered to a process listening on that port. 
Long-lived services are easily implemented using this message passing 
scheme. Even if the service outlives all its servers, the name of the service can 
remain unchanged. Processes, wishing to communicate once for a short 
period of time use the same mechanism: a unique port is generated and used 
for the duration of the conversation. When the conversation is finished, the 
port can be forgotten. 
So far, so good, but this communication mechanism must be secure if it is 
to be used in a distributed operating system. What, for instance, is there to 
prevent a client process, which can transmit requests to the server's port, to 
start receiving messages on that port, thus intercepting requests from other 
clients? And how can we guarantee that no two processes accidently choose 
the same port name for their conversations? In the following sections we shall 
discuss a mechanism that achieves these ends and describe how it can be 
implemented efficiently. 
2.2. Protection and Reliability 
A good interprocess communication mechanism must provide both reliable and 
secure message transport. Reliability and security are, however, achieved in two 
different layers of the interprocess communication protocols. In most distributed 
systems, reliable communication is implemented at the lowest layers of the inter-
process communication mechanisms. Protection is usually found at a higher 
level in the hierarchy. 
We have turned the usual layering upside down. Protection is implemented 
in the bottom layers of the network protocols, and reliability (through ack-
nowledgements, timeouts and retransmissions) comes in a higher layer of the 
communication hierarchy. We have done this for serious reasons, into which we 
shall now go. 
It is far easier to build a secure network than a secure operating system. 
Experience teaches that only very few operating systems are free of bugs which 
allow an intruder to steal secret information from it. The communication subnet 
can be made secure much easier, because it can be better isolated from the rest 
of the system: only a narrow interface exists between processes and the network. 
Operating systems have many explicit interfaces (such as system calls) and 
implicit interfaces (program faults, memory management, i/ o buffers) with user 
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processes, giving many points where the security of the operating system could 
be penetrated?4 The protection mechanism is far safer where the user cannot get 
at it. 
Another argument for removing the protection mechanism from the operating 
system is that some (micro)computers do not have the hardware necessary to 
build a secure operating system. When no memory management is present 
allowing certain areas of memory to be protected, it becomes very difficult, if not 
impossible, to build a secure operating system. 
A last point for moving protection out of the operating system into the net-
work, is that it is far easier to tamper with the hosts of a network, than with the 
network itself. Imagine an office building, with a microcomputer in each office, 
and possibly some centralised facilities, which can be used by the micros. An 
intruder-late at night, for instance-can stop one of the micros, insert a spe-
cially prepared operating system disk and steal all kinds of secret information. 
The point here is that it is almost impossible for a network authority to ensure 
that the correct operating system is run all the time when the hosts are not all 
under his direct supervision. A network can be much better physically pro-
tected, for instance, by keeping the network nodes in secure places, or-as an 
extreme resort-by making the network interfaces give off an alarm when they 
are tampered with. 
It is for these reasons that the Port Layer, the layer that provides protection 
mechanisms is under, or-if necessary-in the operating system, and the Tran-
saction Layer, the layer responsible for reliable transactions rests on top of the 
Port Layer, in the operating system, or even in user space. 
2.2.1. Protection Policies and Mechanisms 
The protection mechanisms must be chosen to make a wide choice of protection 
policies possible. Separation of mechanism and policy has been advocated by 
Brinch-Hansen? and we believe it is good idea. It allows policies to be changed, 
without changing the mechanisms embedded in lower layers of the system. We 
shall look at some of the policies that we think should be made possible by the 
protection mechanisms. 
Most distributed systems use the notion of services, an abstract notion of an 
entity that executes requests for the users of the system. Every service has a 
different set of commands that it is willing to accept and execute. A service can 
give access to objects that it manages for the owners. This makes the principle 
of services much like an implementation of abstract data types?0 But in most dis-
tributed systems the principle of addressing an abstract service is not reflected in 
the design of the interprocess communication mechanisms. Our interprocess 
communication mechanism should support the policy of addressing services and 
objects managed by these services, but also allow a process addressing policy, or 
even a machine addressing policy. 
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Processes must not be able to send messages to every service. Some services 
are private (e.g., the execution of private program can also be considered a ser-
vice), some services are public (i.e., every process may use it), and some are 
semi-public; that is, they may only be used by certain processes or devices (e.g., 
it could be a policy to allow only certain file servers and data base servers to 
have access to the disk server). We suggest capabilities can be used to prove a 
process' permission to send to a service, and likewise capabilities can be used to 
prove the right to receive messages addressed to a service. 
The right to send messages to a service does not imply the right to receive 
messages sent by other processes to that service. It would enable a process with 
a capability to send to a service to impersonate that service by receiving its mes-
sages. 
Since the receiver of a message must be able to tell who sent it, the option to 
authenticate the source of a message should be present. This authentication 
must be unforgeable, and a process that receives an authenticated message must 
be able to verify the message's source, but may not be able to use the authenti-
cation for its own messages. It is of course a matter of policy whether and how 
the authentication mechanism will be used. 
2.3. The Protection Mechanism 
In this section we introduce an interprocess communication mechanism that can 
be made secure with the use of a secure network interface, the F-box, but does 
not require a secure operating system on the hosts. The interprocess communica-
tion mechanism rests on a capability-based naming mechanism-capability 
based, because capabilities are needed to send and receive messages. In our sys-
tem, capabilities consist of knowledge, knowledge of a port, a large random 
number. There are two kinds of ports, get-ports and put-ports. Get-pQTts are 
capabilities for the reception of messages. Put-~ts are capabilities for the 
transmission of messages. Every get-~t has a put-~t associated with it. Messages 
sent to a put-pQTt are received by processes listening to the associated get-port . 
In our communication model, capabilities consist of knowledge. A capability 
to send to a port, or a capability to receive on a port is just a large number, and 
knowledge of this number is taken by the system as prima facie evidence of the 
right to use that port. A capability can thus be passed to other processes, by just 
wrapping it up in a message and sending it. There need not be any 'pass-
capability' operation in the operating system. If knowledge of ports is enough to 
use them, some care must be taken to prevent capabilities from leaking out 
accidently. In particular the network must be secure against eavesdroppers, and 
multiprocessing systems in Amoeba must be secure to prevent processes from 
stealing capabilities from other processes on the same host. Monoprocessing sys-
tems however, need not have an operating system at all, since the network will 
not deliver messages if the receiving host can not show a capability for them. 
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2.3.1. Ports and One-Way Ciphers 
Ports are random numbers-large random numbers-which ensure that the 
space of all possible port names is very large compared to the space of the actual 
port names used; the port name space is thus sparse. Through sparseness it is 
possible to use knowledge of a port name as a capability for that port. Other-
wise it would be possible to generate random port names with a reasonable 
chance of generating an existing port name. In a large network with 2000 
processes and an average of 5 ports per process, a fully random 48-bit port could 
be broken by brute force in 2.8 X 1010 tries, on the average. At a rate of 50 
tries per second, it would take almost eighteen years of continuous trying to find 
just one port. 
Different capabilities are needed to send to a port and to receive on a port. 
The send capability is the put-port, and the receive capability is the get-port. 
Every get-port is related to a put-port by the following relation: 
put-port = F(get-port), 
where F is a one-way function. 
A one-way function maps a number, the plaintext, onto another, the cipher-
text~ with the following properties: 
• Given x, it is easy to computey = F(x). 
• Giveny = F(x), it is infeasible to find x. 
Note, by the way, that is not required that an inverse function, p- I, exists such 
that get-port = p- I (put-port) . In fact, it is required that p- I either not exist at 
all, or at least be too cumbersome to use. In this respect one-way functions 
differ from cryptographic functions. 
We shall not attempt to quantify e~ and infeasible exactly, because these con-
cepts vary, depending on the application, the amount of security required, and 
what is technically possible. To give a rough idea, for Amoeba we are thinking 
in terms of 'encryption' times of in the order of 10 to 20 msec., allowing encryp-
tion at approximately message transmission times, and cracking times on the 
order of at least ten years. The principle of one-way functions is due to a pass-
word encryption system by R. M. Needham, and was first mentioned by 
M. V. Wilkes~ In a later section we shall discuss possible functions suitable for 
our purpose. 
Let us see how ports and one-way functions are used in interprocess communi-
cation. First a service S chooses a port name, Pg (using a good random number 
generator). Pp is then computed, by applying F to Pg. The put-port, Pp, is 
given to 'the public,' the potential clients of the service, and Pg, the get-port is 
• The tenns 'plaintext' and 'cipher/ext' are not used here as in cryptography: ports are converted from 
plaintext into ciphertext, but it is intended to be impossible to convert a ciphertext port back into 
a plaintext port. 
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kept carefully secret and given only to the processes constituting the service. 
Suppose that S' is a server process for service S. S' announces to the network its 
intention to receive messages on get-port Pg (in Amoeba terminology it does a get 
on port Pg). The F-box converts Pg to Pp, by applying F. Let us assume process 
A wants to make use of the services of S. It could obtain the capability for S 
from a 'yellow pages' file, a file containing a list of services and service ports. A 
then sends its request to S, using Pp as the address (in Amoeba terminology, A 
does a put on port Pp)- The network delivers the request to one of the (possibly 
many) processes with a get on port Pg, by comparing the destination port in the 
messages to the put-port derived from Pg , Pp. Requests from A can thus be 
delivered to S' . 
The application of one-way functions to ports makes it possible to give a capa-
bility for communicating with a service to a process without giving the process 
the chance of impersonating the service. We must assume that the network is 
secure; that is, an intruder cannot listen to the traffic passing through the net-
work, because that would give the intruder the chance of obtaining put-ports. 
Many put-ports will be public (e.g., the put-port for file-service, or time-of-day 
service), but many more put-ports are secret, namely all put-ports used in com-
munication between private processes, or possibly in the communication between 
a distributed file server and its disk drivers. 
2.3.2. Reply Ports and Signatures 
The mechanism described fulfills only partly the requirements for authenticated 
communication: it was shown how the receiver of a message must provide an 
authenticating capability for receiving messages, but the mechanism that 
prevents a client or service from sending messages that purport to originate from 
another client or service has not been shown yet. It is highly unsatisfactory if 
the communication between a client and a server can be disrupted by a process 
sending phony acknowledgements for that client to the server. To prevent this, 
we use F , our one-way function, to transform the reply-port in every message 
before it is delivered to its destination. This means that requests can only be 
sent by processes with a capability for receiving the reply. An intruder who 
happens to know a process' put-port can otherwise cause a totally innocent 
server to send messages to that process, by sending messages to the server with 
that put-port as the reply port. If the process were already in communication 
with the server, it may thus become confused. 
The same mechanism can also be used to sign a message. This is especially 
useful for services that have to rely heavily on the identity of their clients. Bank 
Service (presented in Chapter 7), is a good example of such a service. Every 
user of the system can choose one or more signatures, register them with the 
proper authorities (depending on system policy; registration could be with an 
authentication service in one system, and with every separate service in another), 
and use the signature to send signed messages to servers. The signature cannot 
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be misused by the processes that receive them, since only the private plaintext-
signature can be used to sign a message. The ciphertext-signature can be public 
and be used to check the authenticity of the sender. In Chapter 7 more will be 
said on the subject of signatures. 
2.3.3. One-Way Functions 
One-way functions have been studied by a number of people who have used 
them for password protection in operating systems. Basically there are two 
different approaches to designing a secure one-way function; the first is finding a 
function that is mathematically hard to invert, the second is to find a function 
that is computationally hard to invert. The two methods are different. In the 
first method we try to find a function about which we can prove certain proper-
ties, one of the properties being the amount of work involved in computing the 
inverse function. In the second approach, we try to find functions of which we 
do not know the mathematical properties, but can be confident that the compu-
tational difficulties involved in finding the inverse are immense. 
The degeneracy of a one-way function is the maximum number of x's mapped 
onto any one F(x) . The degeneracy of one-way functions is important, because 
the greater the degeneracy, the greater the chance of breaking a one-way func-
tion. Suppose a one-way function maps the numbers {0, · · · , N -1} onto 
{0, · · · , N -1 }, with degeneracy d. For any one y E {0, · · · , N -1} there 
can be as many as d numbers x, such that F(x) = y . The probability of break-
ing a one-way function by searching for a plaintext that produces the desired 
ciphertext is d / N per probe, that is, the probability of breaking a one-way 
function by brute force is directly proportional to the degeneracy. 
Most one-way functions of mathematical origin are based on properties of 
natural numbers, derived from number theory. One possibility is to use a poly-
nomial to a prime modulus, as described by Purdy: 52 
Choose a one-way function F(x) by choosing a polynomial 
p(x) = x" + a 1x" - 1 + · · · + a0 _ 1x + a0 
where n, a 1 , • . . , a0 are integers. Let P be a large prime number, and define 
F(x) by 
F(x) p(x) (mod P) 
Then F(x) can be used as a one-way function that maps the numbers 
0, · · · ,P - 1 onto 0, · · · ,P - 1. Polynomials of degree n to a prime modulus 
haven roots or less [if. 39, theorem 3.15, p.42]. Consequently, the degeneracy of 
F, which is the maximum number of x's mapped by F onto any one y, or the 
number of solutions to the congruence 
F(x ) - y O (mod P ) 
does not exceed n. 
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Given that y = F ( x ), breaking the function amounts to finding roots of the 
congruence F(x ) - y O (mod P). This can be done by brute force, that is, 
by trying random ports, applying F to them and checking if they produce one of 
the desired cipher-ports, or it can be done by finding the inverse function of F 
using a po!Jnomial root finding algorithm . The best root finding algorithms to date 
require en 2 (log P)2 operations to find the roots of a polynomial of degree n, 
modulus a prime P; c is a constant?2• 4 The brute force approach ( trial and error 
method) requires an expected number of P / nm tries to find an inverse of one of 
a set of m ports. Suppose, for example that P = 264 - 179 (which is prime), 
n = i 9 - 1, and the number of ports in the network m = 10,000. Then the 
number of operations required to break the function by the root finding method 
is on the order of n 2 (log N)2, or 5 X 109 . At a rate of a million operations a 
second, it would take about 17 years to break the function using this approach. 
The expected number of tries needed to break one port of a set of m cipher-
ports is P / nm, or 3 X la9 when m = 10,000. Assuming it takes 10 msec to com-
pute F(x), it would take 400 days of CPU time to find just one get-port out of a 
set of 10,000, and even then, chances are that the port thus obtained would be 
no use whatsoever to the cracker. 
As an example of a computationally hard to invert one-way function consider 
the work of Evans et al.~2 who, in their proposed one-way function, use a small 
set of one-to-one mappings, which eventually produce a ciphertext. In a nut-
shell, their scheme works as follows : Assume the one-way function must map o-
bit get-ports onto n-bit put-ports . Let j 1 , h , · · · , fi be k different scrambling 
functions. Each of the Ji must be one-to-one, to keep the degeneracy within 
bounds. The scrambling functions map an intermediate result X of the calcula-
tion into a new value of X' . Some of the functions may be parameterised by the 
original plaintext-port P, or a small integer, m, derived from P or X. Possible 
scrambling functions can be: 
- rotate m bits 
- permute bits, fixed or calculated (from P or m) 
- compute the binary sum (modulo the size of P and X) or the XOR of P and X. 
- add a constant, or a quantity calculated from P to each byte of X. 
- choose some of the machine instructions that can be used to perform some 
one-to-one transformation of X, parameterised by P or m. Use a subset of 
these, calculated from P. 
FIGURE 2.1 shows how these functions are then used to transform P into a 
cipher-port V, via a succession of Xs. K is the number of different scrambling 
functions, J is the number of cycles, and the function next computes new values 
of X from old. The function qk derives small integers from P and X. 
The result of the one-way function thus obtained, is very hard to analyse, and 
the degeneracy is probably very small~2 Each of the fi is one-to-one. The com-
position of one-to-one functions is also one-to-one, but Evans' algorithm is not an 
ordinary composition of the fi , but one depending on the value of P, which 
makes it possible that it is no longer one-to-one. This type of one-way functions 
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#define] NumberOfCycles / * e.g., 5 */ 
#define K NumberOfDifferentScramblingFunctions 
port F(P) port P; { 
port X, V; 
intj, k, m, M; 
X= P; V = P; 
forU = O;j < J;j++) { 
for(k = O; k < K; k++) { 
M = qk(P,X); 
return V ; 
for(m = O; m < M; m++) 
V =,~(V,P,X); 
X = next( 11,.J; 
FIGURE 2.1. Calculation of Evans et al.'s one-way function 
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1s most suitable for our needs: the degeneracy is small, so a trial and error 
approach will take a very long time to yield results, and other approaches to 
cracking the function are not known. The function can be chosen such that it 
takes, for instance, 20 msec to compute, limiting the number of tries in an 
attempt to break it to 50 per second. At this rate, with a degeneracy of say 
three, it will take 6 years on average to get just one plaintext-port of a set of 
10,000 48-bit ciphertext-ports, not counting the time needed to look up the 
result of the encryption to see if a port has been cracked. With a 64-bit port, 
the time is at least 256 times longer. It is, as with any cryptographic system, 
possible that structural weaknesses may make it easier to break the one-way 
function. 
Another well known approach to finding computationally hard to invert one-
way functions, is to use a cryptosystem as a basis. Good results can be obtained 
by using the number to be enciphered as the key to encrypt a known constant. 
Consider, as an example, the Data Encryption Standard, DES?9 The key for this 
cipher is 56 bits, and it is used to encrypt or decrypt 64 bit quantities at a time. 
DES can be turned into a one-way function by encrypting a known 64-bit con-
stant, using the plaintext as the key. 
2.3.4. Secure Communication in an Insecure Network 
In the one-way function scheme we have assumed that the operating systems in 
the hosts are insecure, but that the network is secure. In many local networks 
this demand can be met, but it is conceivable that networks exist that cannot be 
made secure. One solution to achieving more security is to use link encryption 
32 INTERPROCESS COMMUNICATION 2. 
between the network nodes. This prevents information from being stolen by wire 
tapping, but the network must still guarantee application of F to get-ports, 
reply-ports and signature-ports. If the network cannot even guarantee that, 
another solution to achieving secure communication and protection is needed. 
Fortunately, a solution can be found in a public-key encryption scheme16 which 
can be used to build a secure network layer, with an identical interface to higher 
layers. 
The public-key encryption scheme amounts to this: the public key takes the 
place of the put-port, and the private key that of the get-port. When a service is 
created, a public-key pair is generated, plus an identifying port number. The 
port number is used to recognise which messages should be associated with 
which service, and need only be sparse enough to prevent processes from 
accidently choosing the same service number too often. When a message is sent 
from a client to a server, it is encrypted with the public key, which serves as a 
capability for addressing the service intelligibly. In principle the message can be 
intercepted by all the processes in the system, but only a process with a capabil-
ity for receiving the message-the private key- can understand the message. In 
order to avoid tampering with messages, each one must contain an encrypted 
checksum which also prevents interpretation of nonsense messages. A timestamp 
can be included to prevent playback of previously intercepted valid messages. A 
port in this public-key scheme consists of an identifying number, plus a key, a 
public key for put-ports, and a private key for get-ports. 
In wide-area networks, public-key cryptography is already being used. The 
encryption speeds are in the same order of magnitude as transmission rates in 
wide-area networks. Public key ciphers are still too slow to be generally used in 
local-area networks. However, we expect that as soon as public-key hardware 
comes on the market, it will be possible to encrypt messages as fast as they are 
sent. Another problem of public-key ciphers is that public-key ciphers with rea-
sonably short keys do not yet exist. Current cryptographic algorithms use keys 
of hundrec!s of bits. Perhaps, cryptographic research will yield algorithms with 
much shorter keys some day; not all public-key schemes need use factoring. 
2.4. The Port Layer 
The conglomerate of activities related to ports is referred to as the Port Layer. 
In functionality it comes closest to the Network Layer of the ISO OSI model. 
The Port Layer itself is not normally visible to user programs, it must viewed as 
a layer in the operating system, or as a hardware device, that supports the Tran-
saction Layer (the implementation of which is also inside the operating system). 
User programs (and most of the operating system itself) see only the Transaction 
Layer interface:t' The Port Layer provides a secure datagram service to the 
• See also Chapter 4, where the operating system interface is described. 
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layers above; that is, the Port Layer provides protection through ports, it locates 
ports and it delivers messages, addressed to ports. The Port Layer only provides 
a datagram service; it does not guarantee the delivery of every message, 
although it makes an effort to do so; nor does it provide sequencing, i.e. , mes-
sages need not arrive in the order they are sent; in short, it does not provide a 
byte stream protocol. 
There is one vital difference, however, between the datagram service provided 
by the Amoeba Port Layer, and most other datagram services: the Port Layer 
does guarantee that messages never arrive more than once: messages arrive once, or 
not at all . This is realised because the Port Layer never retransmits messages, 
unless it 'knows' that the message has failed to arrive. Furthermore, messages 
are never broadcast, as this may result in two or more hosts, listening on the 
same port, receiving the messagef In § 3.2, which describes the Transaction 
Layer, we shall show that this property simplifies the Transaction Protocol con-
siderably. 
The next four sections describe the interface to the Port layer and its three 
functions: protection, locating ports, and delivering messages. 
2.4.1. The Port Layer Interface 
The Port Layer interface provides calls to send and receive messages , which have 
(almost) unbounded length (currently 32 Kbytes). If necessary, these messages 
are split up into small units and sent piecemeal. A message consists of two parts, 
a 40-byte header part, and a data part . The structure of the header is shown in 
FIGURE 2.2; the header consists of a length field, giving the size the data. A 
header-only message is 40 bytes long, and has a length field of zero. Then comes 
the destination port, the put-port for the port where the message has to go. The 
third field is the rep!J port, the put-port where reply messages are to be sent. The 
next field is the signature port, also transmitted as a put-port. 20 bytes are left 
over for use by higher layer protocols. 
The most important calls are the calls for sending and receiving messages, get 
( or geta'!)' ) and put ( or putany ). These calls may or may not be blocking, 
depending on the structure of the kernel. In the current implementation of the 
Amoeba Kernel~ get and put are non-blocking and implemented in the lowest 
layer of the kernel for best performance. Each call has two parameters, pointers 
to two buffers, one for the message header, and one for the message body. For 
transmission and reception of header-only messages the buffer pointer can be a 
dummy parameter. In a get call, the pointers point to two buffers for the mes-
sage to be received. Only three header fields must be filled in by the receiver. 
The length field must be set to the length of the buffer available for the data 
portion of the received message, the destination port field must be initialised to 
t With the exception of special ring networks as described in § 2.5.2. 
• The Amoeba Kernel is described in Chapter 4. 
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Message length 
Destination port 
(6 bytes) 
Reply port 
(6 bytes) 
Signature port 
(6 bytes) 
Out-of-band 
data 
(20 bytes) 
FIGURE 2.2. The Port Layer header layout 
the get-port on which the message is to be received, the reply port field is set to 
the sender's put-port. A get call is thus a call to receive messages from a specific 
source. It is also possible to receive messages from any source using getany . The 
only difference between get and getany is that the reply port need not be 
specified in a call to getany . 
On a put call, the two pointers point to the header and buffer to be transmit-
ted. The header fields are filled in as follows : The length field is set to the 
length of the data buffer to be sent. The destination port field is set to the put-
port for the receiving port. The reply-port field is set to the get-port for return 
messages. This port is converted by the F-box to a put-port before the message is 
copied to the net. The signature port field is set to the plaintext version of the 
optional signature to be sent. The F-box transforms the signature to a ciphertext 
version, using the same conversion as for ports. The remaining 20 bytes of the 
header and the data buffer can be filled as the sender sees fit. 
A message, transmitted via put can only be received by a process with an out-
standing and matching get . Messages sent using putany , can only be received by 
processes with an outstanding and matching getany . 
A message, sent with put matches an outstanding get when both the destina-
tion ports and reply ports match. A message, sent with putany matches an out-
standing getany when the destination ports match. 
A few other calls are available to users of the Port Layer, unget and local . 
Unget is used to cancel outstanding get or getany operations, e.g. , when a message 
is no longer expected. Its single parameter is the address of the header of the 
outstanding get to be cancelled. Local has two parameters, a get-port and flag . 
Depending on the value of the flag, it tells the system that a port is local to the 
calling process, that the port is local to the caller's host, that the port is local to 
the caller's local-area network, or that the port is global. A new call to local 
cancels the effect of a previous call with the same port. 
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Summarising, the calls are: 
get( &header, &buffer); 
getany( &header, &buffer); 
put( &header, &buffer); 
putany( &header, &buffer); 
unget( &header); 
local( &getport, howlocal); 
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A get call terminates on reception of a message, or is terminated by a call to 
unget. When a message is received, the length field is adjusted to the message's 
length. Messages that do not fit into the buffer are truncated, and the recipient 
is notified. 
As far as the Port Layer is concerned, a put call terminates successfully when 
the message is sent. Note that this is no guarantee of the message arriving. Put 
terminates unsuccessfully if one of its parameters is in error, or when the destina-
tion cannot be found; i.e. , the locate fails. 
Port Layer messages can be very long. Most local-area networks are not 
capable of sending such messages as one network message. However, by 
optimising the Port Layer for optimum performance on the local-area network it 
runs on, transmission speeds can be obtained that could not possibly be obtained 
using other techniques (such as sliding window protocols). Memory is getting 
cheaper every day, and modem microcomputers often have very large address 
spaces, so room to store these large messages can usually be found. Note, by the 
way, that most messages are short~ and that communicating parties have ways 
of bounding the lengths of received messages (e.g., by making requests for small 
portions of data). 
2.4.2. Protection via One-Way Ciphers 
The Port Layer provides protection, using one of the protection mechanisms 
described earlier: one-way functions, or public-key-based protection. To make 
this work, it must not be possible to circumvent the Port Layer protocols, nor 
must it be possible to tamper with them. In traditional operating systems, the 
Port Layer would have been built into the operating system kernel, safe from 
attack by ordinary user programs. Operating system kernels, however, are sel-
dom without security loopholes, due to their enormous complexity and their ela-
borate interfaces. 
Distributed operating system kernels are even more vulnerable to attack. 
Often, a distributed system consists of a cable running through the building, with 
personal computers, file servers, etc. plugged in all over. It is impossible for a 
central authority to keep an eye on every host of the system, so a malicious user 
can easily replace the 'official,' secure operating system kernel by one without 
• See § 3.2.1 . 
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any protection mechanisms. 
As stated before, this has been the prime motivation for turning the usual 
layering of interprocess communication services upside down, and provide secure 
communication in the bottom layers. This makes it possible to implement the 
protection mechanisms in hardware, or to put them in the network nodes, or in 
the network interfaces. 
This is not the only reason for putting protection in the bottom layers of the 
communication hierarchy, however. When protection is in a lower layer, higher 
layers can be designed on the assumption that the communication between two 
parties is completely private: there can be no intruders to disrupt communica-
tion by inserting phony messages, replaying messages, etc. The protocols needed 
for reliable, sequenced communication become much simpler this way. 
Conceptually, the Port Layer is implemented in a 'device,' inserted between a 
process and the network. We refer to this device as an F-box, for Junction-box, 
because its most important task is to carry out the protection mechanism by 
application of the one-way function. 
CLIENT 
put(SP, Cg, Sg, data) 
F-box 
Communications 
Subnet 
F-box 
SERVER 
get(Sg, CP, SP, data) 
FIGURE 2.3. A local network with hosts and F-boxes. 
The F-box applies the one-way function to get-ports, rep!J-ports and signatures, 
as illustrated in FIGURE 2.3. It can be a microcomputer, inserted between a host 
and the network, it can be built into a network interface board, it can be part of 
the host's operating system, or it can be part of the software of the network 
nodes in a mesh network. Whatever solution is chosen, it is secure only if every 
put and every get pass through at least one F-box before a rendezvous is made, 
and furthermore, if the F-boxes cannot be tampered with. 
Many local networks use a coaxial cable that runs through the building with 
an outlet in each room. People who want to use the network can plug their 
intelligent terminals, word processors, minicomputers or microcomputers into the 
wall and use the services provided via the network. The F-box can be built into 
the outlet in the wall, where it can be made safe from tampering. This system 
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allows connection of any hardware to the network, as long as it is capable of 
communication with the network interface. F-boxes can also be built into the 
network interface board. This is not as safe as putting the F-box in a tamper-
proof outlet in the wall, but it prevents circumventing the F-box, unless the 
hardware is tampered with. More secure than putting the F-box on the network 
interface board, is to build an F-box into a network interface chip. To circum-
vent such an interface requires building one's own network interface. From the 
point of view of physical protection, protection by means of hardware F-boxes is 
preferable to a protection mechanism in the operating system of the hosts. 
Tampering with an operating system is orders of magnitudes easier than tamper-
ing with electronic hardware. Electronic tampering is also easier to detect. 
OST 
OST 
OST 
OST 
OST 
OS OST 
OST 
OST 
FIGURE 2.4. The structure of several kinds of secure networks, with F-boxes 
inserted in various places. 
OST 
In a mesh network, every host is connected to a network node. A message 
travels from one host to another via one or more of the network nodes. These 
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network nodes are usually small computers, under control of the network 
management, executing secure network code, which makes them eminently suit-
able to carry out the one-way functions. FIGURE 2.4 shows some examples of 
network structures with F-boxes. 
There is thus a close relation between the Port Layer and the F-box: the Port 
Layer is the collection of protocols that provides a secure (but not necessarily 
reliable) datagram service to higher layers; the F-box is the device that carries 
out those protocols. The terms Port Layer and F-box will often be used inter-
changeably. 
2.5. Locating Ports 
The Amoeba distributed operating system uses ports to address messages. When 
a process sends a message to a port, the system must find the location of another 
process receiving on that port in order to deliver the message. In this section, 
some methods are discussed to locate ports so that messages may be delivered. 
These methods need not apply solely to locating ports, but they are probably 
equally applicable in other systems where, given a location-independent name 
for an object, the place where it resides must be found. 
The Port Layer provides two sets of primitives for sending and receiving mes-
sages. One set provides primitives where a source process does not care which of 
the destination processes listening on the destination port receives the message, 
and the destination processes do not care which source process sent the message. 
The second set provides primitives where a source process sends messages to a des-
tination process listening specifically to messages from that source. In the first set 
of primitives only the destination port must match between sender and receiver. In 
the second set of primitives both destination port and reply port must match. 
This has consequences for locate operations. There must be two kinds of 
locate, one to find a recipient for messages sent using putany , an~ one to find a 
recipient for messages sent using put . In the first case, locate answers the ques-
tion 'who's listening for messages for destination port x ?' In the second case, it 
answers 'who's listening on port x for messages from port y ?' The mechanisms 
for answering these questions are the same, so the difference between the two 
kinds of locate is ignored in the remainder of this section. 
Different types of network require different techniques for locating ports. In 
some networks, such as a star network, locating a port is not difficult : the central 
network node must be provided with a table of ports and their locations, and it 
can do the trivial routing of messages. In other networks, locating may be quite 
complicated: a hierarchy, for instance, of several network types, connected 
together by an internet. In this section, two types of network will be discussed, 
broadcast networks, and ring networks equipped with special hardware. In § 
2.6, methods for locating ports in different types of mesh networks and network 
hierarchies will be discussed. 
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2.5.1. Broadcast Networks 
Two network types have become popular in local-area networks, carrier-sense 
networks and various kinds of ring networks. Both types are broadcast networks; 
messages are broadcast on the network medium (a co-axial cable, twisted pair, 
optical fibre), each of the hosts' network interfaces examines passing messages 
and reads those messages intended for it off the cable. Usually there is a broad-
cast address , an address that all interfaces react to, so messages can be broadcast 
using this address. 
Naturally, the ability to broadcast messages on the network helps in locating 
ports. When a node wishes to send a message to a port whose location is 
unknown, it just sends a 'where is port such-and-such' message to all other nodes. 
The node where the port resides can reply with a 'port such-and-such is at notk so-
and-so' message. 
Note that when the message itself is broadcast, it may be received more than 
once if two or more network nodes receive on the same port, which is not 
uncommon when a service is offered by more than one server process. Another 
problem with broadcasting (large) messages rather than tiny where-are-you mes-
sages is that each node must reserve enough buffer space to receive those mes-
sages only to discover they have to be discarded again, because they are for 
another node. 
To make port locating efficient, each node maintains a cache of known 
port/ host-address pairs. (Since there are two kinds message passing-from a 
specific source or from any source, there are two kinds of port entries in the 
cache: single ports and double ports.) The rules for updating and using the 
cache have to be set carefully: on one hand, messages should nearly always be 
delivered correctly, even when ports move from one host to another, or when a 
port is no longer active on one host, but still being listened to on another; on the 
other hand, under no circumstances may messages be delivered more than once, 
since higher level protocols rely on the property of the Port Layer that messages 
are delivered exactly once or not at all. 
A set of rules that does the trick uses four types of messages: 
1. broadcast message 'where is port xl' 
2. point-to-point message 'port x is at notk y.' 
3. message for port x at node y . 
4. rejected message for port x by node y (port x not at node y). 
These messages are used as follows: 
When a message is given to the Port Layer for transmission, the cache is 
examined for presence of the destination port/host pair. If it is there, the mes-
sage is sent to the node, indicated by the contents of the cache, so suppose it is 
not there. Then a 'where is port xl' message is broadcast and a timer started. 
When a 'port x is at notk y.' message arrives, x and y are stored in the cache, the 
message is transmitted, and the timer is stopped. If the timer expires before any 
replies have come in, the message is discarded, and failure is reported to the 
40 INTERPROCESS COMMUNICATION 2. 
sender. 
When a 'where is port xl' message is received, the table of listened-to ports is 
examined. If an entry is found that matches the request, a 'port x is at node y.' is 
returned. When a message for port x is received, and an entry for x is found in 
the listened-to-port table is found, the message is delivered to its destination. 
Otherwise, the message is returned to the sender as a rejected message far port x 
from node y.' When a node receives this last type of message, it must erase the 
corresponding entry from its cache, and treat the message as if it were a message 
of local origin to be delivered to port x . 
Note, that a node, sending a message, may discard the message immediately 
after transmission; if the message fails to arrive because the information from the 
port cache is no longer up to date, the message will be returned, so it can be 
retransmitted. In most cases, the overhead of returning the message as a whole, 
instead of a small control message, is more than compensated by not having to 
remember every message just in case it is rejected at its destination. Network 
bandwidth is cheap in modem local-area networks. 
It is not difficult to verify that messages can never be accepted more than 
once, when this set of rules is used. When no messages are lost in the network, 
and the destination host is up, the contents of the cache never cause messages to 
be lost. When the F-boxes are constructed in such a way that the F-box contin-
ues to work if the host crashes, no messages are lost, even when the destination 
host is down. However, messages may not be delivered then, because no alterna-
tive port is present to send the messages to. 
2.5.2. Special-Hardware Ring Networks 
With some small modifications, token rings, contention rings and slotted rings 72 
can be used for an especially efficient implementation of the Port Layer func-
tions. No caches are needed; no host need know where ports are, except, of 
course, the ports listened to by processes in that host itself. Before we describe the 
modifications and the protocol, let us describe the properties of ring networks 
that make the protocol work. 
In a ring network, each message is put on the ring bit-for-bit by the sending 
node. Each node on the ring, including the destination node, copies the bits on 
the incoming line from the previous node to the outgoing line to the next node. 
A message thus travels all the way round the ring back to the originating node. 
The destination node alone not only copies the bits to the outgoing line, but also 
copies the bits into its own memory, so it can deliver the message. Often, one bit 
in the header or trailer of each message is not copied by the hardware in the 
receiving node, but set. This is the accepted bit, and it tells the sender that the 
message has been received. This bit is going to play an important role in our 
protocol. We shall now describe the proposed modifications to the hardware. 
The first modification concerns the address recognition mechanism in each 
node. Normally, an address consists of, say, eight bits and is wired into the 
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network interface. The first bits of a message form the address, and while the 
bits are copied through, the network interface compares them to the node 
address. If they match, the rest of the message is also copied into memory. In 
the modified approach, addresses are no longer wired into the interface, but a 
table of addresses is put on the interface. The entries of the table are ports and 
the contents of the table can be changed by the operating system!" When a mes-
sage passes by, the address at the head of the message ( a put-port) is collected, 
and compared to the contents of the table. This comparison takes time, so the 
contents of the message are copied into a buffer on the interface board while the 
comparisons are being made. If the port is not found, the contents of the buffer 
can be discarded, and the rest of the message is copied through unmodified. If 
the port is found in the table, the rest of the message is copied into the buffer, 
and the accepted bit is set when it passes by, noting the old contents of the bit, 
however. If the accepted bit was already on, a previous node already had 
accepted the message, and, since messages may not be received twice, the con-
tents of the buffer are discarded. If it was off the message had not yet been 
received, so the message is accepted and delivered to the host. (The distance in 
a message between a port and the accepted bit must be large enough to make this 
possible. It is a fortunate co-incidence that the accepted bit is usually in the mes-
sage trailer.) 
2.6. The Shotgun Method for Locating Ports in Mesh Networks 
Before a client can send a request to a server which provides the desired service, 
the client has to locate that server. The problem of efficient routing arises at a 
later stage; first the address of the destination has to be found in a match-
making phase. Match-making is finding the address of a server ( or any object, 
for that matter), given its name. A match-making service is often referred to as 
a name server. 
A centralised name server must reside at a so-called well-known address which 
does not change and is known to all processes. (Clearly, the name server cannot 
be used to locate itsel£) When the name server crashes, or its host, the entire 
system crashes. This solution also causes an overload of messages in the neigh-
bourhood of the name server. 
When clients broadcast for services with "where are you" messages, we have 
an example of a distributed name server. This solution is more robust than the 
centralised one, and practical in most local-are networks, which are usually 
broadcast networks anyway. But in large store-and-forward networks, where 
messages are forwarded from node to node to their destination, broadcasting is 
considerably more costly than sending a message directly to its destination. 
• When the operating system writes a get-port into the table, the F-box hardware on the network in-
terface applies F to the port before storing the resulting put-port in the table. 
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Broadcast messages are sent to every host, while point-to-point messages need 
only pass through the hosts on the path between client and server. Conventional 
broadcast methods for locating services need a minimum of Q( n) message passes 
to do the broadcast (e.g., via a spanning tree 13) . 
In this section, realisations of name servers are investigated in the entire range 
between centralised and distributed forms. The efficiency of solutions is measured 
in terms of message passes and local storage. It appears that, in many n-node 
networ~ very efficient distributed match-making between processes can be done 
in 0( V n ) message passes. 
2.6.1. Locate Algorithms 
In all cases, the method used to locate a port is the following: A server process s 
located at address A, and offering a service identified by a port '11, selects a col-
lection P, of network nodes and posts at these nodes that server s receives 
requests on port '1T at the address A,. Each of the nodes in P, stores this informa-
tion in a cache for future reference. When a client process c located at address 
A, has a request to send to '11, it selects a collection of network nodes Q. and 
queries each node in Q. for the address of '11 . When P, n Q. =I= 0, the node(s) 
in the intersection will return a message to c stating that '1T is available at A,. If 
P, = { s} and Q. = U then the technique is called broadcasting; if P, = U and 
Q. = { c} then the technique is called sweeping. 
A class of distributed algorithms for match-making between client processes 
and server processes in computer networks is presented and the expected perfor-
mance of one such algorithm using random choices is analysed. Subsequently, 
the optimal lower bound is determined on the performance in number of mes-
sage passes for any such algorithm, in any network, under any strategy, distri-
buted or not. This yields a combinatorial lemma which results in a lower bound 
on the trade-off product between the number of nodes a server advertises at and 
the number of nodes a client inquires at. The method will be applied to partic-
ular networks, both designed networks and spontaneously emerged networks. 
Finally, a probabilistic and a hashing algorithm for match-making are briefly 
investigated. 
2.6.2. A Theory of Distributed Match-Making 
In this section lower bounds are derived on the message pass complexity of a 
class of locate algorithms (called Shotgun Locate), for the entire range from cen-
tralised to distributed methods, and for any network topology. In the next sec-
tion we give methods which achieve these lower bounds, or nearly achieve these 
lower bounds, for some network topologies. 
The networks under consideration are point-to-point (store-and-forward) com-
munications networks described by an undirected communications graph 
G = ( U,E), with a set of nodes U representing the processors of the network, and 
2.6. THE SHOTGUN METHOD FOR LOCATING PORTS IN MESH NE1WORKS 43 
a set of edges E representing bidirectional noninterfering communication chan-
nels between them. No common memory is shared by the node-processors. Each 
node processes messages it receives from its neighbours, performs local computa-
tions on messages and sends messages to neighbours. A message pass or hop con-
sists of the sending of a message from one node to one of its direct neighbours. 
The number of message passes needed for match-making depends on the 
topology of a network. We want to obtain topology independent lower bounds. 
Therefore, assume that all messages can be routed in one message pass to their 
destinations. Equivalently, assume that the network is a complete graph. Lower 
bounds on the needed number of message passes in complete networks a fortiori 
hold for all networks. 
For each network G = ( U,E) and associated match-making algorithm, there 
are total functions P, Q such that: 
P, Q: u- zu . 
(Here zu is the set of all subsets of U. ) Any server residing at node i starts its 
stay there by posting its (port, address) pair at each node in P(i). Any client 
residing at node j queries each node in Q (j) for each service (port) it requires. 
We assume that all nodes j have a cache which is large enough to store all 
(port, address) pairs associated with addresses i such that j EP(i). That is, the 
nodes at which the rendez-vous' are made can hold all posted material. The 
caches are large enough to hold so many (port, address) pairs that they never 
have to discard one for a server that is still active. Entries are made or updated 
whenever a message is received from a server process with its address ( or when a 
reply from a locate operation is received). The messages can be timestamped to 
determine which addresses are out of date in case of a conflict. 
We have dubbed this class of algorithms Shotgun Locate algorithms. (Put so 
many pheasants in the bushes that the hunter can expect success for the amount 
of shot he is willing to spend.) Later we consider alternative locate methods: 
Hash Locate where the functions P, Q depend on the service ports as well, and 
Lighthouse Locate which is a probabilistic version of Shotgun Locate where 
too-small caches can discard (port, address) pairs. 
2.6.3. Probabilistic Analysis 
Let the number of elements in U (universe) be n. Let a given server s reside at 
node i. Let p be the cardinality of P(i) i;;;; U, the set of nodes where s posts its 
whereabouts. Let a given client c reside at node j. Let q be the number of ele-
ments in Q (j) i;;;; U, the set of nodes queried by c. If the elements of P ( i) and 
Q(j) are randomly chosen then the probability for any one element of U to be 
an element of P(i) [Q(j)] is p / n [q / n]. If P(i) and Q(j) are chosen indepen-
dently then the probability for any one element of U to be an element in both 
P(i) and Q(j) is pq / n2 • Since there are n elements in U, the expected size of 
P (i)nQ(j) is given by 
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E(# (P(i) n Q(j))) = l!!L . 
n 
Therefore, to expect one full node in P(i)nQ(j), we must have p +q;;;,, 2Vn. 
This is the situation for a particular pair of nodes. For the performance of the 
whole network we have to consider the combined performance of the n2 pairs of 
nodes. The above analysis holds for each pair i, j of elements of U, since they 
are all interchangeable. Consequently, the minimal average value of p +q over 
all pairs in U2 must be 2 Vn, in order to expect successful match-making for 
each pair. 
By careful and deliberate choice of the sets P(i) and Q(j), we may improve 
the situation in two ways: 
• The sizes of P and Q can be reduced without reducing the probability of suc-
cess. 
• The probability of success can be increased without increasing the sizes of P 
and Q 
It is, of course, especially interesting to increase the probability of success to cer-
tainty, and to derive the minimum sizes for P and Q needed to achieve certain 
success. This is the subject of the next section. 
2.6.4. Number of Messages for Match-Making 
To match a server at node i to a client at node j the following actions have to 
take place. The server at i tells a set P(i) of nodes about its location. Client j 
queries a set Q(j) of nodes for the desired service. Call the set of nodes 
r;J = P(i) n Q(j) the set of rendez-vous nodes, that is, the nodes at which a 
rerukz-vous between a client at j looking for a service and a server at i offering 
that service can be made. 
Definition. The n X n matrix, R, with entries r;J (l .;;;;i,j :,s;;;n) is the rendez-vous 
matrix. Each entry r;J, represents the set of rendez-vous nodes where the client at 
node j can find the location i and port of the server at node i. Note that: 
n 
LJ r;,J C P(i) and LJ r;J C Q(j) (Ml) 
j=I i=I 
To prevent waste in message passes, we can take care that the inclusions in (Ml) 
are replaced by equalities. An optimal shotgun method has exactly one element 
in each r;J- Below, we represent such singleton sets by their single element. (If 
faults occur in the network then we may opt for more redundancy by using 
larger r;J-
2.6. THE SHOTGUN METHOD FOR LOCATING PORTS IN MESH NE1WORKS 45 
2.6.5. Examples of rendez-vous matrices 
I . Broadcasting . The server posts only to itself and the client queries every node: 
Cl e n t s 
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 1 1 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 
s 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
e 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
r 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
V 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
e 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
r 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
s 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
2. Sweeping . The client stays put and the server looks for work: 
CI e n t s 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
s 2 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
e 3 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
r 4 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
V 5 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
e 6 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
r 7 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
s 8 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
9 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
3. Centralised name server . 
All services post at node 3 and all clients query for services at node 3: 
Cl e n t s 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
s 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
e 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
r 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
V 5 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
e 6 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
r 7 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
s 8 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
9 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
4. Truly distributed name server. 
All nodes are used equally often as rendez-vous node: 
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C I i e n t s 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
l 2 2 2 3 3 3 
s 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 
e 3 l l l 2 2 2 3 3 3 
r 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 6 6 6 
V 5 4 4 4 5 5 5 6 6 6 
e 6 4 4 4 5 5 5 6 6 6 
r 7 7 7 7 8 8 8 9 9 9 
8 7 7 7 8 8 8 9 9 9 
9 7 7 7 8 8 8 9 9 9 
5. Hierarchical!, distributed name seroer. 
Links for nodes lower in the hierarchy are served by rendez-vous nodes higher in 
the hierarchy. Networks are hierarchically ordered as shown in FIGURE 2.5: 
FIGURE 2.5. A hierarchy of networks; nodes higher in the network hierar-
chy seive as rendez-vous nodes for nodes in lower levels. 
Cl e n t s 
l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
l 7 7 7 9 9 9 9 9 9 
s 2 7 7 7 9 9 9 9 9 9 
e 3 7 7 7 9 9 9 9 9 9 
r 4 9 9 9 8 8 8 9 9 9 
V 5 9 9 9 8 8 8 9 9 9 
e 6 9 9 9 8 8 8 9 9 9 
r 7 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
8 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
6. Distn.buted name seroer for the binary 3-cube topology. The node addresses are 
the 3-bit addresses of the comers of the cube. For all a,b,c E {O, 1} , 
P(abc) = {~ I x,y E{0,1}} and Q(abc) = {xbc Ix E{0, 1} }: 
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C l i e n t s 
000 001 010 011 100 101 110 111 
000 000 001 010 011 000 001 010 011 
s 001 000 001 010 011 000 001 010 011 
e 010 000 001 010 011 000 001 010 011 
r 011 000 001 010 011 000 001 010 011 
V 100 100 101 110 111 100 101 110 111 
e 101 100 101 110 111 100 101 110 111 
r 110 100 101 110 111 100 101 110 111 
s 111 100 101 110 111 100 101 110 111 
2.6.6. Lower Bound for Complete Networks 
There are n possible rerukz-vous nodes and n 2 elements in R. By choice of P and 
Q, the algorithm distributes the load of being a rerukz-vous node over the nodes 
in the network. It is sometimes preferable to distribute the load unevenly. For 
instance, in the very large networks with millions of processors which are now 
envisioned, Vn message passes is just too much because n is so large. In 
hierarchical networks (Example 5) the average number of message passes for a 
match-making instance can be as low as O(log n ). This means that some nodes 
are used very often as rerukz-vous node, and others very seldom or not at all. A 
combination of hierarchical and local posting may also be useful. 
Let the rerukz-vous matrix R have n 2 node entries, constituted by k; ;;;. 0 copies 
of each node i, 1 ~ i ~ n. Clearly, 
n 
~ k - = n 2 
.;:;., I > (M2) 
i= J 
To match a server at node i with a client at node j, the server sends messages 
to all nodes in P(i) and the client sends messages to all nodes in Q(j). So, all in 
all, the number ef message passes m ( i,j) involved in this match-making instance is 
given, in a complete network, by 
m(i,j) = #P(i) + #Q(j ) . (M3) 
In the examples above we have seen that, for different pairs i,j, the number of 
message passes m ( i,j ) for a match-making instance can, in a single match-making 
strategy, range all the way from a minimum of 2 to n, and beyond. We determine 
the quality and complexity of a match-making strategy by the minimum of 
m ( i,j), the maximum of m ( i,j) and, above all, the average of m ( i,j), for 1 ~ i,j ~ n. 
Definition. The average number of message passes m (n) of the given match-
making strategy (which is determined by the rerukz-vous matrix R) is : 
1 n n 
m(n ) = - 2 ~ ~m(i,j) 
n i= Jj= l 
(M4) 
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We shall now derive an exact lower bound on m (n) expressed in terms of the 
number k; of times node i occurs in R, that is, the number of times k; is used as 
rendez-vous for a pair of nodes. 
Proposition 1. Consider the rmdez-vous matrix R as defined. Then m (n) is bounded 
below by: 
(M5) 
Proof Let r; [c,] be the number of different nodes in row i [column z] (l~i~n). 
Then 
n 
r; = # LJ r;j & 'i = # U r,,j (1) 
j=l i=I 
Let R; be the number of different rows containing node i, and let C, be the 
number of different columns containing node i ( 1 ~ i ~ n ). Let PiJ = 1 if node i 
occurs in row j, otherwise PiJ = 0, and let YiJ = 1 if node i occurs in column j, 
otherwise Yij = 0, (1 ~ i, j ~ n). Then, 
n n n n 
L'i = L LPij = LR; (2) 
j=l j=li=l i=l 
n n n n 
L'J = L LYiJ = Lei 
j=I j=li=l i=l 
Clearly, for all i ( 1 ~ i ~ n) we have 
(3) 
Furthermore, since 
kR2 -2- URR +kR2 = (- li:R - - li:R)2 J I V lf.;lf.J. I J I J V "i I V If.; J 
;;;;,, 0 ' 
for all i,j (1 ~i,j ~n), we obtain immediately: 
kR kR W; 
_J_• + _•_J ;;;;,, 2 kk 
R · R· I J ' J I 
from which it follows that: 
±R;±k1RT1 ;;;;,, ± ± V½ (4) 
i=l j=l i=lj=l 
Hence, 
n n n n 
L L#P(i')#Q(j);;;;,, L L'i'J (by (Ml) & (1)) 
i=lj=l i=lj=l 
n n 
= L'i X L'i 
i=l j=l 
2.6. THE SHOTGUN METHOD FOR LOCATING PORTS IN MESH NE1WORKS 49 
n n 
~R; X ~ C1 (by (2)) 
i=I j=I 
n n k -
;;;.. ~R; X ~-'J (by (3)) 
i = I j = I Rj 
;,, [t v;;-]' (by (4)). 
The Proposition follows. D 
The constraints (Ml) to (M5) imply a lower bound trade-off between the 
number of message passes for posting (and nodes for storing) a server's (port, 
address) and the number of message passes for querying nodes for the 
whereabouts of services. 
The distributed match-making strategy can be adjusted to the relative fre-
quency of these happenings, so as to minimise the weighted overall number of 
messages. For instance, if the average call for a service at i by a client at j 
occurs a;,J times more often than the average posting of a service available at i, 
then we may want to minimise m(n) replacing (M3) by (M3'): 
m (i,j) = #P(i) + a;J#Q(j) . (M3') 
Proposition 1 immediately gives a lower bound on the average number of 
messages involved with a rendez-vous : 
Proposition 2. For a complete n-node network and any Shotgun Locate strategy, with the 
k;'s as defined above, the average number m (n) ef message passes (c.q., distinct nodes 
accessed) to make a match is 
2 n 
m(n);;;.. - ~ "\11; . 
n i = I 
Proof Assume, by way of contradiction, that the Proposition is false, that is, 
2 n 
m(n) < - ~ "\11; 
ni = I 
But 
1 n n 
- 2 ~ ~ (r; + cj) ..;;; m(n) , 
n i=lj = l 
so 
n n n 
~ ~ (r;+c1) = n ~ (r;+c;) 
i = lj=I i = I 
< 2n± "\11; 
i=I 
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Then, 
n n 
Lr,Lci 
i = I i = I < [t~r 
which contradicts Proposition 1. 0 
Propositions 1 and 2 hold mutatis mutandis for nonsquare matrices R, that is, 
for networks where some nodes can host only servers and other nodes perhaps 
only clients. 
In the tru[y distributed case, that is, k 1 = k2 = · · · =k. = n, Propositions 1 and 
2 specialise to the Corollary below. Here, each node occurs equally often as 
rendez-vous node in matrix R, and hence carries an equal load of the match-
making work. 
Corollary. Consider the rendez-vous matrix Ras defined,for k 1 = k2 = · · · =k. = n. 
Then: 
1 n n 
-2 L L #P(i')#Q(j) ~ n ' 
n i = lj= I 
m(n ) ~ 2Vn . 
This is the same average number of messages as in the probabilistic approach 
described earlier. For certain success, and perfect distribution of the match-
making load, the sum of the sizes of P and Q can not be reduced below 2 Vn, 
where n is the number of nodes in the network. 
Another choice of the k;'s gives: 
Corollary. For k2 = k3 = · · · = k. = 0 and k 1 = n 2, that is, there is a centralised 
name server at node 1, we obtain: 
1 n n 
- 2 L L#P(i')#Q(j) ~ 1 ' 
n i= l j= I 
m(n) ~ 2 , 
which is not surprising. 
2.6.7. Implementations in Particular Networks 
Manhattan Networks 
In a Manhattan Network , the network is laid out as a p X q rectangular grid of 
nodes. If the availability of a service is posted along the server's row and 
requests for a service along the client's column, caches must be of size 0 ( q) and 
the number of message passes for each match-making instance is O(p + q). For 
p = q we have m(n )= 2Vn and caches of size Vn. For the 9-node network 
below, 
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the rendez-V<JUS matrix looks as follows: 
Cl e n t s 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
s 2 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
e 3 l 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
r 4 4 5 6 4 5 6 4 5 6 
V 5 4 5 6 4 5 6 4 5 6 
e 6 4 5 6 4 5 6 4 5 6 
r 7 7 8 9 7 8 9 7 8 9 
s 8 7 8 9 7 8 9 7 8 9 
9 7 8 9 7 8 9 7 8 9 
Wrap-around versions of the method can also be used in cylindrical networks, 
or torus-shaped networks. It is, in fact, the method used in the torus-shaped 
Stony Brook Microcomputer Network~5 
Multidimensional Cubes 
Suppose the network is laid out as a d-dimensional cube. The 'z:' nodes can be 
named by d-bit numbers in such a way that, if two nodes are connected, their 
names differ in a single bit. Assume that d is even. 
Server's Algorithm. A server at an address s =s1s2 · · · sd broadcasts its (port, 
address) along a spanning tree to all nodes in the d / 2-dimensional cube 
spanned by the nodes in 
P(s) = {a 1a2 .. ,a..!.s..!.+1 .. ,sd la1, .. ,,a..!. E{0,1}} . 
2 2 2 
Client's Algorithm. A client at an address c =c 1c2 · · · cd broadcasts its query 
along a spanning tree to all nodes in the d / 2-dimensional cube spanned by the 
nodes in 
For each pair s,c E { 1, . .. , n} the rendez-V<JUS node is given by 
P(s) n Q(c) = {c1C2 .. ,c..!.s..!. +1 .. ,sd} . 
2 2 
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The number of message passes is the same for each server-client pair, and there-
fore 
m(n) = #P(s)+#Q(c) = 2Vn 
The nodes need 0( Vn )-size caches. 
Projective Plane Topology. 
The projective plane PG (2, k) has n = k2 + k + 1 points and equally many 
lines. Each line consists of k + 1 points and k + 1 lines pass through each point. 
Each pair of lines has exactly one point in common. In a network with projec-
tive plane topology, a server s posts its (port, address) to all nodes on an arbi-
trary line incident on its host node. A client c queries all nodes on an arbitrary 
line incident on its own host node. The single common node of the two lines is 
the rendez-vous node. A Vn size cache for each node suffices. Since the nodes are 
symmetric, it is easy to see that 
m(n) = #P(s)+#Q(c) = 2(k+l) ~ 2Vn . 
This combination of topology and algorithm is resistant to .failures of lines, pro-
vided no point has all lines passing through it removed. 
Hierarchical Networks 
Local-area networks are often connected, by galel.tx91 nodes, to wide-area net-
works, which, in turn, may also be interconnected. Locating services and objects 
in such network hierarchies is bound to become an acute problem. 
Service naming preferably should be resolved in a way which is machine-
independent and network-address-independent. Consequently, ways will have to 
be found to locate services in very large networks of hierarchical structure. 
There, the truly distributed Vn solutions to the locate problem are not accept-
able any more. Fortunately, in network hierarchies, it can be expected that 
local traffic is most frequent: most message passing between communicating enti-
ties is intra-host communication; of the remaining inter-host communication, 
most will be confined to a local-area network, and so on, up the network hierar-
chy. For locate algorithms these statistics for the locality of communication can 
be used to advantage. When a client initiates a locate operation, the system first 
does a local locate at the lowest level of the network hierarchy (e.g., inside the 
client host). If this fails, a locate is carried out at the next level of the hierarchy, 
and this goes on until the top level is reached. 
Assume that a level i network connects n; level i - 1 networks through n; gate-
ways, for each l<i,s;;;k (or basic nodes, at the lowest level 0 for i=l). Assume 
also that the n; gateway hosts compose a level i network with a topology which 
allows thrifty truly distributed match-making with 2 Vn message passes per 
match, for all i ;;;a. 1. 
Server's Algorithm. A server posts its (port, address) by selecting y';;; gateways, 
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works in a level i network, at each level i of the 
ost node to the highest level network, to advertise 
each level i on a path from its host node to the 
; locate in a network of that level can be done in 
;e pass complexity 
k 
1(n) E 0( L '/r4) 
i = l 
a total of n ,s;; rr: = I n; nodes. Assuming that all 
>er of levels in the hierarchy is k, and the total 
k is n = a* then the message pass complexity of 
me 1ocate IS m (n) E O(k Va). Therefore, 
I 
m(n) E O(kn 2* ) . 
Having the number k of levels in the hierarchy depend on n, the minimum value 
m(n ) E O(logn ) 
is reached for k = ½log n. This message pass complexity is much better than 
~( Vn ), but the cache size and the match-making load towards the top of the 
hierarchy increase rapidly. Essentially, the cache of a node has to hold as many 
(port, address)'s as there are nodes in the subtree it dominates. In some cases 
this can be avoided. For in a network hierarchy, as we have sketched, services 
are often exclusively accessed by local clients. A service that 'knows' it is local 
can do its posting local. This is, in fact, what the Amoeba local call does, 
described in § 2.4.1. 
2.6.8. Lighthouse Locate 
We imagine each grid point in the 2-dimensional Euclidean plane to hold a pro-
cessor. Communication between processors takes place over the grid lines. The 
number of servers satisfying a particular port in an n-element region of the grid 
has expected value sn for some fixed constants >0. 
In this (infinite) network, there are 2h 2 + 2h + 1 nodes within a radius of h 
hops, so the expected number of servers in a radius of VI/2s is 1. 
The Lighthouse Locate algorithm uses this in the following way: A server adver-
tises its presence by posting its (port, address) to a random node at a distance of 
hops, where c is a constant. This message passes l - I nodes on its way to its 
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destination. Each node on the path plus the destination node store the server's 
(port, address) in their cache. This is repeated at regular intervals; the server 
chooses another node each time. 
Simultaneously, nodes on previously visited paths discard their information as 
their caches fill up with information from other servers. The net effect is, that a 
server advertises its presence like a lighthouse: it sends out beams that leave a 
trail for a short time and then extinguish. This leads to the following algorithm: 
Server's Algorithm. Each server sends out a random direction beam of length l 
every 8 time units. Each trail left by such a beam disappears after d time units. 
That is, a node discards a (port, address) posting after d time units. Assume that 
the time for a message to run through a path of length l is so small in relation to 
d that the trail appears and disappears instantaneously. 
Client's Algorithm. To locate a server, the client beams a request in a random 
direction at regular intervals. Originally, the length of the beam is l' and the 
intervals are 8', where /' and 8' are constants of the algorithm. After e unsuc-
cessful trials, the client increases its effort by doubling the length of the inquiry 
beam and the intervals between them(/' - 2/' & 8 - 28). And so on. 
Another possibility is to let the length of the locate beam be 21; /', where 
t1, (i = 1,2, ... ) is 
0102010301020104010201030102010501020103 · · · 
Here the length of the locate beam is 2' /' once in each interval of 2' + 1 trials. 
(This sequence is sequence 51 in Sloane's catalogue?6 sometimes referred to as 
the binary carry sequence . ) The schedule can conveniently be maintained by a 
binary counter: the position i of the most significant bit changed by the current 
unit increment indicates the current beam length 2' /'. This schedule has the 
additional advantage that the servers which drift nearer to the client are located 
more quickly. 
Before the locate method for the euclidean plane can be converted into a 
practical algorithm for locating services it is necessary to find ways of mapping 
point-to-point networks onto the euclidean plane in such a way that the 
euclidean plane algorithm can be converted into an algorithm for a point-to-
point network. Fortunately, such a mapping can often be found. Most point-
to-point networks have routing tables that tell each node which outgoing arc to 
use to get a message to its destination. In [12] these tables are used back-to-
front to broadcast messages over the network in near optimal fashion. We can 
use these tables back-to-front to simulate sending messages along "a straight 
line" of certain length. The technique is as follows. 
A client (or server) wishing to send a beam of length k (using message passes 
as the unit of length) chooses a random outgoing arc and sends the message 
along it to its neighbour. This neighbour, upon reception of such a message 
decreases the hop count (in the message) by one, and sends the message on any 
one outgoing arc that is used to send messages from the node at the other end of 
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the arc to the original client (or server) where the beam started from. And so on, 
until the hop count reaches 0. 
2.6.9. Hash Locate 
Let in a given network G = ( U,E) the set of ports (i.e., types of services avail-
able) be II. We can define the functions P and Q as in Shotgun Locate, this time 
using the port identities as well: 
P,Q : U X II - 2u . 
If we are dealing with a very large network, where it is advantageous to have 
servers and clients look for nearby matches, we can hash a service onto nodes in 
neighbourhoods. A neighbourhood can be a local network, but also the network 
connecting the local networks, and so on. Therefore, such functions can be used 
to implement the idea of .certain services being local and others being more glo-
bal ( if. the section on hierarchically structured networks) thus balancing the pro-
cessing load more evenly over the hosts at each level of the network hierarchy. 
Like Shotgun Locate, the Hash Locate below is a specialisation of this more gen-
eral method. 
In Hash Locate we construct hash functions that map service names onto net-
work addresses. That is, 
P, Q: II - 2u & P = Q 
This technique is very efficient. Each server s posts its (port, address) at the 
node(s) P(7r), if.,, is the port of s, and each client in need for a service at port .,, 
queries (one of) the node(s) in P(7r). Apart from redundancy for fault-tolerance , 
clients and servers need only use one network node each in every match-making. 
(Clearly, the rendez-vous matrix must be interpreted differently in this setting.) 
Provided the hash function is well-chosen, it distributes the burden of the locate 
work over the network. It suffers from the drawback that, if nodes are added to 
the network, the hash function must be changed to incorporate these nodes in 
the set of potential rendez-vous nodes. 
3 
SERVICES, OBJECTS AND 
CAPABILITIES 
~ service is an abstraction. It allows its users to access and manipulate objects 
without knowledge of the implementation of the service or the structure of the 
objects. In this sense, objects and services can be compared to abstract data types. 
An abstract data type can only be accessed through a well defined set of opera-
tions; an Amoeba object can only be accessed through the service that imple-
ments the object. The set of operations on an Amoeba object is defined by the 
service that implements the object. 
The difference between abstract data types and services lies in the way they 
are used. An abstract data type is a way of structured programming; even when 
sharing the same abstract data types, programs do not share the physical objects 
created as a consequence of using the abstract data types. With services this is 
different: two processes, using the same service often share the same physical 
server process, and additional mechanisms are needed to prevent users from 
accidently, or maliciously manipulating each other's objects. 
This chapter presents general mechanisms for accessing services and the 
objects managed by them using a capability mechanism . This mechanism, which 
is integrated with the capability-based addressing mechanisms of the previous 
chapter, allows a client to operate on objects, managed by a service using 
requests and replies, with semantics defined by the designer of the service. 
Requests and replies come in pairs. A client process sends a request to a 
server process, the server carries out the request and returns a reply. These mes-
sage pairs, transactions, are supported by the transaction protocol which is used 
to reliably communicate requests and replies between clients and servers in as 
few messages as possible. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: § 3.1 discusses object 
oriented protection with capabilities; § 3.2 contains a description of the Trans-
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action Layer, the means by which clients and servers interact. § 3.3 describes 
the Directory Service, a service that provides storage and retrieval of capabili-
ties, and discusses means to protect capabilities from theft. 
3.1. Capabilities 
The Amoeba capability system allows object oriented protection : A client process 
requests a service to create an object of a certain type and receives a capability 
for the newly created object. This capability allows the client to address the 
object in future requests, and prevents other processes that do not possess the 
capability for that particular object from accessing it. 
In the previous chapter it was shown that ports are capabilities for communi-
cation between processes, and that these capabilities are handled directly by the 
processes holding them. The same applies to capabilities for objects. This con-
trasts sharply with the management of capabilities in other capability systems. 
Usually, capabilities are maintained by the operating system, where users can 
only manipulate them through system calls. Examples of such systems are 
Hydra~•28 and Roscoe?7 
In Amoeba, capabilities are not managed by the operating system, but they 
are stored directly in user space. There are several reasons for this. To begin 
with, the Amoeba operating system kernels need not be secure, so they are not 
very useful as reliable managers of capabilities. Furthermore, it will be shown 
that there is no necessity for keeping capabilities out of the user's reach, because, 
properly constructed, capabilities can not be misused, even though they are kept 
in user space. Amoeba keeps capabilities in user space, and it will be shown that 
the Amoeba capability system is just as powerful as other capability systems 
where a secure operating system safekeeps capabilities and carries out operations 
on them. 
A capability is a ticket the possession of which allows the holder to carry out 
certain operations on a specific object. To carry out the same operations on 
another object requires a different capability; other operations on the same 
object also require another capability. The operations allowed by a capability 
on an object by its holder are usually called rights. A capability can hold many 
rights, allowing its holder to carry out many operations on the object it is for, or 
it can have just one right, allowing its holder just to carry out the operations 
allowed by the one right. 
To illustrate the use of these rights, consider a file system. The objects of the 
file system are files. When a file is created, the owner usually receives a capabil-
ity for the file with all the rights on. Files are often shared, however, and typi-
cally the owner would like to give other users permission to read, but not write 
the file, or permission to read and write, but not delete the file , or permission to 
read and append to the file, but not destroy any information already on the file. 
The rights for a file capability are typically: oumer , which allows the holder to 
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remove the file, create new capabilities with other rights, or invalidate all other 
capabilities; read, which allows the holder to read the file, but nothing else; 
write, which allows the holder to write the file, but not read it; and append, 
which allows the holder to append to the file, but not overwrite existing informa-
tion. 
When a service is designed, the operations on its objects are defined, and what 
rights are needed to allow holders of capabilities to carry them out. For each 
type of object there is a different set of operations and a different set of rights. 
3.1.1. Capabilities and Ports 
Capabilities are closely related to ports. To get access to an object, managed by 
some server, a client process needs a capability to access the service, and then a 
capability to access the object within the service. We can think of the concate-
nation of these two capabilities as a capability for the object, and view the ser-
vice as an abstract data type, defining the set of operations on the object. 
An Amoeba capability for object O managed by service S is defined as a bit 
string, made up of two parts, the put-port for service S, and a private part, inter-
preted by service S as a capability for object O. This is illustrated in Fm-
URE 3.1. 
PORT PRIVATE 
FIGURE 3.1. Layout of a capability with a port-part and a private part 
The designer of the service is free to determine both the length and the seman-
tics of the private part. Most services to date use an 80-bit private part for a 
128-bit capability. Often, the private part will contain an object field which is 
used as an index into a table of objects, a rights field, indicating what rights the 
capability holds for the object, and a check field which makes the capability 
sparse (see FIGURE 3.2). Sparseness is essential for protection; capabilities are 
kept in user space, so a malicious user may try to forge capabilities by creating 
bit strings and passing them off as capabilities. By making capabilities sparse 
enough, the probability of a user succeeding in corning up with a bit string that 
is a legal capability can be made arbitrarily small. 
The check field of a capability must depend on the object field and the rights 
field. If this were not the case it would be trivial, knowing a capability for one 
object, to create capabilities with different rights for that object, or to construct 
capabilities for other objects as well. Typically a server will encrypt the object 
number, the rights field and possibly a random number, using a one-way func-
tion* and use the result as the check part of the capability. 
* One-way functions were discussed in § 2.3.3. 
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PORT OBJECT CHECK 
FmURE 3.2. Layout of a typical capability 
Servers are not required to adhere to the capability structure of FIGURE 3.2, 
but it is a general form, and it will be used to illustrate how operations on capa-
bilities can be implemented. Some services, for instance, may not distinguish 
different rights on their objects, so they will not have a rights field. Other ser-
vices may not use objects (e.g., compiler service), but have different rights (e.g., 
for debugging options); such services will not use an object field. 
3.1.2. Operations on Capabilities 
The operations on capabilities are not just limited to presenting them to services 
to carry out operations on objects. It is possible to give capabilities away to 
other clients, giving them permission to perform the same operations on the 
object. New capabilities can be derived from old ones with a subset of the rights 
of the original one, or capabilities can be made invalid. In this section the 
operations on capabilities are discussed: capability passing , restriction , and retrac-
tion . 
Capability passing is trivial in Amoeba. Capabilities are stored directly in user 
space, so users have direct control over them. A user with a capability for an 
object can give another user the same rights to the object by just giving away a 
copy of the capability. In fact, there is no way to prevent users from giving 
away capabilities!9 By some, this is viewed as a defect of our capability system. 
Suppose user A holds a capability for some object, and A is not allowed to give 
that capability to user B . However, A can give a capability for that capability to 
B : All A needs to do is forward requests for operations using that capability 
from B to the server. A has then effectively given away the capability to B. It 
is because of this that we have decided it is useless to restrict capability passing 
in Amoeba. 
Although we believe it is useless to restrict capability passing, it is not difficult 
to implement in Amoeba. There is a simple mechanism which makes a capabil-
ity that works in the hands of one user useless in the hands of another. In order 
to make this work, users must provide an authenticating signature with each 
request (see § 2.3.2). A service that wants to hand out a capability that works in 
the hands of just one user, encrypts the original capability with the client's 
ciphertext signature before giving it to that user:I' When the capability is subse-
quently presented to the service, the original is encrypted with the received 
ciphertext signature and compared to the presented capability. If there is a 
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match, the capability was valid. If not, either the capability or the signature 
was wrong; in the latter case, it was a capability that was given away. 
In this scheme it is still possible to give capabilities away to other users, but 
this requires giving away the authenticating signature as well. We do not know 
any systems, however, where this is not possible: Most operating systems that 
claim to be secure, use passwords for user authentication; giving away one's sig-
nature in Amoeba amounts to the same thing as giving away one's password in 
another operating system. 
Before giving away a capability to another user, it is often necessary to restrict 
that capability; that is, take away some of the rights in the capability. Again we 
consider the example of a file server. When a client requests the file server to 
create a file, the server returns an owner capability, a capability with all the 
rights on. Often the client will allow others to read the file, and perhaps allow 
some to write it or ~ppend to it as well. It will be seldom, however, that a client 
will give the owner right away, the right to remove the file altogether, and the 
right to retract the existing capabilities (make the existing capabilities illegal). 
First these rights have to be removed from the capability. 
In conventional capability systems, where the capabilities are managed by the 
operating system this is easy : when a 'pass capability' system call is made, the 
client specifies which rights should be passed, and the operating system will strip 
some rights bits before copying the capability. In our system this is more 
difficult, since capabilities are in user space. If the client could just strip some 
rights bits and then give the capability away, there is nothing to prevent the 
recipient to add these bits again. 
The usual way to do restnct is to ask the server to create a restricted capabil-
ity. The capability of FIGURE 3.2, for instance, can be constructed by making 
the check field depend on the object and rights fields. To make a restricted capa-
bility, the server would clear selected rights bits and recompute the check field. 
This is a straightforward mechanism, but it requires an extra transaction with 
the server, each time a (new) restricted capability is required. In practise, the 
message traffic need not increase at all, however, if servers allow their clients to 
ask for a number of capabilities with different rights the moment an object is 
created. Apart from the owner capability, a user would then receive a few other 
capabilities 'for giving away.' 
An alternative scheme exists that allows clients to construct capabilities with 
restricted rights themselves. Naturally, this mechanism can only be used to 
remove rights, not add them. The method is based on one-way Junctions , which, 
as it turns out, find many applications in Amoeba. The mechanism works as fol-
lows. 
We start with the familiar capability layout of FIGURE 3.2. We assume there 
are k rights, numbered from 1 to k . Each right is represented by one bit in the 
• Note, that only the holder of the plaintext signature can send messages such that the receiver gets 
the associated ciphertext signature. 
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nghts field, a one when the right is present, a zero when it is absent. Initially, 
the server constructs a capability with all the rights on, the rights field is set to 
all ones, and the check field is set to some random number. One random 
number is chosen per object, and stored along with the object. 
Let us now assume there are k one-way functions, G1 , • • • ,Gk , one for each 
right, that are commutative , that is, 
G; 0 G1(R) = G1 ° G;(R) for all functions G, and G1. 
The functions G; form a mapping of the check field onto itself. The server makes 
the functions G; public, and clients can restrict capabilities by proceeding as fol-
lows: Given a capability with right i on, a new capability with right i off is 
created by clearing the i 'th rights bit, and applying G; to the check field. The 
capability thus constructed can be further restricting by repeating the procedure 
over and over. The commutativity of the one-way functions ensures that the 
order in which the rights are removed is irrelevant. It is thus used only for con-
venience; one could also tag a list onto capabilities providing the order of the G's 
onto the capability. 
When presented with a capability, the server can easily check the validity by 
applying the one-way functions associated with the absent rights (indicated by 
the rights bits in the nghts field of the presented capability) to the original ran-
dom number (which was stored along with the object itself). If this yields the 
same check field as the one in the presented capability, the capability is genuine. 
It is an interesting exercise to find a set of commutative one-way functions. 
We have succeeded in creating such a set, based on the RSA public key algo-
rithm?8 It is not always practical, however, due to the enormous size of the check 
field necessary for this method. This is how it works. 
Choose a number n of sufficient size that it cannot be factored (this may be 
done by taking the product of two or more large primes, as in the RSA algo-
rithm). Also choose k numbers e1 , • · · , e* . These numbers must be chosen in a 
special way, which will be explained later. Define G;(R ) (i = 1, · · ·, k) as 
follows : 
G;(R) = R'· mod n 
Then the functions G; are commutative: 
G,G1(R) - R','• mod n R'·', - R':, mod n = G1G;(R) 
The G; commute, but are they one-way functions? They are, if the e; are 
chosen to be relatively prime to q,(n ):" In order to see this, note that each of the 
G; can be viewed as an RSA public-key encryption function with the decryption 
function thrown away. The arguments for the robustness of the RSA algorithm 
also apply to our one-way functions. In Rivest, Shamir and Adleman's paper a 
discussion can be found on the security of the algorithm?8 
• Euler's Totient function 
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Thee; must be chosen carefully. Suppose e; is a multiple of e1. Then, having 
a capability without right j, it is possible to change it into a capability without 
right i, by raising the check field to the power i / j , thus giving a capability 
without right i, but with right j. But if all the e, are co-prime such constructions 
are not possible. In fact, another interesting construction becomes possible if the 
e; are co-prime. Suppose a client holds two capabilities that differ in one aspect: 
one has right j but does not have right i and the other has right i but does not 
have right j. The client that holds these capabilities can combine the two to 
make one capability that has both right i and right j by choosing two numbers 
d; and d1, such that e;d; - e1d1 = 1. Note that such numbers exist since e; and e1 
are co-prime. The capability that contains right i, but not right j contains some 
random number R, raised to the power e1, while the other capability contains the 
same number R, raised to the power e;. What is needed for the combined capa-
bility is the number R itsel£ This number can easily be found by computing 
R'·d. 
R=-- modn 
- R'A 
This computations is feasible if R'·', is co-prime with n. This is almost certainly 
the case, since n is the product of two very large primes. 
It is unfortunate that this method for restricting capabilities is not practical at 
present for Amoeba capabilities, because of the large check fields needed, caused 
by the large moduli required for sufficient security. The method might be 
applied in environments where capabilities must be made very secure and their 
size is not too large a price to pay for that security. A possible future VLSI 
implementation could make it acceptable, however. 
A compromise between restrict implemented inside the server, and restrict by 
the client using commutative one-way functions, is to use one-way functions that 
do not commute. These can be used in two ways: the simplest way is to allow 
rights to be stripped only in a predefined order. The commutative property is 
not necessary then. In many cases this restriction on the order in which rights 
can be stripped is not so severe as it seems. On a file, for instance, a typical 
order of the rights could be owner, write, append, and read . Only in few applica-
tions the rights will have to be taken off in any different order. In these cases, a 
requests could be sent to the server to create a special capability. 
When rights can only be taken off in one predefined order, there is no need 
for a different one-way function for each right. One function will do, the 
number of times it is applied then serves as the indication of what rights are still 
present. In fact, the rights field can be totally dispensed with. When the size of 
the check field is taken to be the same size as that of a port , the standard one-
way function F can be used. 
A method that does not require commutative one-way functions, but allows 
taking away rights in any order, requires that capabilities contain the order in 
which rights were taken away. The server can then perform the same computa-
tions as the client in order to check the validity of a capability. This method 
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does need k different one-way functions for k different rights. The number of 
orders in which k rights can be taken away is k ! , so the number of extra bits 
needed to store this information is log2 k !. For example, for 4 rights, 8 bits are 
needed, for 8 rights, 20 bits and for 16 rights, 50 bits. 
The retract operation invalidates all extant capabilities for an object, and gives 
the owner a new one. In conventional capability systems retract is a complicated 
operation, requiring indirect objects, back pointers and other complicated 
machinery (see, for example, [28]); in Amoeba retract is simple: the server need 
only change the object's random number, and give the owner the new capability 
derived from it. All extant capabilities automatically become invalid. The 
retract right is, of course, a powerful right, which should not be given away 
lightly. Possession of this right allows the holder to make the object inaccessible 
to everyone else. In practise, retract will be protected by the owner right, or by a 
separate rights bit. 
3.2. The Transaction Layer 
The paradigm of interprocess communication in Amoeba is the transaction. In a 
transaction, a client process transmits a request for an operation on an object to 
one of the server processes for the object. The server process carries out the 
request and returns a reply . The request-reply pair forms a transaction. 
Processes dynamically take on the role of client or server. Server processes pas-
sively wait for requests to be sent to them. Client processes actively send 
requests. A process can be a client and a server simultaneously. 
The Port Layer, which has been described in the previous chapter, provides a 
datagram service between processes. The Port Layer makes an effort to deliver 
every message, but occasionally messages may be lost. A layer on top of the 
Port Layer is needed to implement reliable transactions. This layer is the 
Transaction Layer. Basically, the Transaction Layer provides calls for sending 
and receiving requests and replies. 
In principle, the Transaction Layer can reside both in user space, and in the 
operating system. In the future, it could even be designed as a peripheral dev-
ice, much like the F-box of the previous chapter. In this section, however, it is 
assumed that the Transaction Layer is in the operating system, where it is 
accessed by user programs via system calls. 
3.2.1. The Nature of Interprocess Communication 
Choosing a transaction mechanism as the paradigm for communication is not at 
all a natural choice. Most computer networks use virtual circuits to implement 
a reliable, flow-controlled byte stream between processes. The Amoeba distri-
buted operating system has a transaction protocol, which provides communica-
tion in the form of requests and replies, messages of finite maximum length. 
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There is no flow control and no sequencing: a server, prepared for one request 
at a time, may be bombarded by many requests from many different clients all 
at once; two requests sent to the same server one after the other need not arrive 
in the same order. If a client wants flow control, it must wait for a reply before 
sending the next request. Compared to the smooth, error free, flow controlled 
byte stream of other distributed systems, the Amoeba protocols appear primitive. 
But the simplicity of the Amoeba Transaction Protocol is its strength. 
Virtual circuits, with their flow control, sequencing and error recovery, must 
be set up before the first message can be transmitted, and taken down after the 
last message has been received. Usually, the protocols that maintain virtual cir-
cuits use complicated protocols for optimum exploitation of the available 
bandwidth. Often, messages are accepted out of order, and reassembled in the 
proper sequence after arrival. Clever piggybacking allows acknowledgements to 
be included in reverse traffic. But all this cleverness is expensive: Experience 
with virtual circuit protocols has shown that the overhead of maintaining the 
protocol costs so much, that the available bandwidth is not used more optimally 
and that the bandwidth of the transmission medium itself is often several orders 
of magnitude higher than the bandwidth of the protocol itself. This inefficiency 
of virtual circuits is one of the reasons that Amoeba uses a different philosophy. 
Virtual circuits can be efficient for bulky transmissions of large bodies of data 
from one process to another. In contrast to virtual circuits, transactions require 
no set up (this will be shown later), hence transactions are efficient for short 
interactions between processes. 
The above arguments show that if a choice is necessary between virtual circuit 
service and transaction service, it is important to know how many conversations 
between processes are of the long and bulky kind, and how many are exchanges 
of single messages. We believe the latter kind is far more common than the 
former. The reasons follow. 
Traditionally, data processing consisted of sequential processing of large files. 
A large file would be updated once in a while, by collecting the changes, sorting 
them, and then updating the file while copying it. This method is rapidly 
becoming obsolete. By and large, computer systems will mostly be used interac-
tively. Large (sorted) files disappear in favour of databases which provide more 
possibilities and can be updated in place. Techniques are being developed in 
the data base world to minimise network traffic by optimum allocation of the 
data and judiciously choosing the locations where queries are resolved. Modern 
interactive data base systems mostly use short transactions, large bodies of data 
need seldom be transferred. 
Not all computer data are stored in data bases, however. There is still need for 
file systems, occasionally containing very large files. In text processing, for 
instance, files of more than a megabyte are not uncommon. File transfer is usually 
considered as a typical example of an operation where a virtual circuit is better 
suited than a transaction protocol. However, there are several reasons why trans-
action protocols merit investigation, even for applications such as file transfer. 
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First, there is the semantic argument : Interprocess Communication is most fre-
quently used to communicate requests over the network. Even in large file 
transfers, there is usually a command, accompanying the file, telling the remote 
machine what to do with the received file. IPC semantics based on procedure 
call are more suited to this kind of communication than semantics based on 
sequential file 1/ o. The Remote Procedure Call 51 mechanism has become a popular 
semantic model for IPC. In this mechanism, which requires a hook into the pro-
gramming language used, one process, the caller, can call a subroutine in 
another process, the callee. When a remote procedure call is made, a stub in the 
caller's address space is called, which wraps the procedure's parameters in a 
message and sends the message to a stub in the callee's address space. The cal-
lee stub unwraps the message, and calls the subroutine with the appropriate 
parameters. The procedure's return value is returned to the caller's stub in 
another message. The caller stub then returns the result to the calling program. 
The differences betwween local and remote procedure calls are hidden as much 
as possible. A few differences cannot be hidden, however, mostly related with 
passing pointers to objects in the caller's or callee's address space. 
The differences between transactions and remote procedure calls are mostly 
syntactical: In remote procedure call, the caller calls a remote procedure, and 
hidden mechanisms do the message exchange. In a transaction mechanism, the 
client explicitly sends a request and waits for the reply; the message exchange is 
not hidden. But the most important difference is the following: When a remote 
procedure call mechanism is used, a typical client writes a piece of a file by cal-
ling the remote write procedure, e.g.: 
result = write(filename, data) ; 
If there are several file serveers in the system, the client stub must find out which 
one to use. In order to do this, the stub must examine the filename argument. 
Worse still, adding another file server may require changing all the stubs to 
incorporate knowledge about the new server. 
In object-oriented systems, procedure name and object argument (e.g., 
filename ) object with the operation (e.g., write) as a parameter. Translated in a 
language construct it might look like 
result = filename(write , data); 
The transaction mechanism does this: a request is sent for an operation on an 
object; the object's capability can be viewed as the message's destination (the 
system routes the message to the object's server, the server then operates on the 
object), the operation code (e.g., write) is a parameter of the request. 
Second, a transaction protocol (which can also be used for implementing a 
remote procedure mechanism) is much simpler than a byte stream protocol. A 
byte stream protocol usually employs a sliding window mechanism and sequence 
numbers for sequencing messages, and it has to maintain a connection record for 
the duration of the conversation. A server, communicating simultaneously with 
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hundreds of clients thus needs hundreds of connection records ( and as many 
buffers for receiving messages). A transaction protocol can be kept much 
simpler. There is no need for a transaction recard between transactions, so a 
server, while serving hundreds of clients, needs only transaction records (and · 
buffers) for the number of simultaneously active transactions. This number can 
be much less and it is under control of the server. 
Third, a byte stream protocol crashes when one of the communicating 
processes crashes. Every process, client or server, needs code that will help it to 
deal with a crashed partner. This leads to a duplication of effort: there is 
recovery code in the byte stream protocol for lost and garbled messages and 
recovery code in the user programs to deal with crashed communication lines 
and crashed processes. A transaction protocol needs no special provisions: the 
same mechanism is used to deal with bad communication lines, lost messages, 
and crashed processes. When a client process detects a failed transaction, it can 
usually redo the transaction immediately, to have it carried out by another 
server process. Services are designed to do this correctly. 
Fourth, byte stream protocols are usually complicated to deal efficiently with 
lost and garbled messages. But local networks are very fast and extremely reli-
able nowadays, so the extra overhead due to the more complicated protocols 
probably outweighs the additional efficiency of better dealing with lost messages. 
Transaction protocols are simpler, so the overhead of sending messages is less. 
Fifth, although byte stream protocols may be more efficient in number of mes-
sages for transfers of many messages, file transfer is often better off if a trans-
action protocol is used. The size of file transfers, in many cases, is too small to 
make a byte stream protocol efficient. As an example of the typical sizes of the 
files in a computer system, we have examined the files of our own Computer Sci-
ence Department UNIX system. Our system is mainly used for research, program 
development and text processing, and measurements showed that nearly 70% of 
the 20,000 or so files are less than 2K bytes in size (see FIGURE 3.3). Since 
popular local-area network interfaces typically support packet sizes betwween 
1 K and 2K bytes~ this means that between half and two thirds of the files fit in 
one packet. 
The sizes of files give a good indication of the amounts of data to be shipped 
through the network, because it is the natural place to store that data. Typi-
cally, a number of processes will process data that originates from a file, is 
passed around, modified, and ends up on another file. Many files are not read 
sequentially, which results in smaller chunks of data on the network. The 
numbers, presented above, therefore give a good indication of the maximum sizes 
of data transfers, while on average the transfers will be much smaller. 
We are not the first to observe that the •nature of most conversations in a com-
puter system has a transaction nature; Per Brinch-Hansen6 used the concept of 
message and answer in the IPC mechanism of the RC 4000 system, and the Thoth 
• e.g., 1500 bytes for Ethernet; 2044 bytes for Pronet token ring 
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File length percent File length percent 
0 1.12 2047 67.06 
1 1.12 4095 78.57 
3 1.21 8191 87.90 
7 1.42 16383 94.11 
15 2.18 32767 97.41 
31 3.68 65535 99.01 
63 6.36 131071 99.72 
127 11.48 262143 99.93 
255 19.82 524287 99.97 
511 33.61 1048575 99.99 
1023 51.86 2097151 100.00 
FIGURE 3.3. Percentage of files smaller or equal to the indicated length (in 
bytes). This data was obtained from 600 Mbytes of files in the computers 
in the Computer Science Dept. of the Vrije Universiteit. 
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or V system uses similar primitives in .Send and .Reply~•9 The RIG system of the 
University of Rochester is an example of a system that has both atomic transactions 
and connections , the first for request and reply, the second for longer conversa-
tions? These exist as two separate mechanisms however. 
As an aside before getting into the technical details of the Amoeba Transaction 
Protocol, it is worth noting that many applications are more transaction oriented 
than is often realised. Consider, for example, file transfer. The traditional 
mechanism is to set up a connection between two processes and send the file 
over it. In fact, the programs carrying out the file transfer invariably consist of 
a main loop with read and write statements inside the loop. We maintain that 
since the file really is transferred in a series of discrete transactions, the most log-
ical way of viewing the transfer is to see the reader as a client and the writer as 
a server. The client sends a request saying 'Give me a piece of the file' and the 
server replies with the requested data. The sequence is repeated until the file is 
transferred. 
The strongest argument for a transaction-oriented transport protocol, however, 
is its speed. Few local networks, using virtual circuits obtain a user process to 
user process throughput of more than 25 Kbytes/sec, although the network itself 
(e.g. , csMA/co or a ring) can transfer more than 1 Mbyte/sec. The implementa-
tion of the Amoeba transaction protocols has resulted in a 300 Kbyte per second 
continuous transmission rate between user processes on different machines on an 
otherwise idle token ring~7 
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3.2.2. Transactions 
From the viewpoint of clients and servers, transactions consist of a request, sent 
by the client to the server, followed by a reply form the server to the client. The 
Transaction Layer puts requests and replies in messages and transmits them. 
The Transaction Layer has to meet two goals: It must be reliable, and it must 
be fast. Distributed systems rely heavily on interprocess communication facili-
ties. In fact, where system calls were used traditionally, distributed systems often 
use interprocess communication facilities to get the requested work carried out 
by a remote service process. Clearly, the efficiency of the interprocess communi-
cation mechanisms will determine the practicality of a distributed system to a 
great extent. 
To obtain maximum efficiency, the implementation of the Transaction Layer 
can be dependent on the efficiency and reliability of the underlying network. 
Transactions are used for all interprocess communication in the system, not only 
for communication between processes residing on different hosts, but also 
between processes on the same host and even between a process and the operat-
ing system kernel. To most processes, the Transaction Layer calls are the only 
available system calls. 
The Transaction Layer protocol for 'intra-host' communication can be totally 
different from the protocol for communication through the network, although, of 
course, the syntax and semantics of the calls must be identical. Intra-host proto-
cols will be discussed in Chapter 4. In this section we concentrate on the Trans-
action Layer protocols for communication, using the facilities provided by the 
Port Layer. 
Besides the request and reply messages the Transaction Layer employs control 
messages to make the protocol work properly. In designing the Transaction Pro-
tocol we have made an effort to make the protocol work as fast as possible, 
partly by minimising the number of messages transmitted in a transaction. The 
minimum number of messages is, of course, two: a request message and a reply 
message . In many transactions only these two messages are needed. 
The Transaction Layer uses timers to detect various failures. Retransmission 
timers detect lost messages or crashed partner processes, crash timers are used to 
detect server crashes, and piggyback timers can be used to delay some control mes-
sages to enable them to be included in request or reply messages . 
Most transactions are short. Servers can often provide a reply to a request 
almost immediately. Short transactions are handled most efficiently by the 
Transaction Protocol. In a single short transaction, the client sends a request, 
the server sends a reply, and the client sends a control message to acknowledge 
receipt of the reply. Sequences of short transactions to the same server (e.g., a 
sequence of database queries) are handled even more efficiently: the next request 
serves as an acknowledgement for the reply to the previous request. 
Some transactions take a long time. The Transaction Protocol allows arbi-
trarily long transactions. These are useful, for instance, for transactions with ter-
minal servers and slow or elaborate services. The Transaction Protocol uses 
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control m~ges at regular intervals to check if the (slow) server has not 
crashed. Clients also have the option of interrupting a transaction if it takes too 
long. 
3.2.3. The Transaction Interface 
Requests and replies have two data areas: a data buffer and a param£ter area. 
The data buffer contains the main body of data in a request or reply, while the 
parameter area can be used for additional information, such as capabilities, 
request types, parameters to a request, information about success or failure of a 
transaction, etc. 
These two buffers have been kept separate to reduce the need of in-core copy-
ing: Usually, the main body of data to be transmitted in a request or reply is 
available in the sending process' main memory. If requests have to be sent by 
passing a consecutive area of memory containing the request type, parameters, 
and the data to the Transaction Layer, copying is often unavoidable. If, how-
ever, sending a request can be done by passing two pointers, one to a small 
buffer with request parameters, and one to the main body of data, large 
amounts of in-core copying can be saved. 
In-core copying is an expensive operation compared to the the speed of fast 
local networks. On a small cpu, a copy loop to or from user space may require 
as much as 10 µsec per word. For a 1000 byte m~ge, which has to be copied 
twice ( once at the transmitter's end, and once at the receiver's end), this costs 10 
msec, while the network hardware is usually capable of transmitting such a mes-
sage in less than 1 msec ( after copying the message from main memory to an 
internal buffer using DMA). Many IPC mechanisms consist of a number of layers 
of protocol, each layer copying data from buffers supplied by higher layers into 
m~ges intended for lower layers and vice versa. In the design of the Amoeba 
Transaction Protocol, avoidance of m~ge copying was an important con-
sideration. 
Requests and replies may also contain a signature. Signatures can be used for 
authentication purposes, since they are encrypted with the same one-way func-
tion that is used for ports. The method is described in § 2.3.2. 
The Transaction Layer calls for clients are shown in FIGURE 3.4, and those for 
servers in FIGURE 3.5. Transaction calls use a data structure containing four 
items: a pointer to an 18-byte parameter area, a pointer to a signature (this 
pointer may be nil), the length of the main data buffer, and, if the length is not 
zero, its address. The layout of the parameter area is up to the Transaction 
Layer users. In requests, the parameter area will usually contain the private 
part of a capability which, combined with the destination port, forms a complete 
capability for an object. 
Transaction carries out a transaction. The request, indicated by preq is sent to 
the service whose port is given in the dport parameter. The buffer available for 
the reply is indicated by prep. 
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struct tlparam { 
} ; 
char •t1 _par; 
Port •t1 _sig; 
unsigned ti _Jen; 
char •t1 buf; 
int transaction(dport, preq, prep); 
Port *dport; 
struct tlparam •prep, •preq; 
putsig(psig) ; 
struct tlparam •psig; 
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FIGURE 3.4. The Transaction Layer interface for clients 
int getreq(port, preq); 
Port •port; 
struct tlparam •preq; 
putrep(prep ); 
struct tlparam •prep; 
getsig(gsig, func); 
struct tlparam *gsig; 
void *func(); 
FIGURE 3.5. The Transaction Layer calls for services 
Transactions are blocking; that is, the calling process is blocked while the 
transaction is being carried out. A discussion on blocking vs. non-blocking com-
munication calls can be found in § 4.1.3. Although transactions are blocking, 
an interrupt, caused by an external event, can temporarily unblock a process in a 
transaction. After examining the cause of the interrupt, the process may wish to 
abort the transaction by a call to putsig, which sends a signal to the service car-
rying out the request. 
Services may receive these signals, or ignore them. In the latter case, sending 
a signal has no effect. In the former case, the service may decide to treat the 
signal as it sees fit. In both cases, the service must still return a reply and the 
client must expect one. The putsig call has one parameter: a pointer to a 
tlparam structure, of which only the first two fields are used for an 18-byte inter-
rupt message, and, possibly, a signature.· 
The server calls are complementary to the client calls. Getreq initiates a trans-
action at the server's end. Its parameters are the port on which requests are to 
be received and a tlparam structure giving the address of the buffer for the 
received parameter area, the address for a received signature, and the length 
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and address of the available buffer. Getreq blocks until a request is received. 
Putrep has one parameter, a pointer to a tlparam structure, describing the 
reply. 
Getsig can be used to indicate willingness to receive signals from clients. When 
a signal is received-indicated by an interrupt-the server can act on it by 
aborting the transaction and returning a reply immediately. Note that a signal 
is treated by a service as it sees fit , and that a reply is always required, signal or 
no signal. 
3.2.4. The Transaction Protocol 
The Transaction Protocol was designed to use a nurumum of messages for 
sequences of short transactions. In longer transactions control messages are used 
to acknowledge receipt of requests or replies and to check for server crashes. In 
this section the Transaction Protocol will be described using state diagrams , but 
first the different message types and their layout will be shown. 
The Transaction Layer uses three kinds of messages: data messages , signal mes-
sages and control messages . There are two types of data messages : request messages 
and reply messages , and there are three types of control messages : ack messages , nak 
messages , and enq messages . 
The layout of all messages is the same, although the lengths differ; control 
messages contain only some of the fields. This is shown in FIGURE 3.6. Control 
messages and signal messages are 40 bytes long, and data messages between 40 and 
32K + 40 bytes. The fields are used as follows: The 16-bit length field gives the 
length of the message (exclusive of the header); the destination port is the port 
where the message is sent; the rep{y port is the port where the message originates; 
the signature port contains the signature passed by the users (in control messages 
this field is unused); the type field contains the message type (0=request, 
l=reply, 2=signal, 4=enq, 5=ack, 6=nak); the sequence field holds a sequence 
number, used in sequences of transactions; finally there is an 18-byte parameter 
area and the header is followed by a data buffer of length between 0 and 32K 
bytes. 
We shall now show the protocol using the state transition diagrams for client 
and server end of the Transaction Protocol. The state transition diagrams for 
client and server are shown in FIGURE 3. 7. The transitions have been labelled 
for easy reference in the text. In both diagrams two states are special : START 
and FINISH. These states indicate that no transaction record exists. An event in 
state START will cause a transaction to be started and a transaction record to be 
created. An event causing a transition to state FINISH will cause a transaction to 
end and the transactwn record to be deleted. 
The client states have the following meaning: 
WTACK A request has been sent, the retransmission timer is running, and the 
client is waiting for an ack message, signaling receipt of the request, or a 
reply. 
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message length 
(2 bytes) 
destination port 
(6 bytes) 
reply port 
(6 bytes) 
signature port 
(6 bytes) 
type 
sequence 
parameter 
area 
(18 bytes) 
data 
buffer 
(0 - 32K bytes) 
FIGURE 3.6. Transaction Layer message layout. 
WI'REP The server has acknowledged receipt of the request. A crash timer has 
been started to detect server crashes. 
WI'ENQ The crash timer ran off, or the client process sent a signal. A 
retransmission timer is running and the client is waiting for an ack-
nowledgement on the enq message or signal message . 
PIG11M The reply has been received and a piggyback timer is running, delay-
ing the ack message that must be sent to acknowledge receipt of the 
reply in case a new .request is sent to the same server, which may also 
function as acknowledgement. 
The states at the server end have the following meaning: 
WI'REQ The server process has called getreq and is now waiting for a request to 
come m. 
PIGTIM An acknowledgement for a received request, enq message or signal mes-
sage must be sent. A piggyback timer is running to delay transmission 
of the ack message in case the reply is sent quickly. 
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FIGURE 3.7. State transition diagrams for the Transaction Protocol, those 
for clients on the left, those for servers on the right. The transitions are dis-
cussed in the text. 
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WTREP The ack message has been sent. The Transaction Layer is now waiting 
until the reply will be sent. 
WTACK The reply has been sent. The server is waiting for acknowledgement in 
the form of an ack message or another request from the same client. A 
retransmission timer is running in order to retransmit the reply, when 
necessary. 
Now the meaning of the states is somewhat clear, the state transitions will be 
shown. The transitions are indicated by numbers in FIGURE 3. 7, where one also 
sees the previous state and the new state. The event, causing the transition, and 
the actions to be taken when the event occurs will be given, first for the client 
end, then for the server end of the Transaction Protocol. 
1,2 Event: The client makes a call to transaction. 
Action: A check is made if there is an existing transaction record for the 
same server in state PIGTIM. If this is the case, this transaction record will 
be used after incrementing the transaction sequence number. Otherwise, 
a new transaction record is created, the sequence number is set to zero, 
and a unique port is generated to be used as reply port. Then a request 
74 SERVICES, OBJECTS AND CAPABILITIES 3. 
message is sent; if it is a new request it is sent using putany , otherwise it 
also serves as an acknowledgement and is sent using put . Finally, a 
retransmission timer is started and the crash timer is set to its initial value 
(but not yet started). 
3 Event: The retransmission timer expires. 
Action: The retransmission counter is incremented. If it has reached a 
predetermined maximum, the transaction is aborted, the client receives 
an interrupt, signaling transaction failure, and the transaction record is 
deleted. Otherwise, the request is transmitted again and the retransmis-
sion timer is restarted. For retransmission put is used. If this call results 
in a locate failure, another retransmission is carried out, this time using 
putany . All subsequent messages are sent using put or received using get . 
4,5,6 Event: A reply is received. 
Action: Timers are stopped, the reply is copied to the user buffers insofar 
as is necessary, an interrupt, signaling reception of the reply, is given to 
the client process, and a piggyback timer is started for the acknowledge-
ment. 
7 ,8 Event: An ack message is received. 
Action: The retransmission timer is stopped, the crash timer is started. 
9 Event: The crash timer expires. 
Action: An enq message is sent, and the retransmission timer is started. 
The retransmission count is set to zero. The crash timer value is doubled, 
but not beyond a predetermined maximum value. The crash timer is not 
yet started, however. 
10 Event: The client makes a call to putsig . 
Action: The crash timer is stopped and set to its initial value. A signal 
message is made and transmitted. The retransmission timer is started. 
11 Event: The retransmission timer expires 
Action: The retransmission count is incremented. If it reaches its 
predetermined maximum, the transaction is aborted, the transaction 
record deleted, and the client process receives an interrupt signaling 
'server crash.' If not, the enq message or signal message is retransmitted 
and the retransmission timer is restarted. 
12 Event: The piggyback timer expires 
Action: An ack message is transmitted, the transaction record is deleted. 
For the server end of the Transaction Protocol the events and actions are: 
Event: The server process makes a call to getreq . 
Action: A transaction record is created, and a getany is done for the request. 
2 Event: A request arrives. 
Action: First a check is made if the request also serves as an ack-
nowledgement for a reply in another transaction. If so, it is handled 
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accordingly (see transition 8). The request is copied to the user buffers 
(insofar as necessary) and the piggyback timer is started for the ack-
nowledgement. A get is done for signals and retransmissions. 
3 Event: The piggyback timer expires. 
Action: An ack rru:ssage is sent to the client (using put). 
4 Event: A signal rru:ssage arrives. 
Action: If a getsig call has been made by the server, the parameters are 
put in the user buffers and an interrupt is caused. A piggyback timer is 
started in any case. 
5 Event: An enq rru:ssage arrives. 
Action: start the piggyback timer. 
6,7 Event: The server calls putrep . 
Action: Timers are stopped and a reply rru:ssage is sent to the client. The 
retransmission timer is started. 
8 Event: The retransmission timer expires. 
Action: The retransmission count is incremented. If it reaches the max-
imum number of retransmissions allowed, an interrupt is given to the 
server, signaling completion of the transaction and the transaction record 
is deleted. Otherwise, the reply is retransmitted, and the retransmission 
timer is once more started. 
9 Event: An ack rru:ssage is received or a new request arrives from the same 
client (see transition 2). 
Action: An interrupt is caused signaling transaction complete, the trans-
action record is deleted. 
Note the use of get, put , getany and putany . A new request is transmitted using 
putany , and received using getany , because, in principle, every service listening to 
the server port is capable of handling the request. Subsequent packets in a 
transaction are sent and received using put and get, because these have to go to 
the server process carrying out the transaction, not to another server process 
listening to the same server port. Some extra care has to be taken sending 
retransmissions: There are two possibilities, the request was lost or the reply ( or 
acknowledgement) was lost. In the former case, the retransmission can be sent 
to any server process, but in the latter case the retransmission must be sent to 
the server process that carried out the request in the first place to guarantee that 
the request is not carried out more than once. The protocol handles this prob-
lem gracefully, by retransmitting using put. If the matching get cannot be 
found , the Transaction Layer is notified and the request can be retransmitted 
using putany. As an aside, note that messages are seldom lost, so this mechanism 
is not invoked often. 
When the piggyback timer is set to zero, a special case arises. An ack-
nowledgement is always sent immediately, without waiting for a quick reply. 
Although this costs a little network bandwidth, in some networks it results in a 
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speed-up of the protocol as a whole. The overhead incurred by the piggyback 
timers is often greater than the gain in network delay. If the network is lightly 
loaded and fast, the immediate acknowledgement scheme is preferable over the 
piggyback timer scheme. The former is both faster and simpler. 
Another way of speeding up the protocol is to use a special way of implement-
ing timers. Before this is explained, note that timers ( except the piggyback 
timers) are exclusively used to detect failures, and failures seldom occur in 
modem local-area networks. It is therefore not vital for the efficiency of the pro-
tocol that the timers work very accurately, as long as they work reliably. A 
'sweep algorithm' could be used to manage retransmission and detect failures. 
The algorithm has the following principle: The Transaction Layer causes the 
sweep algorithm to be executed periodically. Whenever the algorithm is executed, 
it checks whether any transactions have become stuck , by comparing their state 
with their previous state. If a particular state has not changed in the period 
indicated by its timer, the appropriate recovery is started (e.g., retransmission, 
failure report, sending an enq message). The Transaction Layer thus incurs no 
overhead starting and stopping timers whenever an event occurs. The overhead 
is in the sweep algorithm . The overhead of handling events increases with increas-
ing network traffic, while the overhead of the sweep algorithm is nearly constant. 
3.2.5. Conclusion 
Although the transport layer of most networks provides connection-oriented ser-
vice to higher layers, we believe that in local networks there is much to be said 
for a transaction-oriented service instead. A proposal for such a service has been 
described in the context of a capability-based distributed operating system, but 
the general idea holds equally well for a system that does not use capabilities. 
The basic idea is to provide the user of the transport service with semantic prim-
itives for carrying out reliable transactions, each one (in principle) independent 
of all other ones. Using the protocol described, reliable communication can be 
achieved under conditions of heavy load with only two messages per transaction, 
one in each direction. When transactions are widely separated in time, a third 
message is needed so the client can tell the server to release its transaction 
record. 
3.3. The Directory Server 
In a capability system, users must store a capability for each object they access. 
The number of capabilities held by any one user can become quite large; hun-
dreds, or thousands of capabilities will not be uncommon. Management and 
storage of capabilities is not a trivial problem. The Directory Server is an 
attempt to solve this problem. 
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In brief, the Directory Server provides to its users a mapping of easy-to-
remember string names onto capabilities. Such a map is called a directory , and 
there can be many of them. A capability is needed to search or change a direc-
tory. This capability may be stored in another directory. The collection of 
directories thus fonns a directed graph, which may be searched and changed by 
the Directory Server's clients. 
Capabilities are precious objects, and it is important that they do not fall in 
the wrong hands. The Directory Server must therefore be made particularly 
secure against all possible fonns of attack. For one thing, it can not leave infor-
mation on files in plaintext, because a file system crash, or a concerted attempt 
to break into the file system might reveal sensitive capabilities. 
The huge number of capabilities that users can collect presents the designer of 
the Directory Server with the problem of finding convenient mechanisms for 
Directory Server clients to store capabilities, pass them to other (selected) users, 
and retrieve them easily and efficiently. 
3.3.1. Directories 
The Directory Server's main task is to map names of objects into capabilities for 
them. Names are collected in directories. A client, wishing to find the capabil-
ity associated with some name, must present that name and indicate a directory 
(or possibly a set of directories) to be searched. 
In principle, a Directory Server could maintain one huge list of names to be 
searched, but this is inconvenient for two reasons. First, all names have to be 
different, so no two users may refer to their objects by the same name. Users are 
therefore not free to choose any name they like for an object, which may cause 
confusion. Second, if one list is maintained, measures need to be taken to 
prevent every user from searching the whole list where other user's private capa-
bilities can be found. 
Each user can maintain a set of directories to store (name, capability ) pairs, 
using any convenient name. Different directories can be created for different 
types of objects, or different directories can be created for references to objects 
related to various projects. By giving an appropriate capability for a directory 
to another user, it is possible to share objects easily. Entering a capability for an 
object in such a shared directory allows all users with access to that directory to 
manipulate that object according to the rights in its capability. 
Like other objects, directories are also accessed using capabilities. No opera-
tion on a directory is allowed, unless an appropriate capability can be presented. 
In fact, it is not possible to refer to a directory other than through its capability. 
Different operations on a directory need different rights in the presented capabil-
ity. In the next section the operations on directories are discussed. 
Since directories are referenced by capability, it is possible to enter a (name , 
capability) pair for one directory in another. Not only can a hierarchy of direc-
tories be thus constructed, it allows directories to be linked together to form a 
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general directed graph; we expect to demonstrate the usefulness of this concept 
in a later section in this chapter. The directed graph structure allows a user to 
search one directory for the capability of a second, in order to find a capability 
in a directory several nodes and arcs away. As a shorthand for such operations, 
the Directory Server allows pathnames, sequences of names, that all but the last 
name refer to directories. 
Although only one design of a Directory Server is discussed here, several 
different types of Directory Servers could coexist in an open distributed system 
such as Amoeba. Clients of the Directory Server will be aided if all Directory 
Servers cooperate. It should be possible that, for instance, pathnames can tran-
sparently snake back and forth across directories in several Directory Servers. In 
order to achieve this, Directory Servers must know the search directory syntax 
used by the other Directory Servers so they can forward partially expanded 
pathnames. The simplest way to do this is to use the same syntax in all Direc-
tory Servers for directory searches. 
3.3.2. The Directory Graph 
Directory capabilities can be stored in other directories, forming a directed 
graph of directories. Every user, when given access to the system for the very 
first time receives the owner capability for a home directory. Every time the 
user logs in, the home directory capability is given to the user. (For security, it 
could be stored in encrypted form, with the user as the only holder of the 
decryption key.) In his home directory, each user keeps capabilities for several 
public directories. Here capabilities can be found for objects that can be 
accessed by anyone in the system. The user can also maintain special directories 
where capabilities for objects can be stored that can be shared with other users. 
A search capability for that directory can then be written in a public directory. 
An example of a fragment of the graph structure that can thus be formed is 
given in FIGURE 3.8. 
The general graph structure that can be formed with directories provides their 
users with a general mechanism for storing capabilities which allows sharing of 
objects, keeping objects private, and communicating capabilities. Many types of 
sharing can be implemented trivially. Two users can share a directory by both 
entering the owner capability for it in a directory of their own. Another form of 
sharing, which is shown in FIGURE 3.8, is user cogito 's share directory. In this 
directory, cogito can make entries for capabilities that other users may use, such 
as the read-only capabilities for file file-a . Not shown, but also easy to implement 
is a mail service: A search capability is made public for a mail directory that 
contains append-only capabilities for files for each user wishing to receive mail, 
and each user receives an oumer capability for the file with his mail. 
Although the Directory Server, as prese~ted, is versatile enough, it has the 
drawback that sharing objects is rather inefficient. In an open user community, 
where most users allow read-access by other users to their objects (mostly files 
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Cogito's " home" 
directory 
Cogito's " share" 
directory 
Ast's "home" 
directory 
FIGURE 3.8. Part of a directory graph. User cogito uses a separate directory 
to facilitate sharing of objects, such as the file file-a . 
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and programs), the operations necessary to enter different capabilities for each 
object in a number of different directories, each time an object is created, may 
be too much of a burden on the user. An alternative mechanism for easy shar-
ing of objects which is equally versatile would be desirable here. 
Such a mechanism can be constructed, using an alternative directory struc-
ture. A directory structure is used that does not have just two columns for 
names and capabilities, but three or more. The first column contains names, the 
others capabilities. In the original approach the Directory Server issues one 
search directory capability, in this novel approach the Directory Server issues a 
different search capability for each column. Clients make entries, not just of 
(name, capability) pairs, but of (name, capability, capability) triples, or even (name, 
capability, capability, capability ) quadruples, depending on the number of columns. 
The mechanism is used as follows: The owner of a directory (one with two 
capability columns in this example) will use the first capability column for owner 
capabilities for his objects, the second capability column will be used for capabili-
ties to be shared (e.g. , read capabilities for files, (column two) search capabilities 
for other directories). Owner capabilities for subdirectories will be put in column 
one, search-only capabilities will be put in column two. In this way, two or 
more directory structures can be superimposed. The owner has full access to 
every object via the capabilities in column one. Others can get restricted access 
via the directory graph for column two. To this end, they receive a special 
capability with a bit in the nghts field that gives access to column two. 
When a directory is created, the number of capability columns in it must be 
specified. The directory owner has full control over the contents of all cohunns. 
A special null entry can be made in one of the columns, making the whole entry 
(including the name) invisible to a holder of a search capability for that particu-
lar column. An example of such a directory structure is shown in FIGURE 3.9. 
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COGITO search2 
Ast's "home" 
directory 
X 
FIGURE 3.9. A three column directory allows easier sharing of objects. 
3.3.3. Directory Server Operations 
Apart from directory search, the Directory Server must implement many more 
operations on directories and directory entries. Typical operations are: list the 
contents of a directory, create a directory, remove a directory, restrict rights to a 
directory, enter a ( name , capability ) pair in a directory, remove such a pair, 
change the name on an entry, change the capability in an entry, etc. 
Several rights are necessary on Directory Server capabilities so clients can be 
allowed, for instance, to search a directory without being allowed to change it. 
3.3.4. Protection 
It has already been mentioned that the security of the Directory Server is partic-
ularly wor.h while breaking, due to its precious information contents. A Direc-
tory Server's armour must be especially strong to withstand not only accidental 
leaks of confidential information, but also concerted attacks against its security. 
Leaks lurk in various places, so the Directory Server must be designed extra 
carefully. 
There are two ways for malicious users to illicitly obtain capabilities from 
other users. One way is to steal them directly from the users, by finding out 
passwords, breaking into programs, luring them into giving them away, etc. 
The other way is to break the Directory Server's security, for instance, by read-
ing the disk where the Directory Server stores capabilities, by sending cleverly 
doctored sequences of requests that yield capabilities that ought not to be 
handed out, by breaking into the Directory Server's address space (e.g. , by forc-
ing a core dump), etc. In this section we are mainly concerned with the security 
of the Directory Server itsel( 
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The security of the Directory Server can be attacked at several points. One 
form of attack that can be tried by anyone is to try to formulate requests, or 
sequences of requests that yield a capability to which the attacker has no right. 
It is not very difficult to design a Directory Server interface that allows no 
'funny business,' but bugs in the Directory Server software may cause the Direc-
tory Server to deviate from its specs. · Actually, this form of attack has frequently 
been used successfully to break the security of operating systems. 
The second form of attack is assailing the file system where the Directory 
Server puts its information. Under normal circumstances it can be assumed that 
file servers are secure, but surrounding most (secure) file systems there is often a 
great deal of insecurity. This insecurity can be caused by simple disk errors, 
which affect the integrity of the file system. Due to such errors, it is possible for 
a user to suddenly find parts of other files embedded in his own. Hardware 
failures may cause information to be revealed accidently. Backups have to be 
made of the file system; these backup tapes are often stored where everyone has 
access to them. 
The information stored by the Directory Server on disk is too sensitive to 
allow an inquisitive user to obtain that information just by reading the disk. An 
obvious solution to this problem is to have the Directory Server encrypt the 
information it puts on the disk. An intruder, illicitly obtaining the contents of a 
file, or a disk drive with many files, is not capable then of retrieving capabilities 
without the key. Naturally, the Directory Server must carefully guard the 
encryption key, or keys, and definitely not store them on a file. 
Encrypting the Directory Server data on the disk already makes it much more 
secure, but there is still a third form of attack that cannot be withstood in this 
way. The Directory Server itself can also be subject of an attack. If an intruder 
has access to the code and data of a Directory Server process, then that intruder 
has access to the Directory Server's secret keys, and the capabilities that the 
server uses to access the files where its sensitive information is kept. It is not wise 
to assume that an intruder has no access to the Directory Server process' code. 
To depend on keeping programs secret for security is to court disaster. Pro-
grams have listings; listings lie around in offices in reach of almost anybody. 
Even if the program code could be kept secret, there is no reason why the 
designers and programmers of the Directory Server should be in the privileged 
position of being able to get at what it stores. In cryptography, the strongest 
cryptographic systems are considered to be those that do not rely on the crypto-
graphic algorithms being secret. In the case of secure services, this principle also 
applies: stronger security is achieved if the security of the service does not suffer 
when the programs are made public. Tampering with the Directory Server's 
binary can be preventing by checksumming the binary and storing the 
( encrypted) checksum elsewhere. When the Directory Server is started, the 
checksum is fetched and the code checksummed. 
Another mechanism is needed to make the Directory Server secure. The keys 
that the Directory Server uses to generate its server port and encrypt the data it 
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writes on file must not be present in the program, but when the Directory Server 
is started these keys should be given to it. They can, for instance, easily be 
derived from a secret password that the Directory Server's manager types in, or 
better still, derived from two secret passwords that two managers type in?4 In 
this way, even the Directory Server's managers can not break the security of the 
Directory server, unless they cooperate. The Directory Server would then work 
as illustrated in FIGURE 3.10. 
Dserver() { 
t • Get passwords from the managers: */ 
GetPasswords(); 
/ * Use the passwords to generate the server get-port • / 
GeneratePort(); 
t • Check the port by computing the put-port and 
• comparing that to the public Directory Server 
• put-port: • / 
CheckPort(); 
I • Generate the key that is used to encrypt the data 
• on disk from the passwords: 
• 1 
GenerateKey(); 
t • Now the server is ready to process user requests: • / 
for (;; ) { 
getreq( ... ); 
I • process the request • / 
putrep( ... ); 
FIGURE 3. 10. An example of a possible initialisation for the Directory 
Server. 
In spite of the mechanisms described above, one form of breaking the Direc-
tory Server's security remains. If the server's memory contents can be examined, 
the keys the server uses are revealed. In a properly working operating system, 
unauthorised processes have no access to other processes' memory contents, but a 
server crash, perhaps causing a core dump, may be exploited to get at the secret 
keys. But, happily, there are ways to overcome even this problem. 
The solution proposed here uses one-way functions. When a directory is 
created, the Directory Server creates a key that it uses to encrypt the capabilities 
stored in it. This key is embedded in the capability for the directory and given 
to the client. The Directory Server does not store the key, but stores the result 
of applying a one-way function to it. In this way, the Directory Server has the 
means of checking capabilities for directories for validity, namely by applying 
the one-way function to the capability and comparing to its stored capability, 
but it does not have the means to extract stored capabilities from a directory 
without the client capability for that directory. Since the Directory Server is not 
capable of reading its own directories without the client capability for them, an 
intruder will certainly not be able to. 
4 
PROCESS MANAGEMENT 
~raditionally, process management was solely carried out by the operating sys-
tem. Process creation, process scheduling, exception handling, it was all done by 
the operating system kernel. Slowly this tradition is changing, and for good rea-
sons: the central position of the operating system kernel in a computer system is 
crumbling, the 'open system' philosophy is taking over. More and more func-
tions, traditionally provided by the operating system kernel itself, are now pro-
vided by 'services,' usually implemented as ordinary user processes. This has not 
only led to the realisation of smaller, simpler, and easier-to-maintain operating 
system kernels, but has also given programmers more flexibility in choosing the 
type and complexity of the services they want themselves; the choice is no longer 
made by the system designers. 
However, the operating system kernel cannot be completely dispensed with. 
Hardware interrupts and software exceptions must be handled, on multipro-
grammed machines, processes must be protected from one another, and an inter-
face must be provided for proc~ to communicate with each other and with 
other parts of the system. Process management must-at least in part-be car-
ried out by the operating system kernel, but for flexibility, functions traditionally 
inside the operating system should be provided through services, implemented in 
user space, where they are easier to maintain, and, when not needed, will not 
hinder the user, just by being there. 
Making out which functions must be provided by the kernel, and which func-
tions can be implemented in user space is complicated. Conceptually it is nice 
to have as many functions outside the kernel as possible, but, if this makes the 
system unacceptably slow, no one is likely ·to use it. Tradeoffs will likely be 
necessary between fast kernel functions and flexible, but less efficient user ser-
vices. 
Before such considerations can be made, an inventory must be made of the 
process management functions needed, and the execution environment must be 
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designed that allows an efficient, yet simple, style of programming. This is easier 
said than done. During the design phase of the Amoeba distributed operating 
system, the execution environment has been changed more often than any other 
part. The success of an operating system kernel depends critically on the execu-
tion environment it provides, and how efficiently it is provided. 
These considerations determine the presentation of the remainder of this 
chapter: the first section discusses the design of the process execution environ-
ment, the second section deals with the support that the kernel provides for this 
execution environment, and the last section describes supporting services, such as 
process service , loader service , and bootstrap service . 
4.1. The Execution Environment 
Programmers have become used to the kind of execution environment provided 
by centralised operating systems. For the most part, this environment is deter-
mined by the host computer: its instruction set, the size of its address space, the 
presence of segmentation, etc. This aspect of the execution environment is 
inflexible, fixed by the computer manufacturer. Fortunately, only few program-
mers still interface to a machine at this level. Most programs are written in 
'high level languages'* that hide this aspect of the execution environment from 
the programmer. The instruction set is therefore not an important factor of the 
execution environment. 
An aspect of the execution environment that affects the programmer much 
more is the interface provided for communication with the outside world, and 
the primitives for process management. In the next sections we shall focus on 
the operating system interface, and interprocess communication. 
4.1.1. Open Operating Systems 
The term 'open operating system' was first used by Lampson and Sproull~6 to 
describe an operating system that can be thought of as (we quote): "offering a 
variety of facilities, any of which the user may reject, accept, modify or extend." 
This can be contrasted with the philosophy underlying traditional 'closed' 
operating systems, which provide one set of facilities that the user must accept, 
and cannot modify. Most operating systems fall in the latter category, and it is 
a useful exercise to compare the pros and cons of traditional 'closed' systems to 
the currently emerging 'open' systems. 
A closed system provides one set of services, thus enforcing a degree of stan-
dardisation. The interface to these services is the same for all users. Mechan-
isms for authorisation, object naming, service access may be provided in a 
• Some claim that only Algo/68 merits the title 'high-level language,' while others maintain that even 
BASIC deserves to be called a 'high-level language.' Both are extremist views. 
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uniform manner. The hardware of many computer systems, which is often 
difficult to use, is hidden by the operating system to ·make the machine easier to 
use. Protection and security are easier to provide, because there is one well-
defined user interface. Closed systems are often implemented by putting the 
facilities it offers in the operating system kernel, resulting in a large kernel which 
is difficult to maintain and will never be quite bug-free. 
Open systems, in contrast, (potentially) provide a wide range of services for 
each operating system function. Users may reject the services offered by the 
operating system in favour of their own. It is not required that services are 
accessed in a uniform manner, although a particular access mechanism may 
become standard as a matter of general convenience. Traditional operating sys-
tems often make it impossible to use special features provided by the hardware, 
or access peculiar peripherals; an open system can provide mechanisms to hide 
the painful behaviour of the hardware from one user, while allowing another 
access to its interesting features. In an open operating system, only the essential 
services are in the operating system kernel. The kernel can thus be kept small, 
its maintenance becomes easier, and the services themselves, each being imple-
mented as a separate user program, are easier to maintain also. Furthermore, a 
service crash affects the users of the service, but does not crash the system as a 
whole. 
In many applications, the one-service-for-everyone approach of closed systems 
has caused considerable inconvenience. Particularly illustrative of this problem 
are the attempts to put database management systems on top of existing operat-
ing systems?0, 73 In most cases this results in inefficient database management sys-
tems, and the main cause for this inefficiency is that the operating system pro-
vides more service than is needed by the application. The operating system has 
a standard way of doing things and this does not allow the database manage-
ment system a fine enough grain of control. A few of these unneeded services 
are: 
(1) In-core buffer caches of recently used disk blocks do not work because data-
base systems usually have insufficient locality of reference to make them 
work. Database management systems usually know which blocks they will 
likely use again, so they maintain their own disk block caches. 
(2) Many operating systems do read-ahead, thus trying to have the next section 
of the file ready when it will be read. Database management systems seldom 
read files consecutively. 
(3) Crash recovery is difficult to implement if the underlying operating system 
does not immediately put blocks on disk when they are written by the data-
base management system. 
( 4) If a database management system is forced to use the flat file system pro-
vided by the operating system, it has no control over the placement of blocks 
on disk resulting in many unnecessary seeks over the disk. Furthermore it 
introduces an extra level in mapping keys onto disk blocks. 
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An open operating system can provide a set of facilities that database manage-
ment systems can choose from. A database management system does not have 
to be burdened by a collection of unnecessary and counterproductive facilities, it 
may even find some useful facilities that traditional closed system cannot pro-
vide?3 An example of such a service is the Amoeba File Server:16 
The point that is being made here is not that file services should not provide 
read-ahead or maintain buffer caches for efficiency; the point is that there are 
some applications that are severely handicapped by such 'features,' so it should 
be possible that several types of file service can co-exist, one for each type of 
application. This is not possible if file service is an integral part of the operating 
system: A file service that caters for every kind of application would be too big, 
too inefficient for simple applications, and too difficult to design and maintain. 
Furthermore, if a new type of application came along, it would not be possible 
to adapt the file service. Obviously, as many services should be removed from 
the operating system kernel as possible, and provided as stand-alone user pro-
grams. File service has served as an illustration only; the arguments apply to 
most types of services. 
4.1.2. The Kernel Facilities 
An open operating system must provide the tools that allow the users of the sys-
tem to implement operating system services. These services, such as file service 
or terminal service, must be in the user domain whenever possible, the system 
only providing the means that allow communication with services, and the 
mechanisms that prevent processes from interfering with each other. 
The kernel is that part of the operating system that is outside the reach of the 
system's users. True to the open system's philosophy, it must provide a 
minimum of functions, allowing most operating system facilities to be built in the 
form of user processes. Its first task is process management. It must provide the 
mechanisms for process creation, execution and termination. Furthermore, the 
kernel must protect processes from each other. One process should not be 
allowed uncontrolled access to another process' address space or disrupt its nor-
mal functioning. The second task of the kernel is to provide access to peri-
pherals at a convenient interfacing level. In some cases this may imply provid-
ing access to the hardware directly, in others, providing access through a device 
driver. When the kernel is multiprogrammed, peripheral access must be con-
trolled by a protection mechanism; not every user process should be allowed 
access to, for instance, the disk. The third task for the kernel is to allow 
processes to access the services provided outside the kernel; that is, provide an 
interprocess communications facility. 
Portability of kernel software is an important property. While using the facili-
ties offered by the hardware optimally, the kernel must be designed so it can be 
ported to other hardware reasonably easily. This requires writing kernel 
software in a high level language and separating the machine dependent parts 
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from the machine independent parts. Although the portability principle is 
widely accepted and few operating systems are written in assembly language any 
more, the principle is important enough to mention here anyway. 
Although the kernel is outside the user's reach, it is still important that even 
the kernel be structured in a modular way. It is, for example, desirable that on 
some of the larger CPUs there should be the possibility of using multiprogram-
ming to put the available computing power to better use, while on the smaller 
microcomputers multiprogramming is often not possible due to the absence of 
suitable hardware. A highly modular operating system kernel could be 
equipped with 'plug-in' multiprocessing modules, 'add-on' device drivers, etc. 
From the viewpoint of portability of software this is an important principle: one 
set of device drivers suffices for both monoprogrammed and multiprogrammed 
machines, and it allows, for instance, memory management using paging on one 
host, and segmentation on another without a need for changing the rest of the 
kernel. 
While many operating system kernels exist today, there are still relatively few 
kernels especially designed for use in an open operating system environment. 
Let us take a look at some of the operating system kernels that function in a 
more-or-less open environment. 
It is our contention that an operating system kernel for an open system should 
provide an absolute minimum of facilities to its users: an environment for process 
execution which allows efficient communication between processes and between 
processes and peripheral devices. Naturally, this may not be done at excessive 
cost: If it is not possible, for instance, to build efficient and secure protection 
mechanisms outside the kernel of the operating system, but trivial to do so inside 
of it, those mechanisms should by all means be put in the kernel. We hope to 
show, however, that with a minimum of kernel facilities it is still possible to build 
efficient systems. 
As an aside, it is worth noting that the less reliance there has to be on an 
operating system kernel in a distributed system, the more freedom can be given 
to the participating systems. We explicitly allow both private personal comput-
ers and existing operating systems to take part in the Amoeba distributed system, 
provided those systems adhere to the protection mechanisms discussed in 
Chapter 2. 
4.1.3. System Calls for Interprocess Communication 
There are as many different interprocess communication mechanisms as there 
are operating systems; no wonder, since there are many ways to set up an inter-
process communication system: it can be made stream oriented or datagram 
oriented, or something in between. The calls can be made blocking or non-
blocking , communication can be unidirectional or bidirectional . These options can 
be arbitrarily combined, and all of these options have subtler suboptions. 
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Usually, when there is a choice of many options, most can be discarded 
immediately, either because they are impractical, or because they are infeasible, 
or because they are inelegant. Unfortunately, however, most of the combina-
tions mentioned above are in use, with sensible arguments supporting their 
choice. The weight attached to different arguments determines the choice of 
mechanisms. 
We have chosen a capability-based protection using ports, because it allows 
an implementation of a protection mechanism without having to rely on a secure 
operating system kernel, and, because it allows addressing services without need-
ing a separate name server to map server names into process-ids or machine 
numbers. (See Chapter 2, in particular§§ 2.3 and 2.4.) 
We have chosen a message-oriented transaction mechanism because it is a 
better semantic model for distributed operating systems than a connection-
oriented mechanism and because it can be implemented much more efficiently 
than virtual circuits, especially when measurements show that most network 
traffic consists of short exchanges of information increasing the relative overhead 
of opening and closing connections to an unacceptable level. (See§ 3.2.) 
We have chosen transaction type communication, because most interactions 
between client and server processes have a transaction nature: A client wants the 
server to do something and sends the server a request; the server carries out the 
request and returns a reply to the client. Furthermore, transactions can be 
implemented efficiently and provide a natural mechanism for synchronisation of 
processes. (See § 3.2.1.) 
We have chosen blocking calls; that is, a client that does a transaction (send a 
request and wait for a reply) is blocked until the transaction completes; a server 
that does a getrequest (wait for a request) is blocked until a request is received. 
This last choice is not at all obvious. From a client's point of view, blocking 
transactions resemble a remote procedure call mechanism?8 Nonblocking transac-
tions allow a client to start a transaction and continue doing useful work while 
the transaction is being processed by the server. When the transaction finishes, 
the client is warned (e.g., by means of an interrupt). 
Nonblocking system calls allow the programmer to exploit the possibilities of 
parallel processing: Requests to remote services can be processed while a client 
process continues doing work. A client process can, in fact, have multiple out-
standing requests. Likewise, non-blocking interprocess communication gives a 
server process the freedom to handle many requests simultaneously: A server can 
start by doing multiple getrequests, and, when an interrupt occurs, start process-
ing the received request. During this process it may become necessary to call on 
a subservice, and while the server waits for the reply from a subservice, it can 
continue handling other requests. 
Blocking system calls allow no such freedom: A client process is blocked while 
waiting for the reply from a server, so it cannot do any work while the server is 
busy, nor can it send requests to more than one service simultaneously. Server 
processes can only handle one request at a time, also because they block on 
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subtransactions, and because they can do only one getrequest before being 
blocked. 
In the first implementation of the Amoeba Transaction Layer, we decided to 
implement non-blocking calls. A call made by a client process to transaction * 
causes the run-time system to send a request and await a reply. The client pro-
cess would continue execution, and an interrupt, caused by the run-time system 
would finally warn the client that the trans call had completed. A server pro-
cess, analogously, would call on getrequest * which caused the run-time system to 
prepare for reception of a request; the server process would continue to execute 
and the run-time system would warn the server that a request had been 
received. After processing the request, a reply would be sent by a call to putre-
ply . 
Although this non-blocking method gave processes more control and allowed 
more parallelism, it had a severe drawback: Its exploitation requires very skilled 
programming and often leads to the introduction of race conditions, due to inter-
rupts that occur at inopportune moments. An even greater problem is how to 
structure server programs to handle more than one request simultaneously in a 
manageable fashion. We found two approaches to structuring server programs. 
HandleEvent(event, params) { 
/ * 1bis routine is called when an event occurs• ; 
TransRec = FindTrans(event, pararns); 
I • Find the transaction record for 
• the transaction that caused the event 
• 1 
(*EventTable[event][TransRec-> state])(event, pararns, TransRec) ; 
/ * Call the routine to do the work from a table 
• of pointers to functions, indexed by event and 
• transaction state 
• 1 
MainLoop() { 
I • Main loop of the server • / 
for (;;) { 
Pause(); 
I • wait for an event • / 
HandleEvent(e, p); 
I • Handle the event; the e and p parameters are set 
• by the interrupt routine 
• 1 
FIGURE 4.1. Server process structure in a finite-state implementation 
One approach is to write a server process as a finite state machine: An event 
(e.g., the reception of a request from a client or a reply from a subserver) causes 
•See§ 3.2.3 
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the server to find the transaction record for the transaction that caused the event, 
carry out an appropriate action, based on the contents of the transaction record 
and the information given by the event, and change over to a new state. Every 
time a new request arrives, a new transaction record is created. Whenever a 
reply is sent, a transaction record can be removed. This method of 
programming-although feasible-does not provide the programmer with a 
clear view of the structure of the server's algorithm: the algorithm is split up into 
pieces, separated by the points where an event must be awaited. With this 
approach it is, for instance, impossible to use subroutines to make a layered 
implementation of the server's algorithms; the structure must always be like the 
one depicted in FIGURE 4.1. 
The other approach is the following: Using a small run-time library package, 
called task manager, a server process is split into a number of subprocesses, 
called tasks. The tasks share the address space, and each task has its own stack, 
stack-pointer and program counter. All system calls are trapped by the task 
manager, which passes them on to the kernel. System calls are non-blocking, so 
the task manager regains control immediately after making the call to run 
another task, if appropriate. To the task itself, system calls appear blocking. 
When a system call completes, the calling task resumes processing as if the call 
were blocking. 
A server process can thus be organised into a number of parallel tasks; each 
task executes one client request at a time, and carries out system calls as if they 
were blocking. This makes efficient structured programming possible, in con-
trast to the previous method, which led to programs without much structure that 
were very difficult to understand and maintain. 
The task manager contains the only critical code, since task switching only 
occurs when a task makes a system call. There is no danger of race conditions if 
tasks leave internal tables in a consistent state before making system calls. Get-
ting the machine-language assist to work correctly is tricky, but it has to be done 
only once. 
We have used this second approach in a simple disk server and file server, 
written by two students in less than 6 months. The task structure proved to be a 
valuable approach to managing multiple requests in one server process. Once 
the task manager worked correctly, all attention could be given to the design of 
the server itself, administration of concurrent requests required only little con-
cern. 
The success of the second method for managing concurrent requests made it 
clear that, from the viewpoint of program design, parallelism obtained through 
parallel processes (or tasks) is preferable to parallelism obtained through non-
blocking system calls. This is a strong ar;-gument for the design of an operating 
system interface that allows management of parallel processes sharing an address 
space, combined with blocking system calls. 
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4.2. The Amoeba Kernel 
Putting the theories of the previous section about distributed operating system 
kernel properties to the test resulted in the design and implementation of the 
Amoeba Kernel. Several versions have been tried before the kernel as described 
here was designed. 
The primary design considerations have been to construct a kernel that is as 
small as possible, provides a simple, yet powerful, process interface through 
blocking interprocess communication system calls, and 'cheap' processes for 
parallel processing. 
The concept of a task is used as a model for both the modules of the kernel, 
which operate in parallel, and sets of processes, sharing an address space, which 
also operate in parallel. 
4.2.1. Clusters and Tasks 
To avoid confusion with the familiar concept of a process, the entities that make 
up an Amoeba system will be called clusters and tasks. A task can be viewed as a 
deterministic process, communicating with other tasks via shared memory or 
transactions . A cluster is a group of tasks sharing one address space. 
The whole of the address space is shared, except the stack. The operating sys-
tem kernel controls these processes by executing their system calls and schedul-
ing them. 
Since several tasks can share one address space, there could be race conditions 
when two tasks simultaneously access a data structure. If pre-emptive schedul-
ing of tasks occurs within a cluster, race conditions must be avoided, e.g. , by 
semaphores, monitors, or message exchanges. Another synchronisation method 
would be to use non-pre-emptive scheduling between tasks in the same cluster; 
that is, tasks within a cluster run until they are blocked before another task in 
that cluster is allowed to run. Fortunately, it is not difficult to use scheduling 
techniques, where there is pre-emption between tasks in different clusters, but 
not between tasks within a single cluster. As a matter of fact, the Amoeba Ker-
nel uses this last scheduling technique. 
In practise, most clusters consist of only one task. This reflects the conven-
tional notion of a process. Services, however, will often be implemented as a col-
lection of identical tasks. Typically, each task, after initialisation, will block on a 
getreq . When a request comes in, one of the tasks will become runnable, and 
execute the request. While processing requests, it is possible that other services 
must be invoked. Appropriate transactions are made to subservers, temporarily 
blocking the task. When the task has carried out the request, it will send a reply 
and go back to the top of the loop. Within a single task, there is thus a single 
thread of code, and its execution will be 'deterministic.' The cluster as a whole 
handles many requests simultaneously. Tasks will run until blocked, other tasks, 
after having become unblocked, taking their place. 
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Tasks of a cluster share an address space. This makes it easy to share global 
variables, caches of data, pools of buffers, etc. Tasks must however, leave these 
variables in a consistent state before blocking, but this is not difficult. 
4.2.2. Kernel Tasks 
Conceptually, a number of concurrent activities take place inside an operating 
system kernel-both for single-user machines or for multiprogrammed machines. 
Interrupts especially are a well-known source of headaches for programmers. A 
widely used technique for keeping this parallelism under control is message pass-
ing , as used by Brinch-Hansen? for instance. In this technique, the kernel is 
divided into a number of semi-independent processes which exchange messages 
for synchronisation. These processes run to completion before another process is 
allowed to run, thus avoiding race conditions. Hardware interrupts are immedi-
ately converted to messages and queued for the appropriate kernel process. 
The Amoeba task concept lends itself naturally for structuring the kernel into 
a number of parallel tasks. Kernel tasks communicate by means of transactions 
with the same semantics that other tasks and processes use. 
4.2.3. System Calls 
Traditionally, operating system services are accessed using system calls, traps 
from a user program into the operating system kernel, parameterised to tell the 
kernel what to do. In open systems, many services will be provided by user pro-
grams, while others are still offered by the kernel itself. 
Exactly what services must be provided by the kernel, and what services can 
or must be provided outside it, depends on many things: whether it is possible to 
implement the service inside or outside the kernel, whether an implementation 
outside the kernel will be unacceptably inefficient, or whether an implementa-
tion inside the kernel is too inflexible. 
Evidently, the decision which services to implement inside the kernel, and 
which to implement outside it, must not be enforced by the operating system 
interface: the system calls for accessing service X must be the same whether the 
service is a kernel service, or a user service. Thus, services can be implemented 
in several ways, without having to make changes to the user interface. 
All this implies that operating system services must be accessed like any other 
service: by making transactions. The only system calls available in the Amoeba 
kernel are therefore the calls provided by the Transaction Layer, trans, getreq, 
putrep , etc., as described in § 3.2.3. The implementation of these calls is sketched 
in the next section. 
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4.2.4. Transaction Layer Implementation 
Transactions form the sole mechanism for interprocess communication; transac-
tions are also the mechanism by which a process communicates with the operat-
ing system. Although this interface to the system is flexible and conceptually sim-
ple, it can only be practical if it can be made fast enough. Amoeba will not be 
used if a conventional operating system does the requested work an order of 
magnitude faster, even if its operating system interface is ugly. Obviously, if one 
thing affects the speed and efficiency of a message-passing operating system, it is 
the message-passing mechanism. The transaction mechanisms form the basis of 
the system, fortunately; this allows the kernel to be designed around optimally 
functioning interprocess communication mechanisms. 
task task task task task 
kernel 
local networ network 
WI e-area network 
FIGURE 4.2. Local interprocess communication must be handled locally : 
communication between tasks of a cluster is handled by the task manager; 
communication between processes of one kernel is handled by the kernel, 
etc. 
task 
Heavily used services must be provided close to where they are used. It is 
therefore logical to optimise the mechanisms for local transactions. This implies 
that transactions local to one cluster, i.e. , between tasks, can best be handled by 
that cluster's task manager; transactions local to one operating system should be 
handled by the operating system; transactions local to a local area network must 
be handled by the network, and so on. This is illustrated in FIGURE 4.2. 
There is a hierarchy of transaction handlers that works as follows: When a 
message (request or reply) is offered to it for transmission, the transaction 
handler checks if its destination is local to it; if so, it handles the message itself, 
otherwise it passes the message to its superior. To detect local message destina-
tions, each transaction handler keeps a table of local ports and destinations. 
Assume thus, that a process carries out a getreq operation. The get-port is then 
entered in the local table, and the getreq is passed to the superior transaction 
handler. After this, a process carrying out a trans with a put-port that matches 
the get-port can be handled locally. The rep(y-port is entered in the table, so the 
reply can also be handled locally. 
In principle, every getreq must be passed on all the way to the top of the 
hierarchy, because it is not known by the system where the processes that will 
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send to it are. Many services do know this, however, so, as an optnrusation 
mechanism, an extra call to the transaction layer can be implemented that 
allows a service to tell the system 'how local' its clients are. The operating sys-
tem kernel, for instance, offers some services, purely to local processes. Getreq 
calls, made by the operating system for local services, need not be passed to the 
network. The local calls tells the Transaction Layer that a port is ( 1) local to 
the cluster, (2) local to the host, (3) local to the local-area network, or (4) glo-
bal. By default, a port is always assumed global. 
Mention must be made of the mechanisms for handling interrupted transactions . 
A server process can make a call to getsig , to tell the Transaction Layer that it is 
prepared to be intenupted by its client. This is particularly useful in services 
that execute requests that take a long time, as, for instance, a terminal server, an 
editor service, or an alarm-clock service. lntenupts are received as signals , 
header-only messages sent by a client to a server. Client processes can only send 
them while engaged in a transaction with a server; server processes can only 
receive them while engaged in executing a client request. 
When a signal arrives, a server process can either be processing the request 
itself, or it can be waiting on the reply from a subtransaction with a subserver. In 
both cases the intenupt routine is called (the address of which was specified in 
the getsig call). From the intenupt routine, no transaction calls are allowed, 
except a call to putsig to intenupt an active subtransaction. There are two calls 
to return from the interrupt routine: rti and longjmp . Rti returns to where the 
server process was at the time the interrupt occurred, and, if the server was 
blocked on a subtransaction, continues blocking. Longjmp jumps to a position 
previously indicated in a call to setjmp (much like the calls of these names in the 
C run-time library), and, if necessary, breaks off a subtransaction by unblocking 
and ignoring the reply (if it arrives at all). 
The mechanism for handling interrupts can thus be used to propagate an 
interrupt through a hierarchy of services. When a user hits the interrupt key of 
his terminal, for instance, the terminal server is interrupted. The terminal server 
passes the interrupt on to its client, for example, to the shell; the shell, in tum 
may pass on the interrupt to its client, the editor. 
4.3. Process Management Services 
When a person at his terminal types a command, it is interpreted by his com-
mand interpreter and turned into a request to the appropriate service. Some 
services are always present and available, sometimes because they are vital to 
the operation of the system, sometimes jus_t because they are heavily used. Other 
services, in contrast, are not always available, but have to be brought to life 
especially for the execution of a request. Usually, such services are not essential 
for the operation of the system and little used. Typical always-present services 
are the File Service of Chapter 6, the Bank Service of Chapter 7, and the 
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Process Service and the Boot Service, discussed in this chapter. Examples of ser-
vices of the other kind which do not always have a server process waiting to 
carry out requests could be compilers, text formatters, mail service, etc. 
Several services are responsible for enabling users to run their programs. 
First, there is the Process Service which handles all requests from clients to 
manipulate processes : it creates processes, it makes them execute; it can check-
point, suspend and kill processes. Second, there is the Pool Processor service, 
which makes a virtual processor available for executing the program code. Then, 
there is the Loader Service, a specialised file server that stores programs. When 
a client wants to run a program, the Loader Service provides the code and data. 
To clarify the relationship between these services, let us go through the typical 
scenario of creating and running a process. Process creation is initiated by a 
client sending a request to the Loader Server to obtain the process descriptor of 
the program to be run. The process descriptor contains information about the 
type of processor the program runs on, the memory requirements, whether it 
runs on any processor, or a particular dedicated one, and the process descriptor 
has three more capabilities that can be used to obtain the program's code, data 
and stack. The client can provide an environment for the process-to-be by 
replacing the stack capability by one that refers to an initial stack of its own. This 
provides a way of passing an environment to a new process. 
The process descriptor is then given to one of the Process Servers as data in a 
request to create a new process. The Process Server allocates an appropriate 
processor, sends it the process descriptor and tells it to run the program. The 
elected processor-probably a Pool Processor-allocates memory for the process 
(it knows how much, since this information is in the process descriptor), and 
fetches the code, data and stack by sending requests on the capabilities enclosed 
with the process descriptor. The code and data capabilities refer to the Loader 
Service, and the stack capability can refer either to the client process, the client's 
Command Interpreter Server ( or Shell), or to the Loader service. 
The Process Server replies to the client with a capability for the newly created 
process. The client can then exert control over the process by sending com-
mands on that capability. These commands are executed by the Process Server. 
For some more clarification we shall describe checkpointing a process. 
Checkpointing is making a copy of the state of a running process, in order to 
be able to have a point for resuming execution of the process in case it should 
crash. Checkpointing can be ordered by the client owner of the process, but it is 
more likely that it will be ordered by the process itself, since it 'knows' the points 
at which it is safe to resume execution. The mechanism works as follows : The 
Process Server sends a command to the executing processor to stop the executing 
process and generate a process descriptor for it. For this purpose, the format of 
the process descriptor allows recording the state of an active process. Note that 
this is relatively easy, because the only interaction of a process with the outside 
world is through transactions. The process descriptor can be given to the 
Loader Server, which, can then fetch and store the process' code, data and stack. 
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At a later moment, the process can be resumed as if it were a new process. 
Other operations on processes are forking , which is like checkpointing and con-
tinuing execution of both the original process and the copy; migration, which 
amounts to stopping a process, moving the process descriptor, and the code, data 
and stack to another machine where the process continues execution; remote 
debugging , which can partly be done by stopping a process, examining the pro-
cess descriptor and memory contents, possibly modifying the state of the process 
and continuing execution. 
The Pool Processors accept code from the Process Service and execute that 
code. These processors are part of the Pool Processor Service. This service has 
been kept as simple as possible so it can be realised in a microcomputer's ROM. 
Multi-programmed hosts can realise as many (virtual) Pool Processors as there 
are slots in their process tables. 
For permanent services the Boot Service is available to help maintain them. 
Foremost, the Boot Service brings up the permanent services (File Service, Pro-
cess Service, etc.) when the system comes up. This explains the name 
Boot(strapping) Service . The other task of the Boot Service is to take care of 
crashed server processes: A typical service, File Service, for instance, consists of a 
number of server processes. Due to software failures, hardware failures, power 
failures, etc., these processes can crash. The Boot Service helps client services by 
periodically checking if its server processes still work, and, if not, the Boot Ser-
vice replaces them. Although this does not relieve the designer of a service from 
thinking about and implementing crash recovery procedures, it does make crash 
recovery simpler. Naturally, the Boot Service is its own client: when one of the 
Boot Servers crashes, the others replace it. 
The next sections describe each of these services in detail. 
4.3.1. Processes 
A process (or cluster) communicates with other processes at different levels of 
abstraction: The highest level of concern to us is the level at which the process' 
code communicates with the outside world. A server process, for instance, 
receives requests and sends replies, using ports (and capabilities) that it, or its 
clients choose; let us call this level the process level. 
One level down, however, there is another type of communication with a pro-
cess: requests are used to control a process, such as requests to terminate, 
suspend or checkpoint it. We shall call this the control levd. The control level 
is the level at which the owner of a process exerts control over it by making 
transactions with the process' managing service, the Process Service. Requests to 
terminate a process are interpreted and carried out by the operating system, but 
when a process migrates from one host operating system to another, these 
requests must be carried out by the new host operating system. In our imple-
mentation, a process carries a capability with it, created when the process was 
created, and given to the client that ordered the process' creation. This 
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capability, the control capability, travels around with a process, and at any 
time, the operating system in charge of the process accepts requests through that 
capability to terminate, suspend, checkpoint, etc. that process. 
At the lowest level, the management level, a process is viewed as an object, 
that is manipulated by its host operating system. This is the level of communi-
cation used internally by the services that provide process execution. The 
Amoeba Kernel, for instance, can be told to unload whatever 'code' resides in its 
memory, or to start (resume) or stop execution on the code in its memory. At 
this level a process is treated as a collection of instructions and bytes of data. 
The management level requests are the Pool Processor requests, which we shall 
discuss shortly. 
As we have just seen we can look at a process at three levels, or, if one wishes, 
from three viewpoints: a process as a client or server, a process as an object from 
the 'client point of view,' from the outside, or as an object seen from the 'server 
point of view,' from the inside. In a sense Amoeba is self-referential: services 
define and implement objects, but services themselves consist of processes which, 
in tum, are also objects under control of a service~7 However, there is no infinite 
regression here: the recursion bottoms out at the level of the physical processors 
of the system; they are not objects being created and deleted by some service, 
but offer service without needing another service to be able to exist. 
The Process Level 
At the process level of looking at processes we are concerned with the 
programmer's point of view. A process is governed by a program which 
describes the sequence of actions of the process. 
The system calls provided by the Amoeba Kernel are rather different from the 
usual set of system calls that we know from most operating systems. To begin 
with, there are fewer system calls. The Amoeba operating system kernel does not 
provide file service, terminal 1/ o , time-of-day service, and all those other services 
present in many systems that we know. Instead, Amoeba provides only system 
calls making transactions. Using transactions directed to the Amoeba kernel, 
other system calls can be realised in an indirect fashion. In this way, no 
difference exists between using services provided directly by the kernel, and ser-
vices provided by other processes, possibly on different hosts. 
The Control Level 
The control level describes the management of processes by other processes: the 
way a process can be created, and the way it can be influenced as it runs. Pro-
cess creation and management resembles creation and management of most 
objects in Amoeba: a request is sent to the manager of the objects-in this case 
the Process Service-to create a process. The Process Service returns a capabil-
ity for the process, which has to be used in future requests concerning the pro-
cess. 
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Process creation works as follows: A request must be sent to the Process Ser-
vice, asking it to create a process. The request contains a process descriptor which 
describes the program to be run. The Loader Service, which will later be 
described in detail, is a specialised kind of file server that, given a capability for 
a program (which is viewed as a process in statu nascendi), can deliver a process 
descriptor for it, which, in turn, contains capabilities for the code and data of the 
program. The Process Service uses the information in the process descriptor to 
allocate a suitable processor and causes the process to be loaded and run. The 
client that created the process receives a control capability that it can use to 
exercise control over the process. 
Here are some typical commands that can be given to control a process: One 
command is the command to kill the process. It stops the execution of the pro-
cess, and clears up the remains. Another command is the command to checkpoint 
a process. This command causes the Process Service to save the current state of 
the process (by giving it to the Loader Service), and to return a capability for 
the saved state. This capability can later be used to continue execution of the 
checkpointed process as if it were a new process. Checkpointing can serve two 
purposes, namely to obtain a dump of the process' state to examine it, or to have 
a process image that can later be given to the Process Service to be run, if, for 
instance, the original process crashed. The checkpointed process continues to 
run as if nothing had happened. Naturally, a process can also checkpoint itself. 
Killing and checkpointing can be combined in the suspend command: it saves 
its state so it can be given to the Process Service later to continue where it left 
off, and then kills the process. 
There are also commands to give the current status of a running process and 
commands for debugging, such as commands to single step through a program, 
to set and clear breakpoints, etc. More about these commands when we come to 
the Process Service. 
The Management Level 
This section deals with processes as objects, mainly as seen from the inside. 
The state of a process is all the information necessary for its execution. Among 
this information is the contents of the process' memory, its registers, its program 
counter, stack pointer, and the status of any system calls in progress. But this is 
not all : A process that executes on one processor cannot execute on every other 
processor. The CPU type for which the process was made, is also a part of the state. 
The next section is devoted to the representation of the state of processes. 
The process state, just mentioned, exists in tangible form only when a process 
is transferred from one host to another, or when it is (temporarily) stored on a 
disk. When the process runs, its state changes continuously, and its representa-
tion is embedded in the state of the pr~essor executing the process. When a 
process stops execution for one of a number of reasons, its processor gathers all 
state information into a representation of the process' state that is as machine 
independent as possible. 
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The representation of a process' state mainly resides in its Process Descriptor. 
The Process Descriptor tells on what CPU type a process must execute. It also 
tells the value of its program counter, its registers and it gives the state of various 
active system calls. As the Process Descriptor is reasonably small, it can be sent 
from one processor to another easily. The state of a process' memory is not 
included in the Process Descriptor, but three capabilities for obtaining the 
memory contents are included, one for the code, one for the data, and one for 
the stack. With these capabilities the memory contents can be read as if from a 
file. 
Processes have the possibility of migration in Amoeba; that is, a process that 
has been executing for a while on one processor can be moved to another to con-
tinue its execution there. Migrating a process is almost identical to loading one; 
in the former case, a process moves from one processor to another, in the latter it 
moves from a Loader Server to a processor. Checkpointing can be seen as a 
special form of migration: a process then moves from a processor to a Loader 
server. A combination of checkpointing or suspending a process with looking at, 
and possibly changing its saved state can be a powerful debugging tool, espe-
cially if it is combined with a processor that allows setting breakpoints. 
An important property of this model is that initially loading a process into a 
processor is no different from migrating a process into a processor, so even on 
systems where the Process Service does not make use of migration for scheduling, 
but processes are assigned to one host for their duration, clients can be allowed 
to have much more control over processes than in most operating systems 
(checkpointing, suspending, modifying processes). 
4.3.2. The Process Descriptor 
The Process Descriptor describes the process' state, the contents of its registers, 
the state of system calls in execution, it contains accounting and scheduling 
information, and two capabilities, the process control capability and the code 
capability for obtaining the memory contents of the process. Before we discuss 
each of these items we refer to FIGURE 4.3 where, globally, the lay out of the 
Process Descriptor is given. 
The control capability is the capability giving the right to manipulate the pro-
cess at the control level (start execution, stop execution, give process status, etc.). 
The processor executing the process receives the control commands for this capa-
bility and carries them out. 
The code, data and stack capabilities give access to the process' code, stack, and 
data, respectively. When a process descriptor is made (this happens when a pro-
cess is created, checkpointed or suspended), a code capability is made that can 
be used to fetch the code and data associated with the process. The Process 
Descriptor containing the code capability can move from one host (processor, 
Loader Server) to another, and code and data can be fetched by the latter, using 
the code capability. 
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Control capability 
Code capability 
Data capability 
Stack capability 
Host 
descriptor 
Accounting 
& 
scheduling 
Process State Flag 
Process 
Registers 
Transaction 
States 
FIGURE 4.3. Amoeba Process Descriptor lay out. 
The host descriptor is a list, where each entry describes some aspect of the host 
that the process must run on. Each entry consists of a one-byte length , a one-
byte type, and zero or more argument bytes. The terminating entry has a zero 
length field. Each type indicates a different aspect required of the host processor. 
FIGURE 4.4 gives a list of some of the types and their meaning. 
The accounting & scheduling entry can be used by a processor to convey useful 
scheduling information and amounts of used resources to a client Process Server. 
The Process State Fla.g gives the 'overall state' of the process: running, pausing, 
suspended, exited, killed or crashed. The last three states are practically the same; 
they exist to inform the owner of the process of the cause of the process' demise. 
The transaction states give the states of outstanding transactions: request and 
reply ports, buffer addresses and lengths and the state of the transactions. 
Timers and retransmission counts can safely be (re)started from zero. 
4.3. PROCESS MANAGEMENT SERVICES 
type 
HOST 
CPU 
CPU SUPPORT 
MEMORY 
argument 
capability 
type 
bit_map 
size 
description 
Specifies the host processor for the process. 
Dedicated processes can thus contain a capabil-
ity for running on some specified processor or 
class of processors. 
Indicates the CPU type (instruction set) the pro-
cess uses. 
The CPU-dependent bit map indicates which 
extra features the process needs in its host (e.g., 
floating point, memory management, commer-
cial instruction set). 
The (maximum) amount of memory needed by 
the process. 
FIGURE 4.4. An overview of some of the host descriptor entry types. 
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Processors form the heart of a computer system. This section describes the 
different kinds of processor service in Amoeba, private processors, dedicated pro-
cessors and pool processors. The private processors are of no concern to us here; 
they are processors, connected to the Amoeba network so they can use Amoeba 
services, but they are not under control of an Amoeba service. Their owners 
decide which programs they will execute. 
Before discussing the details of processor service, it is important to explain 
what we define processors to be. A physical processor is the hardware necessary 
to execute programs, usually a CPU and memory, plus, sometimes, peripherals. 
A virtual processor is an environment in which a process can execute. In gen-
eral, each physical processor provides an environment for the execution of at 
least one process, usually the operating system. But an operating system itself 
also provides an execution environment for processes, user processes. It realises a 
number of virtual processors. Some physical processors with their operating sys-
tem implement one virtual processor; we call these monoprogrammed. Other 
physical processors have an operating system that implements several virtual 
processors; those are multiprogrammed. Some operating systems can be user 
processes running in a virtual processor (i.e., on top of another operating system). 
One virtual processor can thus split itself into many, if the virtual operating system 
is a multiprogramming system. In the remainder of this chapter we shall use the 
word processor to mean a virtual processor. 
In Amoeba there are several classes of processes that need to execute: dedi-
cated processes, very long-lived server processes, short-lived server processes, and 
'user' processes. The word 'user' is in quotes, because in Amoeba the distinction 
between system processes and user processes is one of viewpoint. The 'system' 
makes no distinction. Dedicated processes are processes that must run on a 
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particular physical or virtual processor. Examples of dedicated processes are 
operating systems, processes that control devices, such as disks, phototypesetters, 
etc. Server processes accept requests from clients, carry them out, and return 
replies. Some servers are long-lived; that is, the server process is started up, and 
then supposed to run for ever. If the process crashes it has to be replaced. 
Short-lived services are usually created to carry out one request, and then 
removed again. These services are typically infrequently used services for which 
a dedicated processor is a waste of resources. The remaining processes are the 
familiar 'ordinary' processes, user processes which usually run once. 
4.3.4. Dedicated Processors 
The dedicated processes are the easiest to manage. They always run on the 
same physical processor, and the only management activity associated with these 
dedicated processes is to check at regular intervals to see if they still operate, 
and, if not, to attempt to start them up again. 
Most physical processors, when they are switched on, automatically run a 
bootstrap program in ROM. If they have a local disk, the bootstrap program can 
load its host's operating system, the operating system can load the server process, 
and off the server goes. Not every physical processor has a local disk, however. 
In such cases, the dedicated processes must be loaded through the network, 
which is straightforward, assuming there is a service in the network that is able 
and willing to provide the binary. 
The service that provides process images for its clients is the Loader Service. 
It is implemented by one or more dedicated servers that each have a local disk. 
The Loader Servers can easily bootstrap themselves from this disk. As far as 
dedicated services are concerned, the Loader Service provides a very simple file 
service. The bootstrap program in the dedicated processor's ROM ( or the virtual 
processor's operating system) sends a request to the Loader Service to give it the 
image of the process it wants to run, and the Loader Service provides it. We 
shall discuss the Loader Service in more detail in § 4.4. 
It is an interesting observation that inside the allocable Pool Processors are 
dedicated processors ; the dedicated process executed by them is the operating 
system, which implements one or several virtual Pool Processors. The next sec-
tion describes Pool Processor Service in some detail. 
4.3.5. Pool Processors 
The allocable processors accept work from their clients, usually the Boot Server 
or the Process Server. The service, offered by the allocable processors to the sys-
tem is the Pool Processor Service, which we shall now describe. 
Pool Processors are virtual processors; each Fool Processor handles at most 
one process at a time. Roughly, the service works like this: A client (Process 
Server or Boot server) sends a request to a Pool Processor to allocate it, load it, 
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and execute the loaded code. When the loaded process terminates ( either natur-
ally, through a crash, or by being stopped by the client owner), a Process 
Descriptor is made for the loaded process, and the process' memory contents are 
made available. The Pool Processor can then be deallocated after which it is 
ready for the next client. 
The set of requests and replies defined by the Pool Process Service is quite 
simple and straightforward. Typically, a client uses a Pool Processor as follows : 
First it sends a request to it to allocate the Pool Processor. This request contains 
a process descriptor for the process to be run. While the Pool Processor is allo-
cated it will not accept requests to do work for other users. The Pool Processor 
then fetches code, data and stack using the capabilities in the process descriptor, 
and returns a capability for managing the process to the client. The client can 
then order execution to be started, stopped, checkpointed, migrated, etc. 
Finally, the client deallocates the Pool Processor, allowing it to accept work from 
other clients. 
Ordinarily, regular user processes will not be allowed to use Pool Processor 
Service directly; that is, most users will not have the appropriate capabilities to 
access a Pool Processor. If a user wishes to run a program, he must send a 
request to a 'Process Server', which checks budgets, quota and permissions, 
builds up the process, and finds a Pool Processor to do the job. 
A sketch of a list of requests, accepted by the Pool Processors follows. Pcap 
represents the capability needed to access the process in the Pool Processor. 
Alloccap is the capability needed for allocating a Pool Processor. Pool Processors 
only listen to this capability when available. 
allocate( alloccap, processdescriptor) 
Allocate and load a Pool Processor. A capability is returned for control-
ling the loaded process. 
start(pcap) 
Start a loaded process. 
stop(pcap) 
Stop a running process. 
status(pcap) 
Returns the state of the executing process. 
unload(pcap) 
Build up and return a process descriptor for the current process. Allow 
the code, data and stack to be fetched. 
deallocate(pcap) 
De-allocate the Pool Processor. Allow it to accept another process. 
report event(pcap, events) 
Reply to this request when one of the specified events occurs. Typical 
events are: process terminated; process started to pause; process ended 
pause. 
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Some commands may be bundled into one. For instance, allocate and start will 
often be done in one blow. The same applies to stop and unload, or stop and 
deallocate . 
Pool Processors, capable of tracing, single stepping, and what-not can accept a 
few more calls, useful for program debugging. A Debugging Server could use 
such Pool Processors to provide to Amoeba users a powerful debugging tool. 
Pool Processors provide service to their clients, but unlike most services, they 
do not usually receive a request to do some 'bounded' amount of work; in a Pool 
Processor a request (e.g., start) may cause a Pool Processor to run for ever. This 
does not matter normally, because its client (e.g., the Process Service) will stop 
the Pool Processor if the process runs too long. But, hardware and software 
being what they are, processes do not run forever, and even a Process Server can 
crash. All the Pool Processors allocated to a crashed Process Server must 
somehow be returned to the pool of available Pool Processors. Some of them 
may find out by themselves that their client has crashed, because they will 
attempt to send a reply and fail, but others, waiting for the next request, will not 
find out and wait forever. 
We have considered two solutions to this problem. The first is to build timers 
into the Pool Processors, which, if no requests come in during the timer interval, 
automatically stop any running processes and return the Pool Processors to state 
free. The other solution is to let the Boot Service-which keeps track of the Pro-
cess Service anyway and detects Process Server crashes-find 'orphaned' Pool 
Processors and return them to the free pool. 
We have chosen the second solution. The first solution is not elega,nt, because 
it requires both the Pool Processors and their clients to maintain timers. These 
timers must be shorter than the Pool Processor timers, and when these expire the 
client must make some sign of life to its Pool Processors. The Pool Processor's 
timeout time must be globally known and can not simply be changed, and the 
client's timers must be shorter by some unknown amount that depends on mes-
sage transmission times and network and operating system delays. In the other 
solution, the Boot Server plays an important role, because it has to find the 
orphaned Pool Processors. This does not, however, greatly increase the complex-
ity of the Boot Server, since it has to manage some of the Pool Processors any-
way; the Boot Server uses Pool Processors to execute (some of) the server 
processes under its management. 
4.3.6. Migration 
The process of migrating a process from one host to another is tricky. It has to 
be done carefully so as not to disturb outstanding transactions (trans or getreq). A 
process, while being moved from one processor to another cannot execute 
instructions, but its state can change because transactions complete or requests 
arrive. Received messages especially must be treated right: Imagine, for 
instance, a process being migrated because it had been blocked waiting for a 
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message. Another process may send it a message (request or reply) while it is 
being moved. If this message is not received, nor its retransmissions, the sending 
process decides incorrectly that the process being migrated has died. This 
should not happen. 
An additional problem may be caused by outstanding transactions with the 
local operating system. The operating system kernel must either delay migration 
until the request has been carried out, or send the reply to the process' new host. 
The choice depends on the kind of request made to the kernel. 
Not every process can be migrated. A process, for example, waiting for a disk 
interrupt (reply from a request to the disk) cannot be migrated to another pro-
cessor (with another disk) to do the next transaction with the disk there. 
Let us assume process P has to migrate from host A to host B. First host A 
must suspend the process. Then a Process Descriptor can be made, describing 
P's state. The Process Descriptor is then sent to host B , which, upon reception, 
immediately does P's outstanding gets, according to the state of the outstanding 
transactions. Retransmission timers and piggyback timers can all be restarted 
from scratch. The process is deaf from the time a process descriptor is created at 
host A until the time host B receives the Process Descriptor. This time is, 
approximately, one message time plus the overhead of making (at host A) and 
interpreting (at host B) the Process Descriptor. This time can be kept small, so 
the probability of message loss can also be kept small. However, sometimes, 
messages will be lost. But this is acceptable, because the transaction protocol 
was designed to recover from lost messages. 
When host B receives P's Process Descriptor, restarts timers for it, and does its 
gets again, migration is by no means complete. Host B must first use the code , 
data and stack capabilities in the Process Descriptor to obtain P's memory con-
tents. A little care has to be taken by B to restore P's memory contents 
'around' any messages received in the mean time. When B has completed the 
migration, A can remove P's Process Descriptor and free the memory, occupied 
by it. B can start execution of P . 
As a variation on 'ordinary' migration, we can also consider 'swapping.' Swap-
ping, in a multiprogrammed machine, means temporarily writing a process' state 
to secondary storage to make room for another process. In an Amoeba environ-
ment, swapping is temporarily migrating a process to a special swap server, a 
host with secondary storage that can store the state of many processes at a time. 
The swap server is not just a specialised file server, however, because the swap 
server has to be able to handle a swapped process' outstanding gets and timers. 
This requires some knowledge about processes' internal structures-which differ 
for processes for different target machines. 
Another special case of migration is the initial loading of a process. The Pro-
cess Service gives a Process Descriptor to a Pool Processor, which then uses the 
code capability to retrieve the process' code and data from the Loader Service. 
The Pool Processor uses exactly the same protocol for downloading a migrating 
process, for swapping in a process, and for loading and starting a new process. 
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4.4. Loader Service 
The Loader Service has already been mentioned as a service that provides pro-
cess images to its clients. Basically, it is a simple service that responds to com-
mands to store and retrieve processes. A process-as shown before-consists of a 
Process Descriptor plus code, data and stack. When the capability of a process 
is given to a Loader Server, it responds by returning the Process Descriptor. 
The Process Descriptor contains capabilities for code, data and stack, and with 
these capabilities the process' code, data and stack can be read as if from a file. 
Programs or processes are easily stored by the Loader Service; all a client 
must do is request it to store a process and give it the Process Descriptor for it. 
The Loader Service stores the Process Descriptor, uses its code capability to 
obtain and store the program's or process' codes and data, and returns a capa-
bility for the process. 
The protocol that the Loader Service uses for moving processes between hosts 
is the same all over: first the Process Descriptor changes hands, then the code, 
data and stack capabilities are used to transfer the rest of the process. The 
importance of a uniform procedure for process transfer is, of course, to hide the 
difference between process downloading, swapping, migrating, checkpointing, 
dumping, etc. A Pool Processor need never know whether it receives a process 
from another Pool Processor, from a Swap Server, a Process Server, or a Loader 
Server, nor need it know where it sends a process. 
The basic functions of the Loader Service can be augmented by some extra 
service in heterogeneous systems. A request for a Process Descriptor can be 
accompanied by a description of the host the process must run on. An intelli-
gent implementation of the Loader Service could store several versions of a pro-
gram, one for each of a set of processors. It could then deliver several Process 
Descriptors and several code and data images, as required by its clients. 
Such service can be implemented by storing processes in some machine 
independent code, that can be quickly expanded into the target code of the 
desired processor. This should be combined with a cache for target machine 
versions of programs, because code generation from an UNCOL * is too slow to do 
it on every execution of a program. 
An even further refined version of the Loader Service could store program 
sources and compile into desired target code upon request. Again, this should be 
combined with a cache of frequently used binaries, because of the speed of 
current compilers. Such an integrated compiler/loader/program store no longer 
deserves the name Loader Service, but perhaps 'Program Service.' The technology 
• An UNCOL (UNiversal Computer Oriented Language) is an intermediate language, resembling 
machine language, for which compilers produce c0<le~1 The UNCOL code is then translated into target 
machine code. With this scheme it is possible to get compilers for n high-level languages on m target 
machines by writing n compilers and m translators. Without an UNCOL, n X m compilers would be re-
quired. The AmodJa system, which runs on various CPUS, uses the Amsterdam Compiler Kit, based 
on an UNCOL?' 
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for making such a system is known 74 ; it is an interesting project to build it to test 
its practicality. 
At a glance, it would seem that Swap Service and Loader Service are very simi-
lar: both services store processes, although the Swap Server stores them only for 
short periods of time. There is an essential difference, however, between the two: 
The Swap Server stores active processes, whereas the Loader Service stores pro-
grams, disguised as (inactive) processes. While a process is stored by the Swap 
Server, it does not execute instructions, but it is still active: its transaction timers 
continue to run and may well expire while the process is stored on the Swap 
Server's disk; its outstanding gets may still complete by the reception of a message. 
4.5. Boot Service 
Important goals of distributed system design are reliability and availability. The 
prime mechanisms to achieve these goals are replication and fault tolerance. 
Every service, if it is to be reliable, must be designed in a way to expect errors in 
subservices, but it must also be designed to expect that it will occasionally crash 
itsel£ As an aid in recovering from crashes the Boot Service has been designed. 
However, it is not more than just an aid. No service can be implemented to 
complete error recovery for any other service. Services must do their own crash 
recovery, but the Boot Service can help to detect crashes, and create server 
processes to replace crashed ones. 
Boot Service must be a distributed service itself. If there were one Boot Server 
process in the system, it could crash, and Boot Service would no longer be. Boot 
Service consists of several processes which keep an eye on each other. If one 
server crashes, another is created to take its place. In this way is continued Boot 
Service guaranteed in the face of single-site crashes. 
The Boot Service has to do three things: keep itself going, keep client services 
going, and put orphaned Pool Processors back in their .free state. We shall now 
examine each of these tasks in turn. 
The Boot Servers have to check periodically if their colleague Boot Servers are 
still functioning. If it is detected that one of them has crashed, it is restored by 
one of the others. Crash detection and restoration must be done in an orderly 
way; for instance, when two Boot Servers simultaneously detect that a third has 
crashed, they might both create a new one. Synchronisation techniques for this 
problem are well known.17•38•56 An appropriate one can be selected, depending 
on the number of Boot server processes, the type of the network and other 
parameters. 
Each of the Boot Servers receives polls from its colleagues on a unique port. 
Besides its own unique port, every Boot Server must know the ports of the Boot 
Servers it polls, plus enough information to restart them when they crash. In 
both models this implies that every Boot Server must know the ports of all the 
other Boot Servers. 
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A service that the Boot Service keeps an eye on generally consists of a nwnber 
of server processes. These processes need not all be the same, but could be 
different processes, each specialised to offer some part of the service. The 
nwnber and kind of server processes must be dynamically changeable, so it is 
possible to create more server processes for a service when it is heavily used, and 
reduce the nwnber of server processes when business is slack. Per client service, 
the Boot Service maintains two tables, one that gives the desired state of the 
client service (in terms of which processes should run where), and one that gives 
the actual state of the client service, which may not be completely up-to-date. 
Information on a process that should be running is called a template. Infor-
mation on a running process is called an instance. Normally, there is a one-to-
one mapping of templates and instances, but occasionally a crash destroys a ser-
vice process which temporarily disrupts the one-to-one correspondence. 
The template table holds the following information: 
An instance pointer, referring to the corresponding entry in the instance table . 
When there is no running service process for the template, this pointer will be 
set to nil. 
A capability for the program to be executed as the server process. When the 
server process has to be booted, or rebooted, this capability is used to find the 
program to start. 
The allocate port for the server process. This is a port which gives access to a 
processor where the server process can be run. This can be a Pool Processor, 
or a dedicated processor; in the former case, many processors will offer service 
on that port, in the latter case, only one processor will listen on the allocate 
port. 
A test request and reply , to be used to test whether the corresponding instance 
of the server template functions. The test request can be a request to the server 
process to carry out a self-test operation. If the correct reply is not given or if 
no reply is given at all, the Boot Server will asswne the tested instance has 
crashed. 
The template information is 'semi-permanent.' It survives crashes of both the 
service it refers to and the Boot Service. The template information for a service 
is given to the Boot Service when the service becomes a client of the Boot Ser-
vice. It can be changed if the nwnber of servers for that service should change, 
or if something else about the service changes. 
The instance table changes much more rapidly. Whenever a server process 
crashes, or a new service process is created, this is reflected in the instance table. 
The instance table contains: 
A template pointer which refers to the template on which the server process is 
based. 
The server capability , the capability used to address the test request. 
The process capability, with which the server process is controlled. 
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Templates can be added and removed dynamically, increasing or decreasing 
the number of server processes. When a new template is added, the Boot Server 
creates a new server process for it; when a template is removed, the Boot 
Service's client can specify if he wants the associated server process to be killed, 
or if he just wants the Boot Service not to create a new server process when the 
old one terminates. 
Note that bootstrapping is just a special case of the normal Boot Service task: 
all processes crashed. The Boot Service needs non-volatile storage for the tem-
plates, so when Amoeba is bootstrapped by starting the Boot Service, the Boot 
Service knows what processes to create. At least one Boot Server needs a local 
disk where the templates are stored; it must be a local disk, because regular Disk 
Service cannot be assumed to be operational when the system is down. 
When bootstrapping the system, some care has to be taken about the order in 
which various services are started up; services form a hierarchy, so some services 
depend on the availability of others to function. On becoming a client of the 
Boot Service, a service could specify on which subservices it depends. The Boot 
Service can then generate a dependency graph. If it contains no cycles, it is a 
simple matter for the Boot Service to start the services in the correct order. If it 
does contain cycles, the Boot Service can attempt to start all services in the cycle 
simultaneously, or as closely together as possible. 
Pool Processor service can generally be found right at the bottom of the ser-
vice hierarchy. Its availability is therefore essential for the operation of most ser-
vices, including Boot Service itself! Pool Processors cannot generally be brought 
up the same way other services are brought up; when a Pool Processor crashes, 
this usually means the processor on which the Pool Processor runs has to be 
reset. If the network provides mechanisms for resetting processors, the Boot Ser-
vice can do this. Otherwise it will have to be done by hand. 
5 
PROCESS SCHEDULING 
~n most operating systems, when a process is run, it is assigned to · a processor 
for execution. In time-sharing systems proc~ are assigned for short periods, 
tenths of seconds, and usually spend the time in between waiting for 1/ o to com-
plete, or for a new time slice in the processor. In a large distributed operating 
system, with hundreds of processors, proc~ may be exclusively assigned to a 
processor for the process' life time. The decision making process of when to allo-
cate which proc~ to which processors is called scheduling. This section 
presents a scheduling algorithm suitable in a number of different environments 
based on pre-emption and notions of fairness, maximising throughput and 
minimising response times. 
In traditional operating systems, there was just one processor that had to serve 
many users. Multiprogramming, or time sharing was the technique usually 
employed for such systems. Hardware prices are still dropping, especially those 
of processors and memory; distributed systems will soon have tens, hundreds, 
perhaps thousands, of processors. On such systems, with current computer use, 
every process can easily be assigned to a private processor of its own for its life 
time. However, as our computing environment changes, the demands we make 
on it will also change; as more processing power becomes available, we shall also 
need more of it. Our programs will become bigger, more complex, intelligent, 
and we shall try to exploit the possibilities of parallel computing. However 
many processors we have, we shall never have enough. 
Programs, as they are written today, spend most of their time waiting for 
input or output. Some programs, of course, are intended for interactive use, 
which causes them to be idle nearly all the time, waiting for human users to 
think up and type their input. Other programs also have to do a lot of waiting: 
waiting for disk 1/ o to complete, waiting for confirmation that a data base 
update has been done, waiting for a tape to rewind, waiting for another process 
to feed more data into it, etc. Simple measurements in the UNIX operating 
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system have shown that processes spend six times as much time waiting for sys-
tem calls to complete as time computing. In theory, by removing a waiting pro-
cess from its processor, and replacing it with a running process, throughput can 
be increased by a factor six. 
Changing the processor allocation is called process switching. In different 
environments process switching occurs in different ways: In a centralised multi-
programming system a switch consists of changing the memory map, some regis-
ters and setting up a new environment. Some computers have a single instruc-
tion to do this; in others it takes a few milliseconds. In a distributed environ-
ment, such as Amoeba, a process switch can be used to balance the load on a 
number of processes; the switch could then consist of sending the state of a run-
ning process from one processor to another. Such a switch is a much more 
time-consuming affair. In the next sections we shall not go into the details of 
how switching is done, but rather into the decision making process of what 
switches must be made and when. 
Optimal load balancing between the processors of a distributed system can 
only be achieved with global and up-to-date knowledge of the state and load of 
each processor and the behaviour of each process. The nature of distributed sys-
tems makes it impossible, however, to have totally up-to-date information about 
the state of the system at all times. Furthermore, the behaviour of most 
processes that run in an open, general-purpose system is not usually known in 
advance. 
In all operating systems, scheduling decisions must be made based on imper-
fect information. A process' future behaviour has to be predicted using statistical 
information about processes in general and extrapolations from processes' past 
behaviour. In distributed systems these predictions are necessarily less accurate 
than those that can be made in conventional, centralised, closed operating sys-
tems, in which the scheduler has more information about what the process is 
doing than in distributed systems. For instance, when a process is waiting on an 
event, the scheduler in a traditional operating system usually knows what event, 
so it can estimate quite accurately when the event is likely to occur: A process 
waiting for disk 1/ o to complete will probably be blocked for a short time, while 
a process waiting for terminal input is likely to be blocked much longer. In 
Amoeba this information is not available. Amoeba is an open system, where all 
requests are made through the network. The scheduler cannot look at these 
requests, so it cannot know when a reply is due; it can only estimate from past 
experience. 
As an illustration of making predictions based on a process' past behaviour, 
consider a process copying a large file. The process will alternately make read 
requests and write requests to a File Server. The Scheduler can observe the time 
the process is blocked waiting for the reply, and predict, when the process waits 
next, that the delay is approximately going to be the same as in the past. Such 
an estimate will usually be correct, although it is possible that every now and 
then it will be widely off the mark when, for instance, a process suddenly decides 
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to request terminal input instead of doing disk 1/ o. 
Deterministic scheduling algorithms are well-known! 0 In these algorithms, 
advance knowledge is used of processes' execution times. Generally, however, 
such knowledge is not available, and scheduling algortithms must be used that 
do not use advance knowledge of process run times, or that use predictions of pro-
cess execution times. Scheduling algorithms that do not use such estimates are 
used in most operating systems . . Typical algorithms are: round robin, shortest 
elapsed time, and priority queues. An algorithm that requires advance knowledge of 
process' run times is shortest remaining run time. As the name suggests, this algo-
rithm schedules the process with the least remaining run time at each moment. 
For this algorithm, the mean number of processes in the system is minimalf3 
which is a desirable property for an operating system. 
A shortest remaining ,un time algorithm for scheduling must know about the 
remaining run time of the processes is schedules, or at least be able to estimate 
it. Generally speaking, remaining run times are just as unpredictable as wait 
times. Several ways exist, however, to make better estimates than, for instance, 
the average run time of every process executed in the past. One way is, to 
gather run-time statistics for specific programs that are executed regularly, to use 
these for a better prediction of future run times. Note, by the way, that run 
times of most processes depend heavily on the size and complexity of the input 
(unseen by the Process Server), causing considerable variation in run times. 
5.1. Runs and Pauses 
Before going into the details of scheduling algorithms it is necessary to know a 
little about the behaviour of processes. Typically, a process executes instructions, 
makes system calls, executes more instructions, makes more system calls, and 
finally terminates. Usually, making a system call involves disk accesses, terminal 
input, tape movement or other 1/ o. The process then blocks, until the system 
call is completed. During this time the process cannot execute instructions, and, 
usually, the operating system makes a process switch to execute a process that is 
not blocked. Both in traditional time-sharing systems and in other distributed 
systems, processes alternate between periods of executing instructions, and 
periods of waiting for external events. 
It is important to estimate the remaining time a process will execute instruc-
tions before it pauses again, because this information is needed to decide which 
process to allocate, and for how long it is likely to remain allocated. A period of 
executing instructions between pauses is a run, and we shall now attempt to find 
methods to predict the lengths of runs. 
In order to determine which times exactly have to be estimated let us examine 
the hypothetical path of a process through the system of FIGURE 5.1. We see a 
process being created at t 0. The scheduler allocates it to a processor at t 1. 
Then the process runs for a while, until it blocks (waiting for 1/0) at t2. The 
5.1. RUNS AND PAUSES 
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time-
FIGURE 5.1. The path of a hypothetical process being scheduled in an 
operating system. 
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scheduler decides to remove the process from that processor temporarily at t 3, 
probably in order to use the processor to execute another process. The event 
that the process was waiting for occurs at t 4 and the scheduler finds a processor 
again at t 5. This story continues until tl 0, when the process terminates. 
Let us define some terminology to aid discussion. The execution of a process 
consists of a sequence of runs and pauses. A run lasts from the moment a pro-
cess becomes runnable to the moment it terminates or pauses to wait on some 
event. The pause that then starts lasts until an event occurs that makes the pro-
cess runnable once more. For scheduling, we are interested in the lengths of 
runs and pauses, but before we discuss run times and pause times, we must note 
an important difference between the two. When a running process is suspended, 
it continue; to be runnable, but no instructions are being executed. A run must 
therefore be divided into periods where a process is running and periods where it 
is merely runnable ; that is, it is not executing instructions, but it could be if only 
it had a processor to do it on. Together, the durations of these periods yield the 
real time of a run. However, for each run we are primarily interested in the sum 
of the periods where a process is running (runnable and allocated), the run time. 
Note that in a run, the run time plus the suspended time equals the real time of 
the run. 
Pauses are different. The event that terminates a pause will occur indepen-
dent of whether the process is suspended or not. The pause time , therefore, is the 
time between the start and the end of a pause, and the duration of a pause is not 
influenced by how the pausing process is scheduled (although it may depend on 
how other processes that must eventually cause the event that terminates the 
pause are scheduled). 
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Looking at FIGURE 5.1 again, we see that our hypothetical process has three 
runs (tO to t2, t4 to t6, and t 7 to t 10), during which it is suspended three times, 
once in each run (tO to tl, t4 to t5, and tB to t9). It has two pauses (t2 to t4, 
and t6 to t7). 
The CPU time of a run is determined by the process (program), its input, and 
the speed of the processor that executes it. The scheduler has no influence on 
run times, but, in order to allocate processes to processors efficiently, schedulers 
need to know or to estimate them. Suspended times are under scheduler control. 
Scheduling algorithms will make an attempt (among others) to minimise these. 
Pause times, finally, are determined by external events, such as when a user at a 
terminal presses the return key, or when a disk request completes, or when a 
query sent to a data base server gets its reply. 
We want to develop useful scheduling algorithms for the processes under con-
trol of the scheduler. These processes include short lived client or server 
processes that do their work and then terminate, but also very long lived server 
processes that execute a request, return a reply, and then wait for the next 
request to arrive. Potentially these processes live for ever and disappear only 
when they crash or when they are explicitly terminated. 
Because of this mix of short lived, long lived and 'eternal' processes we do not 
use 'total' execution times of processes in our scheduler model, but base schedul-
ing on the (predicted) lengths of individual runs and pauses. 
In the next section we shall develop a model for predicting the length of runs 
and pauses, using no other information then the knowledge how long a run or 
pause has already run or paused. 
5.2. Estimating run times and pause times. 
When we wish to estimate how long a run or pause is going to be, we can use 
several sources of information to base such an estimate on. First, we can use sta-
tistical information about processes in general. Run times and pause times of 
some large collection of processes executed can be measured and collected, and 
their distribution can be computed. We have made such measurements, and 
below we shall present the results. Second, when a particular program (e.g., Pas-
cal compiler, text formatter) is executed very often, we can also gather the same 
statistics for that particular program, yielding a more accurate prediction of run 
and pause times for frequently run programs. (The Loader Service could store 
this data along with the code.) Third, we can use information that is gathered 
as the process runs to predict its future behaviour. We have already mentioned 
how we can observe, for instance, that a process makes a sequence of requests, 
followed by similar pause times. We can also safely assume that a process that 
has executed for an hour will probably not finish in the next few seconds. 
Finally, we can combine these methods to obtain even more accurate predic-
tions. 
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We shall examine measurements made in our UNIX system, and use these to 
derive a model for the distribution of run times. Given such a distribution func-
tion, the expected run time of a process can be computed. It is also possible to 
compute the expected remaining run time when the run time consumed so far is 
known. 
Measurements were put in the operating system's code to register the moment 
processes were blocked and the moment processes became runnable again. Pro-
cess creation was treated as a special case of a process becoming runnable; pro-
cess termination was a special case of a process ceasing to be runnable. Both for 
runs and pauses 32 counters were installed, such that counter i (i = 0, · · · , 31) 
counted the number of runs or pauses of length between zi - 1 - 1 and 2; clock 
ticks of 20 ms. From the probability density function thus obtained the mean 
run time and mean pause time can be computed. The mean run time was 
found to be 26.4 msec, and the mean pause time 160 msec. In FIGURE 5.2, a 
bar graph shows the measured probability-density functions for runs (top) and 
pauses (bottom). 
A few notes are in order before any conclusions are drawn. Because of the 
logarithmic scales used in the figures the beholder may falsely put too much 
trust in the values in the rightmost columns. These represent samples of a size of 
on the order of 10- 6 of the total number of samples: a few. One more sample 
in the rightmost column in the graph would already make a significant 
difference. Some of the columns in the histogram overlap. This was done to 
reflect the inaccuracy in the measurements: A process that received 1 clock 
interrupt during its run has had a run between O and 2 clock intervals; a process 
that received 2 interrupts has had a run of between 1 and 3 clock intervals. 
This explains the overlap. 
A first glimpse at the measurements shows both a surprisingly large number of 
very short runs and a surprisingly small number of runs of a minute or more. 
Two causes can be put forward to explain this phenomenon. Firstly, the meas-
urements show statistics of individual runs, not individual processes. Most 
processes are 1/ o bound, and do very little processing between being blocked on 
system calls. These processes execute many system calls, however, which have a 
significant effect on the size of the leftmost columns. Few processes are so CPU 
bound that they compute without executing a single system call for a solid 
minute. Those that do, however, make few system calls and have only little 
effect on the right-hand side of the histograms. Secondly, the measurements 
were made over a period of a few weeks on one computer science faculty com-
puter. Most of the users were staff working on various projects, most of which 
involved program development and text processing. Just one user doing, for 
instance, a project to try to find a new largest known prime number, would have 
had a significant effect on our measurements. However, no such user was on the 
system during the time these statistics were gathered. 
In order to develop a mathematical model for estimating run times, a proba-
bility density function p ( t ) will be fitted to the measurements to give the 
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FIGURE 5.2. Run-time and pause-time distribution for the UNIX operating 
system. The bar graphs are based on measurement of slightly more than 
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probability, P(t 1, t2), that a process starting a run at t=0 ends that spell 
between t 1 and t 2 by 
12 
P(t 1, t2) = f p(t)dt 
II 
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p (t) must be normalised, so 
00 j p(t)dt = 1 
0 
The expected run time is given by 
00 j tp(t)dt 
0 
100 -
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A function that was found to fit the run-time measurements accurately was 
2M2 p(t) = (t + M)3 (5.1) 
as can be seen in FIGURE 5.3 where p is superimposed on the measured histo-
gram (with M set to 26.4 msec). In order to examine the properties of this pro-
bability density function, let 
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00 00 
ll>(T) = j p (t) dt, and i'(T) = j t p (t) dt. 
T T 
Computing the integrals we get 
(T+ M)2 
and 
[ 
M2 t M2 l 00 2M2 T + M3 
i'(T) = - (t + M)2 - (t + M) T - (T + M)2 
We can easily see now that p is normalised: ll>(T) = 1 for T = 0. The 
expected run time for a process is 'Y(O) = M. The expected run time of a pro-
cess, given that it has already run for a time Tis 
which is 
00 
jtp(t)dt 
T T(T) = --
oo 
j p(t)dt 
T 
11.D_ 
ll>(T) 
2M2T + M3 
M 2 = 2T + M, (5.2) 
This simple model gives us an instrument for estimating the lengths of runs. 
When a run starts, we predict its length to be M, but as it lasts we revise our 
prediction, based on the knowledge that it has already last some time. It is 
interesting to observe the following: if we have exact or nearly exact information 
about run times, estimates of their lengths will not change or hardly change as it 
lasts; the estimate of the time between now and the time a run ends decreases as 
time elapses. In our model, however, it is exactly the other way around. As 
time goes on, the model predicts that the time between now and the moment a 
run ends increases. A process that has run for a time T is expected to run for a 
time M + T more. In the next section we shall see that this has consequences 
for the scheduling algorithm. 
The model for predicting run times can be further refined; if the Scheduler 
passes measured times to the Loader Service, the information is available when 
the process is run next. The Loader Service can collect the data and compute 
expected times and variations. 
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For pause times another interesting probability density function was found to 
fit the measurements: 
'(t) _ 2M 
p - (t +M)2 
This probability density function has an expected pause time of oo ! Yet, as can 
be seen in FIGURE 5.4, it yields an good approximation of the measured pause 
times. 
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FIGURE 5.4. Measured pause-time distribution with distribution derived 
from p'(t ) superimposed 
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The pause-time distribution will be much more dependent on the underlying 
operating system than the run-time distribution. A distributed system like 
Amoeba may yield a probability density function with different characteristics 
altogether. 
The primary cause for the "fat tail" distribution measured in UNIX is the 
usage of getry processes, pausing on a read from a terminal to log a new user in. 
At night, when hardly anyone is logged in, there are many such processes paus-
ing for hours. A system that used a different method for logging in (e.g., one 
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process that handles all terminals) would undoubtedly show a pause-time distri-
bution that was quite different. 
5.3. A Model for a Distributed Scheduler 
Now that a model for estimating processes' run times is available, it can be used 
in a scheduling algorithm. Assume there are N processes and K processors. To 
simplify the problem assume also that every process can be allocated to any pro-
cessor, and that all processors are equally suitable for any process. A processor 
can execute one process at a time. No assumptions need to be made about 
where processes are when they are not allocated; they can be kept in primary 
memory somewhere or on a swapping device. The time to allocate and de-
allocate a process depends on the method of storing de-allocated processes and is 
represented by the switch time, which may be process dependent. 
When a processor is idle, the Scheduler can pick an unallocated process, and 
allocate it to the processor. When a processor is allocated, the Scheduler can 
de-allocate the process and allocate another (unallocated) process. In order to 
decide which process to allocate and which process to de-allocate we shall 
develop two priority functions, one for allocated processes and one for de-
allocated processes. Using these priority functions we can decide which allocated 
process least deserves to be allocated and which unallocated process most 
deserves to be allocated, and we can decide if the least deserving allocated pro-
cess is less deserving than the most deserving unallocated process. 
The scheduler has three criteria to base its decisions on: to maximise 
throughput, minimise response times and ensure fairness, simultaneously, if possi-
ble. We shall briefly describe each criterion. 
Maximise throughput 
This criterion states that the amount of work done per unit of time must be 
as large as possible. Work can be measured in different ways, depending 
on what the Scheduler schedules. We shall use as a measure the number of 
instructions of the processes in the system executed per unit of time, where, 
for simplicity, we assume all processors are equally fast. 
Minimise response times 
The response time of a process is the time that elapses between the moment 
the process is created and the moment it delivers its results. In our model 
we do not consider the execution times of whole processes, but of individual 
runs. The response time then is the time that elapses between the moment 
a process becomes runnable (the start of a run) and the moment the process 
ceases to be runnable (through exit or pause). The response time of the sys-
tem is the sum of the individual response times. Minimising response times 
will cause minimum wait times, both for human users at a terminal, for 
clients waiting for a service to be carried out, and for peripheral equipment. 
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Ensure fairness 
The throughput criterion and the response time criterion may not cause a 
runnable process never to be run at all. The fairness criterion states that 
processes or groups of processes must make equal progress. There are 
several ways to define the notion of fairness. One is, to give each process an 
equal share of the processor(s), another, to give each user an equal share, 
independent of the number of processes under his .control. 
These criteria are often contradictory: According to the throughput rule each 
processor must be kept as busy as possible, so processes with long expected run 
times should be run as much as possible, but according to the response time cri-
terion, shortest jobs should be run first. Both rules may cause some processes 
never to be run at all, which violates the fairness rule. The scheduler cannot 
maximise throughput, minimise response times and ensure optimal fairness at the 
same time. It will have to enforce each of these rules to some degree, and, 
ideally, the weight of each rule is a parameter of the scheduler. 
We shall phrase some scheduling rules, rules that increase throughput, 
decrease response times and ensure fairness. These rules will be based on the 
present allocation of processors to processes, and our predictions on the 
behaviour of processes in the near future. We shall not attempt an optimum 
schedule for any of the criteria, because it is not useful to compute-at great 
expense- an optimum allocation of processes, based on estimates of the involved 
processes' future behaviour. 
Some terminology is needed before the scheduling rules can be described. 
Processes will be indicated by lower case letters. Predicted times are indicated 
by a capital T; times that can be computed (such as the time required to load a 
particular process in memory) by a lower case t . If a process, x, is runnable, 
the predicted remaining run time is J:. If x is in a pause, the predicted remain-
ing pause time is 71; . The time, required to load or unload process x is t~. 
5.3.1. Throughput Rule 
Let us look at the throughput rule first. It simply states that the processors must be 
kept as busy as possible. This implies that, if a processor is idle and there is an 
unallocated runnable process, it should be assigned to that processor forthwith. It 
also implies that processes, once assigned to a processor should, if possible, run to 
completion, because process switching costs time. When an allocated process 
pauses, its processor is idle, so if the expected pause time exceeds the time required 
to exchange the pausing process with an unallocated runnable process, a switch 
should be made; when no unallocated runnable process is available, but there is 
an unallocated process with a shorter expected pause time than that of the allo-
cated process, then a switch could also be useful. The variations in pause times are 
usually so large, however, that it is better to wait until a process becomes runn-
able. We have summarised the throughput rules in FIGURE 5.5; the rules are put 
in order of precedence, the top rule should be applied first, if applicable. 
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allocated unallocated switch if ... 
process process 
Runnable Allocate the process with the longest expected 
No process run time. 
pausing wait until a process becomes runnable. 
runnable switch if the expected pause time exceeds the 
pausing switch time. Choose the process with the longest 
expected run time. 
pausing wait until a process becomes runnable. 
running runnable never switch a running process 
or 
pausing 
FIGURE 5.5. Scheduling rules for maximising throughput, stated in order of 
precedence. 
5.3.2. Response Time Rule 
The next criterion we shall look at is response time. The response time of a run 
is the time between the moment a run starts-the moment the process becomes 
runnable-and the moment a run ends-the moment the process exits or starts a 
pause. The response time of a process consists of the time the process was allo-
cated during a run, and the time it was not allocated. The total response time 
of the system is the sum of the response times of the individual processes. 
Suppose there are two processes and one processor. Process one needs 100 
seconds of CPU time to complete its run, while process two needs only 10 seconds. 
Switching processes costs one second. If process one is run first and process two 
after process one, the response time of process one will be 100 seconds, that of 
process two will be 100 + 1 + 10 = 111 seconds (the time waiting for process 
one, plus the time to switch processes around plus the time to run process two). 
The total response time is 211 seconds. It is easily verified that running process 
two first results in a total response time of 121 seconds. In order to obtain the 
best response time, the shortest process should be run first. It is not difficult to 
see that in a situation with many processors and processes the response time is 
also minimised by executing processes with shortest runs first.10 When a processor 
is idle, and there is a choice of several unallocated runnable processes, the one 
with the shortest expected run time must be chosen. 
When process x is allocated, with expected run time T:, and processy is wait-
ing to be allocated, with expected run time Ty, the expected response time if no 
process switch is made is 
T.-esp = 2T: + 'I'y + ti, 
where t1 is the time it takes to unload process x and load process y . If the 
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processes are switched, however, the response time will be 
T,,,p = 2 'I'y + 'I'x + 2.t, 
123 
The minimwn response time rule thus states that a process switch should be 
made if T,,,,p > T,,,p, or 
'I'x - I; > t, 
When the expected run times are accurate estimates, this rule indeed minimises 
response time. Consider, however, what happens when the remaining run time 
of a process is predicted using the amount of CPU time already conswned, 
according to EQUATION (5.2). A process, y, which ran for ,; CPU seconds has an 
expected run time of T(t;) = 2.t; + M , hence an expected remaining run time 
of Ty = t; + M. Asswne process x is allocated and has had the CPU for 
,: = 20 seconds, and process y is not allocated, and had the CPU for ,; = 18 
seconds. Asswne also that t1 = 1 second. Observe what happens if the 
minimwn response time rule is applied: 
'I'x > I; + t, 
,: + M > t; + M + t1 
20>18+1 
This is true, so processes x and y are switched. Process y now needs about 18 
seconds of CPU time to end its run, but as it executes, the expected remaining run 
time increases. After little more than 3 seconds of CPU time, Ty will be large 
enough to cause a new process switch, according to the response time rule stated 
above. Clearly, the response time rule must be changed to prevent processes 
being switched back and forth every 2.t1 seconds. This not only causes much 
unnecessary overhead and reduces throughput, it actually increases response 
time rather than reducing it. 
Two things can be done to prevent this thrashing: one is to simply forbid 
processes to be switched back before the newly allocated process has had its 
remaining expected run time, the other is to change the response time rule in 
such a way that a switch will not be made unless the swapped-in process gets its 
remaining expected run time of CPU time, even though the expected run time 
changes. Note the difference between the two methods: the former method 
causes an immediate switch and prevents premature switching afterwards, the 
latter postpones switching, so that no special rules are needed afterwards. 
We choose the latter method for two reasons. First, the former method 
requires special rules for processes that have just been allocated or have just 
been de-allocated. This means the scheduling history must be retained. Second, 
it requires the scheduler to explicitly ignor~ newer-hence, better-predictions of 
processes' run times after having made the switch. We have therefore chosen the 
latter method by formulating scheduling rules that will only make a switch if it 
is guaranteed that the involved processes will not be switched back before the 
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newly allocated process has at least completed its expected run time. In order to 
formulate this rule, we view a process' expected remaining run time as a function 
of CPU time consumed, denoted by T'(t;). 
We now have two rules: the old minimum response time rule that states 
'I'x > TS, + t, 
and a new rule that states: assuming a switch is made, the above rule may not 
become applicable during a time of Ty, or 
T' ( t) > 'f"x + t1, remains false for all t; ~ t ~ t; + TS, 
If the computation of the expected remaining run time, according to 
T'(t;) = t; + M is used, T'(t) is an increasing function oft, so the second rule 
becomes 
T'(t; + T'(t;)) ~ t; + M + t1, 
or 
t; ;;;;., t; + T' ( t;) + M - t1 
If the original minimum response time rule is also written in terms of CPU time 
consumed, we get 
t; > ,; + t,, 
so we can combine the two rules to one new rule (substituting TS, for T'(t;) once 
more): 
t; > t; + Ty + M + t1 
We can now summarise the scheduling rules for minimising response time in a 
manner similar to FIGURE 5.5. The result is shown in FIGURE 5.6. 
allocat«l unallocated switch if ... 
process process 
Runnable Allocate the process with the shortest expected 
No process run time. 
pausmg wait until a process becomes runnable. 
pausing runnable . switch if Tl; > 2.t1. 
pausing wait until a process becomes runnable. 
runnable switch if 'I'x > TS,(t) + t,, for all 
runnmg t;<t<t;+ TS, 
pausing don't switch 
FIGURE 5.6. Scheduling rules for minimising response time, stated in order 
of precedence. 
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5.3.3. Fairness Rule 
The last criterion for scheduling is fairness. Each process, when runnable, has a 
right for an equal share of processing. This means that, ideally, at the end of a 
run, the ratio of the allocated time and the unallocated time should be the same 
for all processes. With N runnable processes and K processors, this ratio of allo-
cated time to unallocated time should be K to N - K. Fairness can be achieved, 
for instance, by allocating processes for K units of time, after they have been de-
allocated for N - K units of time. By choosing a large unit of time, the amount 
of switching is small, but short processes, especially, are not treated fairly, 
because they do not use up their whole time slice. By choosing a short unit of 
time, however, process switching will take up all of the processor time. Ideally, 
both short and long processes get a fair share of the processors in as few time 
slices as possible. 
In order to reduce the number of process switches and ensure fair treatment of 
both short and long runs, a scheduling rule is phrased that de-allocates a process 
when it has had its fair share of the CPU, and allocates a process when it will get 
its fair share if it executes for its expected run time. This will give processes with 
long expected run times long time slices at the price of having to spend a long 
time de-allocated, while processes with short expected run times will spend a 
short time being de-allocated, at the price of getting short time slices. Every 
process will still get a fair share of the CPU, however. 
An allocated running process has received a fair share of the CPU if its 'degree ef 
fairness,' 
N-K t' 
Dfai a11oc = --- . -; = 1 
r, K tx (K<N), 
where t1 is the time process x spent runnable, but de-allocated, waiting to be 
allocated. If this ratio is greater than one, the process has had more than its fair 
share; if it is less, it has had less. A (de-allocated) runnable process will have had 
its fair share at the end of its expected run time if its degree of fairness 
N-K 
Dfair,fkailoc = ~ e; + I; = 1 id 
')I 
If this ratio is less than one, the process will get its fair share after more than its 
expected time. If it is greater it will get it sooner. In order to give processes 
time slices of size expected remaining run time, we shall use Dfair,alloc for allocated 
processes, and Dfair,fkalloc for de-allocated processes. Process x (allocated) and 
process y ( de-allocated) should be switched if 
t' t' + T'..y 
X > ~')I--~ 
td td 
X ')I 
Of the allocated processes, the first to be de-allocated is the one with the largest 
Dfair,alloc; of the de-allocated processes, the first to be allocated is the one with the 
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smallest Dfair,deall« · 
There are no fairness rules for pausing processes or idle processors, but if a 
process has to be allocated, the fairness rule states that the process with the smal-
lest degree of fairness should be chosen. We have summarised the fairness rules 
in FIGURE 5.7. 
allocated unallocated switch if .•. 
process process 
No process Runnable Allocate the process with the smallest Dfair,dea/1«· 
runnable fairness rule does not state that a process must be 
pausing allocated, but if one is allocated, the one with the 
smallest Dfair,dea/1« should be chosen. 
pausing fairness rule is not applicable in this case. 
running runnable switch if Dfair,a11« > Dfai,,t1ea11«-
pausing fairness rule is not applicable in this case. 
FIGURE 5.7. Scheduling rules for ensuring fairness. 
5.3.4. Combination of Rules 
The scheduler must somehow combine the rules for the three criteria of 
throughput, response time, and fairness. Some of the rules are plainly contradic-
tory: the throughput rule states: 'allocate the process with the longest expected 
run time,' while the response time rule says exactly the opposite. Still, the 
scheduler must use rules that give reasonably good throughput, reasonably good 
response times, and reasonable fairness. 
Best throughput is obtained by making as few process switches as possible of 
runnable processes, and de-allocating pausing processes in favour of runnable 
ones. The rule never to de-allocate a running process will often contradict the 
fairness rules and response time rules, but de-allocating pausing processes in 
favour of runnable ones does not hurt fairness and can be good for obtaining 
better response times. To some degree we have already tried to obtain good 
throughput in the response time rules and fairness rules, by always trying to allo-
cate processes for the duration of their expected run time. Thus the number of 
times a process is switched during a run can be kept low. 
Most difficult to integrate are the response time rule and the fairness rule for 
switching runnable processes. A mixture of the two rules must be used, 
parameterised, so more stress can be given to fairness, or more to good response 
times, as the situation may demand. In general, for short processes, response 
time is usually more important than fairn~, while for very long jobs, with runs 
of minutes or hours, fairness will be more important. 
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When the response time rule and the fairness rule for processes with expected 
run times according to EQUATION (5.1) are compared, a similarity between the 
two immediately catches the eye. The response time rule for switching an allo-
cated running process, x, and a de-allocated runnable process,y, is: 
1: > t; + Ty + M + t1 
and the fairness rule for such processes is: 
t' t' + Ty 
X > _.'Y __ -"--
td id 
X 'Y 
The two formulas can be combined in several ways. One method to combine 
the two is to rewrite the fairness rule 
id 
,: > tj . [t; + Ty] 
The rules can then be combined as follows : 
t: > a . :; . [t; + Ty] + (1-a) . [t; + Ty + M + t,] 
If M + t1 is ignored, this rule can be further simplified to 
t: > [,; + Ty] . [ a . :; + 1- a] 
In this rule a is a weighting factor between fairness and response time. Setting a 
to one reduces the rule to the fairness rule, while setting it to zero gives the 
minimum response time rule. Intermediate values give a mixture between fair-
ness and minimum response time. 
Simulations have shown that different values for a were needed to obtain good 
scheduling for short processes and for long processes. In the competition 
between processes with very short run times and processes with average run 
times, short processes need to be more favoured by the response time rule than is 
the case in the competition between processes with average run times and 
processes with very long run times. 
Another drawback of this weighting method is that it is not possible to write 
the rule in the form 
P a(t:, t~) > P a(t;, tj) 
where P is a priority function, parameterised with a. This is particularly impor-
tant in a distributed environment, because it makes it possible that two 
schedulers can exchange lists of priorities for their processes. It also gives a sort 
of absolute measure for the priority of a process, independent of other processes. 
A method for mixing the response time rule and the fairness rule that works 
much better is to use the following rule: 
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t: t; + Ty 
--->~-~~ 
t1+D tj+D 
In this rule, D regulates the relative weights of fairness and response time. Set-
ting D to zero reduces it to the fairness rule, setting it to a very large number, 
compared to the time a process is de-allocated during a run, reduces the rule to 
the response time rule. For short processes, spending short times de-allocated, D 
has more weight than for long processes, spending more de-allocated time, hence 
short processes are treated more according to the response time rule than long 
ones. 
The important advantage of parameterisation with D, is that it does allow 
definition of a priority function, so we can not only decide which processes to 
switch, but also which allocated process most needs to be de-allocated, and 
which de-allocated process most needs to be allocated. 
Another advantage of the second weighting method is that it allows an extra 
parameter for putting extra stress on throughput. This parameter, L, represents 
the time required to switch processes. If the switch time is short, L can be small, 
if it is long, L must be larger. The switch rule for a running and a runnable 
process is now: 
t' X t; + Ty > -"'---'"- + L 
t~+D tj+D 
In fact, L replaces the M + t1 of the minimum response time rule. 
The priority function for a running process can be defined by: 
t, 
p (t t) -L,D " d - td + D 
and for a de-allocated runnable process: 
t, + T,(t,) 
PL n(t,,td) = ---- + L 
' td + D 
The scheduling rules for combined fairness, response time and throughput can 
now be summarised as shown in FIGURE 5.8. 
The ultimate test, of course, of different ways of combining fairness, response 
time and throughput is to look at their performance. We have run simulations, 
using different ways of weighting response time and fairness, varying the 
parameterisation, and also varying the number of processors and processes. We 
measured the response time of processes as a function of their CPU time. In a 
totally fair schedule, the ratio of the two is the same for all processes, because the 
response time of a process is the sum of its CPU time and its suspended time. The 
best response times are obtained when the response time is equal to the CPU 
time; in other words, when the ratio of response time and CPU time is equal to 
one. Measuring response time as a function of CPU time can therefore be used 
both to obtain an indication of response time and of fairness. 
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allocated unallocated switch if ... 
process process 
No process Runnable Allocate the unallocated process with the smal-
lest Pn,L(t,,td)-
runnable if the expected pause time is greater than the 
switch time, allocate the process with the smallest 
pausing Pn,L; otherwise, use the switch rule for running 
processes. 
pausing don't switch, wait until a process becomes runn-
able. 
runnable switch if 
Pn,LU:,t1) > Pn,LU;,tj) 
runrung 
for running process x and some unallocated runn-
able process y . 
pausing don't switch. 
FIGURE 5.8. Combined scheduling rules for ensuring fairness, minimising 
response time, and maximising throughput. 
Simulation results are discussed in§ 5.5. 
5.4. Macro Runs and Pauses 
In conventional time-sharing systems, when a process is blocked on a system call 
it can be swapped out to disk. For many system calls, the swapping time is 
much longer than the time required to execute the system call. It is therefore 
unwise to swap every process the moment it blocks, but only those that are likely 
to remain blocked for a time long enough to merit swapping. 
Most time-sharing systems do this. This is because in most traditional time-
sharing systems, the operating system can make a reasonable estimate of the 
time a process will remain blocked on a system call. In an open system like 
Amoeba, this is not possible: processes make transactions with services outside the 
operating system; there is no telling in advance how long processes will block. 
In a distributed system, where processes may be swapped over the network, 
swapping is an expensive operation. Therefore it is important to know some-
thing about the expected pause time of a process before swapping it. It is only 
worth while swapping processes with a pause time that is longer than the swap 
time. The problem is to find out in advance which pauses will last long enough 
to make swapping necessary. 
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In § 5.2, the pause-time distribution of the UNIX operating system was shown. 
In this section we shall use a different model for predicting pause times for two 
reasons: We believe the UNIX distribution has an exceptionally fat tail, due to 
the usage of getty processes waiting all night for some one to log in. The other 
reason is that the analysis further on in this section becomes simpler if we assume 
run times and pause times have the same distribution function (albeit with 
different parameters). 
In this section we shall use a probability density function based on 
2M2 
p(t) = (t+~p)3 
that is, the same distribution function that was used for predicting run times. 
The mean expected pause time is Mp, and if the elapsed pause time is tp , then 
the expected remaining pause time is Tp =Mp+ tp, from EQUATION (5.2). 
Assume now, that Tm is the minimum expected pause time that makes swap-
ping worth while. Then the scheduler need only consider processes with pause 
times longer than Tm; that is, processes that have already paused for a time 
Tm - Mp , or longer. Pauses of shorter duration are not considered by the 
scheduler. 
A macro run is defined as an alternating sequence of runs and pauses, each 
pause shorter than Tm - Mp, ending with the first Tm - Mp seconds of a pause 
that lasts longer than Tm - Mp . The rest of that last pause is defined as a 
macro pause. In contrast, the runs and pauses defined previously will be 
referred to as micro runs and pauses. The idea is illustrated in FIGURE 5.9. 
macro run: u LJ macro pause: -
rrucro run: 
T.-M, : T.-M, : 
micro pause: -
tO ti t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 tB t9 t!O 
time -
FIGURE 5.9. The relation between micro runs and pauses and macro runs 
and pauses. The pauses between t 5 and t 6, and between t 7 and t B are 
longer than Tm - Mp-
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The distinction between micro runs and macro runs introduces a hierarchical 
notion of 'runnable': There can be schedulers at different levels of the system, 
using different notions of runs and pauses. One possibility, for instance, is to use 
a 'micro scheduler' to schedule processes within a processor, interacting with a 
'macro scheduler' to schedule the processes of a collection of processors. When a 
process pauses for a short time, only the micro scheduler will know about it, and 
swap it for another local process. When the pause lasts longer, the macro 
scheduler is informed, which may swap the process over the network. The 
parameter Tm determines at which point processes come under the influence of 
the macro scheduler. 
5.4.1. Analysis• 
Given the run-time and pause-time distributions of EQUATION (5.1 ), let us try to 
analyse the probability distribution functions for macro runs and macro pauses: 
Let x;, i = 0, 1, 2, · · · , be random variables with probability density function 
2M2 
f (t) = (t + ~,)3 (t ;;;. O); 
Lety;, i = 0, 1, 2, · · · , be random variables with probability density function 
2M2 
g(t) = (t + ~p)3 (t ;;;. O); 
The random variable n has the value n, n = 0, 1, 2, · · · with probability 
Prfy;< Tm (i= 1,2, · · · ,n) and Yn+I ;;;.Tm}, 
that is, with 
T. 
fg(t)dt 
0 
one has 
Pr{n=n} (1-/J)/!' ,n=0,1, ··· . 
Finally, let 
n 
P = Xo + L (y; + x;) + Tm , 
i=t-
as illustrated in FIGURE 5.10. Let p' = p - Tm. 
Then, with 
P(t ) = Pr{p < t} (p(t) 
• This analysis is due to E. van Doom 
AP(t)) 
dt 
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I XI I YI IX 2 I Y2 I ................................ .. ... ,___x_n _____ Y_n ___ _, 
Tm 
FIGURE 5.10. p is the random variable indicating the length of a macro 
run, composed" of micro runs x, and micro pauses y,, where each y,, 
(i = I, · · · ,n) is shorter than T::, buty. +1 is longer than Tm. -
one has 
00 
P'(t) = (1 - P) 2Jl' Pr{:_o + Y1 + :_1 + 
i=O 
Letting 
00 
./(s) = Je- st f(t)dt 
0 
be the Laplace transform off(t), 
T. 
• 1 f g (s) = /3 /- st g(t)dt 
00 00 
p°(s) = Je- st p(t)dt ( = Je -st dP(t)) 
0 0 
it follows that 
00 • 
p • ( s) = ( 1 - P) "'2:, fl' {.f ( s )Y + 1 {g ( s )Y 
n =O 
p -P1(cs2 
1 - P./(s)g.(s) 
It is readily verified that 
./(s) = 2eM,sE3(M,s) 
and 
where 
OO -zl 
En(z) = f-e-dt (exponential integral) 
I tn 
+ Yn + Xn < l I Y, < 1;,,} 
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Since 
I I 2 2) E3(z) = 2 - z - 2 z lnz + O(z (z-0) 
([I], 5.1.12), it follows after some algebra that, for (s-O), 
p•(,)=1-{M,[1+ ~]'+ iJ-~[1+ ~r,2 ln.+O(,') 
Consequently, the expected duration of a macro run is : 
{ } [ ]
2 d • Tm Tm 
- -p (s) = M, 1 + - + -
ds s=O Mp Mp 
00 
jt p (t)dt 
0 
One also has 
T. 
2M, (1 +;; )2 
p(t) ~ ---t3_....,,_P_ (5.3) 
Apparently, for large t, the probability density function for macro runs is very 
similar to that for micro runs. A mathematical analysis for smaller t is much 
harder; instead we have analysed the behaviour by simulation. 
The probability density function for macro runs depends on M,, Mp and the 
choice of Tm. In our simulations we have generated random sequences of runs 
and pauses with expected durations of 26.4 rnsec and 160 rnsec, respectively, in 
accordance with the measured values mentioned earlier. From these sequences 
the macro runs and macro pauses were determined using various values of Tm. 
The minimum duration of a macro run is, of course, Tm, which shows in the dis-
tribution graphs by an apparent shift to the right of the whole graph. 
5.5. Simulation Results 
A simulator was used to obtain some results that indicate the usability of the 
scheduling rules formulated in the previous section. The program could simu-
late the execution of a number of processes on a number of processors. Each 
process alternated runs and pauses, whose lengths were drawn randomly accord-
ing to the distribution of EQUATION (5.1). We have already shown that this 
function accurately yields the run time distribution of actual processes. It does 
not reflect the pause time distribution very accurately, but when other distribu-
tions were tried in the simulator the results were not significantly different. 
Runnable processes compete for the available processors; pausing processes do 
not compete for processors. The process switch time was assumed to be zero in 
the simulations. The simulator used two priority functions for runnable 
processes, one for processes allocated to a CPU (swapped in), one for processes not 
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FIGURE 5.11. The distribution of macro runs and pauses as generated by 
simulation. (M, = 26.4 mscc, Mp = 160 mscc, Tm = 500 mscc.) 
allocated to one of the CPUs (swapped out). For swapped-in processes the prior-
ity function was 
t, 
pin= ---
td + D 
while for swapped-out processes 
t, + Texp p""' =---~ +L 
td + D 
was used. Note that the higher the value of the priority function, the more CPU 
time it has had, hence the less it is entitled to be or remain allocated. D and L 
are adjustable parameters of the priority function, D can be used to adjust the 
relative importance of minimising response time and ensuring fairness, L can be 
set to slightly delay switching processes to obtain better throughput. The simu-
lator continuously compared the highest priority of the swapped-in processes to 
the lowest priority of the swapped-out processes, and, if the former was greater, 
switched the corresponding processes. Running processes that finished their run 
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were, of course, immediately replaced by the swapped-out runnable process with 
the lowest priority. 
The simulator was run with varying values of D and L to obtain some insight 
into their behaviour and to find optimal values. Tcxp was computed according 
to the rule of EQUATION (5.1 ). 
At the end of the simulation various statistics were printed. The performance 
of the scheduler can best be judged from two of these, shown on the following 
pages: One gives the ratio of the actual response time and the fair response time, 
that is, the response time each process would have had if all processes received 
exactly the same fraction of the CPU during a run. The other gives the average 
number of times the process was swapped out during a run. Both graphs are 
gives as a function of the run length of processes. The first one can be used to 
check the performance of the scheduler in terms of both fairness and response 
time. Optimal fairness is achieved if the function is constant; good response time 
is achieved if the function increases, that is, shorter processes get better response 
time. The second graph gives an indication of the overhead of the scheduler. 
The number of swaps should be kept as low as possible, since swapping is a rela-
tively expensive operation, especially, if swapping must be done through the net-
work. 
Each figure shows scheduling results for one and for five processors under two 
different loads : A lightly loaded system: 5 processes per processor, where a pro-
cess has pauses that last about six times as long as runs, and a heavily loaded 
system with 10 processes per processor. L and D were normalised by multiply-
ing them with a normalisation factor L ' and D', respectively: 
L' = k 
Mp+ Tm 
n Mm 
n M2 M ' m 
k Mm +Mp+ Tm 
where n is the number of processors and k the number of processes. 
In the first figure, both Land Dare set to 0, in the second, L is set to 3L', in 
the third, Dis set to D' and in the last, L is set to 3L' and D to D'. 
In all figures, the response time graph resembles a sawtooth wave. This is 
caused by swapping: processes that finish their run just before they are swapped 
have a better response time than processes that are swapped just before they 
finish their run. Within a single 'sawtooth wave,' shorter processes have rela-
tively less good response times, due to the fact that they run for shorter times 
than estimated by the scheduling algorithm. 
Setting D improves response time: shorter processes have relatively better 
response time than longer ones; each sawtooth wave is higher than its 
FIGURE 5.12-5.15 (following pages). Simulation results for scheduling various numbers of processes 
and processors using various scheduling parameters. 
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neighbours on the left, the response time curve increases. L influences the 
number of slices a process needs to complete its run. Making L larger has a 
deteriorating influence on the response time of very short runs, but increases the 
length of time a process remains allocated to a processor. Setting L increases 
throughput. 
Research in the area of process scheduling is still being carried out in the 
Amoeba project. A Processor Pool will be built to test this scheduling algorithm, 
and perhaps others as well. The simulation results presented above are prelim-
inary results: process run-time and pause-time distributions will have to be meas-
ured again when Amoeba is operational in a production-environment to see if our 
results are still valid. Another point of interest is to see how well a processor 
pool can be scheduled when no information is available on the length of pauses, 
information that is usually available-albeit not very accurately-in traditional 
operating systems. 
5.6. Examples of Scheduling 
5.6.1. Scheduling Multiprogrammed Processors 
Many general-purpose operating systems manage many processes simultaneously 
on a single CPU. A runnable process is assigned to the CPU where it executes 
instructions until it ceases to be runnable, or the clock signals the end of its time 
slice. The decision which process to assign to the CPU can be made using the 
priority function derived in the previous section. 
In many operating systems, however, there is an additional difficulty in 
scheduling, because of the limited amount of main memory that processors have. 
Not all processes can reside in main memory at the same time, so some processes 
must be swapped out to secondary memory. 
One approach to allocating memory for processes is to use demand paging.14 
Demand paging can easily be combined with our scheduling algorithm: when a 
page fault occurs, the process stops being runnable, and a pause starts, the 
length of which can be predicted quite accurately. Process switching will cost 
far less time than the time it takes to fetch a page from disk, so the runnable 
process with the best priority is chosen to be run next. When no process is runn-
able, the scheduler must wait until a process does become runnable. 
In other operating systems, usually running on hardware that does not sup-
port demand paging, other methods of allocating processes to main memory are 
needed. Often, in these systems, processes are swapped in and out as a whole. 
In these systems, of which many versions of UNIX are examples, a process resides 
wholly in memory, wholly on the swapping device, or it is in the process of being 
transferred from one to the other. In time sharing systems, such as these, two 
levels of scheduling are necessary: it has to be decided which process should be 
swapped in or out, and which of the processes in main memory should be 
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allocated to the processor. 
The CPU scheduler decides which of the processes in main memory to allocate 
to the CPU. The scheduling algorithm for this can be the one of the previous sec-
tion. The swap scheduler must decide which processes to swap. If they all had 
equal size, the same algorithm would have been suitable also for deciding which 
processes to swap in or out. This is never the case, however. One swapped out 
process can make room for several processes to be swapped in, or several 
processes may have to be swapped out to swap one in. All other things being 
equal, it is best to swap the smallest process in, and the largest out. The swap 
scheduler must not only take priorities into account, but also the sizes of the 
processes to be swapped. 
As far as the swap scheduler is concerned, primary memory is a scarce 
resource, so a measure of primary memory use is the amount of memory the pro-
cess occupies, multiplied by the time it occupies that memory. Like the CPU 
scheduler, the swap scheduler is also concerned with obtaining maximum 
throughput, minimum response time, and ensuring fairness. Again, we shall 
examine them in turn. 
For the size of a process, x, we shall write sx. For the time a process spent in 
primary memory during a run we write tin ,x, and for the time swapped out tout,x· 
Maximum throughput can be obtained by ensuring that at all times at least 
one runnable process is in primary memory, so the CPU will not be idle. This 
can be achieved by trying to ensure that there is always at least one runnable 
process in primary memory besides the one that is currently executing, but this is 
only possible if enough memory is available. The swap scheduler must have as 
many processes in primary memory as possible, and never swap out the 
currently running process. 
Minimising response time means that processes occupying little memory with 
short expected run times should have precedence over processes needing much 
memory with long expected run times. We shall use the same criterion for swap-
ping processes as for CPU scheduling, replacing T.-,x by Tin ,x·sx. The time required 
to swap processes in or out is proportional to the size of the process, so we 
replace t, by tswap ·Sx where tswap is the time required to swap a process of unit 
size. 
If we do the same substitution in the fairness formula as in the one for 
response time, we get the following rule for swapping two processes: 
tin X tin ,Y + T,11,J 
, .Sx > ~~-~-.Sy 
tout,x + U tout,Y + U 
where T,-,, ., is the estimated time process y must be in primary memory to com-
plete its run. If there are on average k processes in primary memory, 
Tin., = k. T,., . 
The swapping rule as stated above has two aspects that need closer inspection. 
The first is that the rule considers primary memory as the only resource to be 
scheduled. This is not the case. It is the CPU that is the essential resource. 
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Scheduling of primary memory must be subordinate to scheduling of the CPU. 
The rule as stated above will allocate a process to primary memory twice as 
long as another of twice the size. Small processes will therefore have much more 
chance of being allocated to the CPU, since the CPU scheduler can only choose 
from the allocated processes. A weighting parameter, S should be added to the 
scheduling rule to reduce the importance of a process' size: 
t;,,,x t;,,JI + T;,, JI 
---.(sx + S) > --"---"'-. (Sy + S) 
loui,x + ij tOfdJI + ij 
The second aspect also has to do with the unequal size of processes. The rule 
cannot be used to decide to swap one process out and another in, because the 
hole left by the swapped out process may not be big enough for the process to be 
swapped in, or it may be big enough for several. The rule should become: Find 
the process,y, most in need of swapping in; that is, the process with the smallest 
trnJI + T;,,JI p °"'JI - --''----"-.(Sy + S) 
t°"'JI + u 
If there is room in primary memory, swap the process m. If not, find the 
processes in primary memory with 
t · 
Pin,x = rn,x .(sx + S) 
lout,x + U 
greater than Pou,JI· If these occupy more room than process y needs, swap as 
many of them out to make room for it, then swap it in. If they occupy less 
room, wait until there are enough processes with Pin,x > P °"'JI to make room for 
processy. 
5.6.2. Scheduling Pool Processors 
In § 4.3, the mechanisms used by the Process Servers to execute processes on 
Pool Processors were described. Using these mechanisms, the Process Service 
can implement the scheduling rules that we developed in § 5.3. Each Process 
Server will have a number of Pool Processors under its control, and receive 
requests to execute processes. If there is just one Process Server in the system, 
this method works well. Even if the Process Server crashes, the Boot Service of 
§ 4.5 can bring Process Service back to life quickly enough not to cause great 
inconvenience to its clients. 
With more than one Process Server we have the advantage of increased acces-
sibility of Process Service, and greater capacity. But it presents an additional 
problem to be solved: distributing the work evenly over the Process Servers. To 
do this a measure of the workload on a Process Server is needed. 
The workload on a Process Server and its Pool Processors consists of two parts, 
the workload on the Pool Processors, and the overhead for the Process Server 
itself. The Pool Processor workload depends on the number of Pool Processors 
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available to do the work, the number of processes that run on these Pool Proces-
sors, the ratio of run time and pause time of the processes, the number of process 
switches necessary, and the time needed for process switching, which depends on 
the size of the processes. The Process Server overhead depends primarily on the 
number of process switches, which depends, among other things, on the number 
of processes. 
To measure the Pool Processor workload we introduce the weight of a process, 
a measure for the load a process puts on a Pool Processor. The weight of a pro-
cess, x, is 
~tr,x 
W x = ------
~tr,x + ~tp,x 
where we sum over the runs and pauses in the process' history up to now. The 
weight of a totally compute bound process is thus one, while the weight of a 
forever-pausing process, which-assuming the process can be swapped out-
places no load on any Pool Processor, is zero. Note that this measure depends 
on the characteristics of the process, and the events it pauses on, not on the way 
the process is scheduled. 
The load on the Process Server is mainly determined by the number of pro-
cess switches it must handle. A measure for this is the number of state changes 
(pause to run, and run to pause) per unit of time of the processes under its con-
trol. For the Process Server load caused by a process, x, we use 
where N,,x is the number of runs in its history. 
The work load on a Process Server and its Pool Processors is a weighted sum 
of the work load on the Process Server and that on the Pool Processors of the 
processes under the Process Server's control : 
8 . ~wx + (I-8) . ~w'x 
W= X X 
n 
where n is the number of processes. By adjusting 8, the relative weights of Pool 
Processor load and Process Server load can be set. 
The work load measure that has just been defined can be used to distribute 
processes and Pool Processors more evenly over the Process Servers. In some 
cases, it is simplest to allocate more Pool Processors to busy Process Servers, tak-
ing them away from less busy ones, in others it is more convenient to migrate 
processes from busy Process Servers to less busy ones. In multi-programmed 
machines, for instance, the number of (virtual) Pool Processors is usually fixed , 
and one special process functions as Process Server. In a situation like this, it is 
not possible to reallocate Pool Processors; load balancing must be achieved by 
reallocating processes to other Process Servers. A different situation arises when 
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a Process Server controls a number of microcomputers-each functioning as a 
Pool Processor-over a network; in this case it may be more convenient to pass 
Pool Processors from Process Server to Process Server. 
Two approaches exist to achieve load balancing. One method is to let the 
Process Servers exchange information periodically to compare work loads. If the 
difference is greater than some predetermined amount, processes or processors 
should be exchanged. Another method is to create a service especially for load 
balancing. Such a service would periodically obtain the work load of each of 
the Process Servers connected to it, and balance the load by ordering the Process 
Servers to pass processes and Pool Processors around. Potentially, a separate 
load balancing service has more global information than the individual Process 
Servers in the former method, but its centralised approach makes it more vulner-
able to crashes. The former method is simpler and, if the load distribution does 
not change very rapidly, it will work just as well. 
• 
6 
THE DISTRIBUTED FILE SERVER 
~le systems play an important role in allowing information to be widely acces-
sible, since most information is in one way or another stored in files. Many 
different kinds of file systems for distributed systems exist, ranging from private 
file systems for each host to special purpose file servers for the whole network. 
Each kind of file system has its own characteristics concerning accessibility, com-
plexity, protection of information against unauthorised access, speed and distri-
butiveness. 
The ideal distributed file system would be fast, files would always be near the 
hosts needing them, there would be protection, if necessary, to guard against 
access from unauthorised hosts or users, files could be shared among different 
hosts at the same time, and the system would be totally immune agains indivi-
dual file server crashes or disk crashes. Unfortunately, such distributed file sys-
tems do not yet exist, and improving one aspect of a file system is nearly always 
detrimental to another. The consequence, for instance, of replicating files at 
several sites to improve their availability is that updating these files will become 
more costly, since all copies have to be updated, and if, additionally, the changes 
made by different users must be synchronised, such that the changes made by 
one user do not interfere with the data read by another, then the cost of file 
operations could be increased by several orders of magnitude. 
This chapter goes into the design of the Amoeba File Service, one of the three 
file services for the Amoeba Distributed System. § 6.1 describes the considera-
tions that led to the design of this file server and gives an overview of related 
work. The underlying Block Service is briefly discussed in § 6.2. A detailed 
description of the Amoeba File Service follows in § § 6.3. 
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6.1. Design Principles 
The Amoeba Distributed System was designed by Mullender and Tanenbaum at 
the Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam~9 Amoeba is an open system, designed to 
accommodate heterogeneous hardware and software. The Amoeba Kernel, the 
replicated operating system running in most of the machines on the network, 
supports process management and interprocess communication. All other ser-
vices are provided by server programs that execute in user space. A capability 
mechanism provides protected communication between clients and services and 
protected access to objects~8 
The advantages of open systems over the traditional approach are obvious : 
operating system kernels become smaller and more maintainable, operating sys-
tem services are no longer in the kernel, making them portable, and allowing 
multiple, equivalent, but different services to co-exist side by side. 
Data base management systems often have their own operating systems, 
tailored to this particular application, because traditional operating systems pro-
vided the wrong functionality ?0, 73 An open operating system, with the right kind 
of file service, can support data base management efficiently, while integration 
with other system services is possible. A hierarchy of services, as illustrated by 
FIGURE 6.1 , allows a logical layering of facilities while the development effort can 
be shared. 
The design of the Amoeba File Server was an experiment. We wanted to try 
to design a layered file system, where replication, concurrency control, and data-
base management would be in different layers. The bottom layer, the physical 
layer , consists of the storage devices: electronic disks, magnetic disks and write-
once optical disks. The next layer is the Block Service , providing virtual disk blocks 
of various kinds: fast but crash-volatile storage in memory, stable-storage disk 
blocks, replicated disk blocks with atomic write on all copies simultaneously, etc. 
The next layer up is the file system, with concurrency control mechanisms for 
file access, and the top layer, providing the interface to various applications, 
provides database management services. This paper concentrates on the middle 
layer: the file system. 
The Amoeba File Service is a distributed file service: a request for an opera-
tion on a file can go to any one of a number of file server processes where it will 
be executed. The layered structure is an advantage here; the Block Service 
already forms an abstraction away from physical storage locations. 
But the layered structure of the file system is also a potential bottleneck for 
performance of great magnitude: A simple query on a tiny database from a 
client process invokes the database service, which invokes the file service, which 
invokes the block service, which finds the block on disk. Caching strategies are 
essential at all levels of the hierarchy to avoid having to descend to the bottom 
level of the service hierarchy on each client request. However, caches and con-
currency control mechanisms are likely to become enemies: the administration of 
the caches in a rapidly changing environment can cause more inefficiency than 
6.1. DESIGN PRINCIPLES 
Source ccxle 
control 
system 
Flat file 
server 
I 
~ 
L::_J 
! § 
Directory 
server 
Stable 
storage 
server 
I 
\ 
Distributed 
data base 
server 
Optical 
disk 
server 
151 
I \ ! 
§§0 
FIGURE 6.1. An example of a storage services hierarchy in an open system. 
not keeping caches at all. Obviously, thinking about caching possibilities and 
strategies have to be an essential part of the design process. 
File services must provide the tools for the efficient implementation of as wide 
a set of applications as possible. This can be realised, in part, by providing a 
large set of different file services, each tailored for a particular application, but, 
naturally, it is best to have as few as possible different file services that cover the 
needs of every conceivable application. 
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Currently, Amoeba has three file servers: a simple one, written as a student 
programming project, which implements simple flat files, without concurrency 
control; a UNIX-like file server, which is used in combination with a UNIX emula-
tion package for running UNIX software on Amoeba; and the Amoeba File 
Server, described in this paper. 
An important design principle was also: 'You should not have to pay for those 
features you do not need'. A file server, for instance, that implements atomic 
update on replicated files is a very nice thing to have, but a user who wants to 
store the output of a compiler, prior to calling a linking loader doesn't share that 
output with any other user; he is not interested in having his file replicated 
across five different network nodes for increased availability, nor is he interested 
in having his file atomicly updated. All such a user wants is a temporary file 
that can be quickly accessed and changed, and just reliable enough that usually 
he doesn't need to compile his program all over because the file was lost. On 
the one hand, our file server should cater for users who just want a reasonably 
reliable repository for their files, cheap and fast, while on the other hand, other 
users should be taken into account who need ultra-reliable storage for their files, 
fancy synchronisation of access by many simultaneous users, and guaranteed 
availability, who will be prepared to accept that it must be more expensive and 
slower. 
Another important issue in file service design is that the semantics of file ser-
vice be easy to understand. The interface to the file server must not only be 
simple, with as few commands as possible, clients must also have a simple con-
ception of the structure of a file, and how to use the mechanisms provided. 
Even if clients want highly sophisticated things done, like changing a heavily 
shared file atomically, they should not be burdened with the details of a five step 
locking protocol, or have to know just how many times the file is replicated. 
It is a design goal that the distributed file server should be suitable for an 
Amoeba environment, using the protection provided by Amoeba's ports and 
capabilities18 
6.1.1. Related Work 
Since the beginning of distributed computing, many file servers have been built. 
In this section we shall look at some that are closely related to our work: 
XDFS71 FELIX~4 SwALLow:5 and ALPINE? They all have mechanisms for con-
currency control. Most file servers, including the Cambridge File Serverf 8 
XDFS, FELIX and ALPINE use locking ~1 while some, among them SwALLow, use 
timestamps ?4 
XDFS is a distributed file server that uses the notion of transactions. Open tran-
saction and close transaction commands bracket a series of read write commands to 
one or more files, and the system guarantees the atomic property for these transac-
tions; that is, either all of the changes will be done, and the transaction succeeds, 
or none, and the transaction fails. XDFS realises the atomic property via so-
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called intentions lists, a list of changes to the file and a two-phase commit proto-
col. 
XDFS uses an interesting locking mechanism to guarantee serialisability: there 
are three kinds of locks, read locks, intention-write locks, and commit locks. 
When a client has locked a datum on a server for some time, a timer expires 
and the lock becomes vulnerable. Another client, waiting on that lock, can then 
prod the server, requesting it to release its lock. If it is in a state to do so, it 
releases its lock, otherwise it ignores the prod. 
The FELIX file server also uses locking, although here it is at the file level. 
The FELIX locking mechanism is combined with a version mechanism: when a 
file is examined or modified, a new version of the file is created. A new version 
is created by making a (virtual) copy of the current version; this new version can 
then be read and modified, and, when all changes have been made, the new ver-
sion may become the new current version. Sharing is controlled using locks, 
providing six access modes. Files are tree-structured. A new version is created 
by copying a pointer to the root of the current version. When it is modified, a 
copy-on-write mechanism is used which leaves the current version intact. With 
this mechanism, only the changes between versions are stored. 
ALPINE offers the user a choice between locking at the file level or at the page 
level. File locking is the default, but sophisticated applications are provided with 
mechanisms for setting and releasing various types of locks on individual pages 
of a file. A transaction log is kept to enable recovery from failures and 
deadlocks caused by conflicting locking operations. Brown et. al. claim that 
transaction logs can be implemented more efficiently than a shadow-page 
mechanism? A transaction log mechanism, however, makes it more difficult to 
implement an efficient and simple caching mechanism, as shown in § 6.3.5. 
Like FELIX, SwALLOW also uses a version mechanism, but the synchronisation 
of concurrent access is quite different. SWALLOW uses a timestamp mechanism, 
based on Reed's notion of pseudo time. This mechanism is used to ensure the 
atomic property of updates to collections of arbitrary objects (e.g., files). Addi-
tionally, versions do not overlap; that is, they do not share the unmodified por-
tions of the file. 
6.1.2. The Amoeba File Service Compared With Other File Servers 
The Amoeba File Server is a file server, with a version mechanism similar to 
that of FELIX, but in contrast to other file servers, it uses a combination of lock-
ing21 with an optimistic concurrency control mechanism?3, 59, 62 Optimistic con-
currency control mechanisms have been used in data base management systems, 
but we have never seen them used in a file server. Yet, an optimistic con-
currency control mechanism, combined with a version mechanism provide a 
number of advantages, not present in other file systems. 
The most important characteristic of a version mechanism, is that the file sys-
tem is always in a consistent state. Most file systems, update files in place and 
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need a mechanism for bringing back the file system to a consistent state after a 
crash of a server and possibly also after a crash of a client. A client crash can 
cause parts of the file system to be inaccessible for some time, for instance, 
because a rollback operation must be done first to bring the file system back to a 
consistent state. In the Amoeba File Service, the file system is always in a con-
sistent state (assuming the updates themselves are internally consistent). Server 
crashes have no serious consequences: there is no rollback, clients need only redo 
the update that remained unfinished because of the crash. Clients do not have 
to wait until the server is restored, because they can use another server to do 
their updates. 
In a way, optimistic concurrency control and locking are complementary 
mechanisms: Optimistic concurrency control maximises concurrency and works 
best when updates are small and the likelyhood that an item is the subject of 
two simultaneous updates is small. Locking, in contrast, does not allow as much 
concurrency, and is more suitable when updates are large and unwieldy and 
when the probability of an item being subject to more than one update is 
significant. The Amoeba File Service combines locking and optimistic con-
currency control in such a way that updates of large bodies of data (several files) 
use locking to prevent having to redo them if they clash with another update. 
Updates of small bodies of data (one file) are less likely to clash with other 
updates, so an optimistic approach is used here. When necessary, a soft-locking 
scheme can be used in addition to optimistic concurrency control to ward off 
potential conflicting updates. In all cases, the mechanisms for carrying out 
updates guarantee consistency of the file system at all times. 
The Amoeba File Service provides the necessary mechanisms to maintain 
caches of data. Caching is an important concept in distributed systems~7 ITC61 
and CFS?3 mention caching mechanisms as important parts of the system. Both 
Amoeba File Servers and their clients can hold data in a cache. In many file 
systems, it is difficult or impossible to maintain caches, because the integrity of 
the data in the cache cannot be assured. ITC was not designed for database 
applications and does not provide complicated machinery for concurrency con-
trol ; maintaining a cache is relatively simple there. XDFS uses 'unsolicited mes-
sages' to tell clients to unlock cached data when it is going to be modified. This 
makes their caching strategy efficient only for data that is rarely modified. In 
CFS, shared files do not change after creation which makes caching trivial; a 
version mechanism embedded in the naming mechanism is used to reflect 
change. 
On the Amoeba File Service, the integrity of the cache need only be checked 
at the start of a transaction. The . cost of checking whether the cache is up-to-
date is small, even for files that are frequently modified. Furthermore, the 
Amoeba File Service needs no unexpected 'unsolicited messages.' 
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6.2. The Block Server 
The principle of separating the issues of file service and block service makes it 
easy to combine different methods of storage (e.g., stable storage [35]), and 
storage media (e.g., small fast 'electronic disks,' large slow magnetic disks, very 
large optical disks) in one system. Carefully designed, disk service can combine 
high speed with high reliability, using techniques, such as caching and dual 
storage, both on fast, but not so reliable storage, and slow, but very reliable 
storage. 
We assume the block service implements as a minimum commands to allo-
cate, deallocate, read and write fixed size blocks of data. Protection must be 
provided, so that a block, allocated by user A cannot be accessed by user B 
without A 's permission. Writing a block must be an atomic action, with an ack-
nowledgement that is returned after the block has been stored on disk. This pro-
perty is vital for the implementation of atomic update on files. 
The block server can implement a simple locking facility on individual blocks. 
Based on this, file services can realise concurrency control policies. The Amoeba 
File Service, to commit a version of a file, for instance, will exclusively lock and 
read a block, examine and modify it, then write and unlock the block again. 
Magnetic disks and optical disks do not usually lose their information in a 
crash, but it does happen occasionally. In any case, they are at least tem-
porarily inaccessible. In order to achieve high availability in the face of disk 
crashes, it is necessary to store every block at least twice, on different disks, 
managed by different servers. Lampson and Sturgis35 have suggested a method 
to use dual disk drives to implement stable storage . With minor modifications 
their method can be used to provide disk service which continues to be available 
when single-site crashes occur. 
6.3. Amoeba File Service 
The Amoeba File Service was developed for, but is not restricted to, the Amoeba 
Distributed Operating System. It implements the file system as a tree of pages, 
whose subtrees are files, and uses a combination of an optimistic concurrency 
control mechanism and a locking mechanism to prevent conflicts in simultaneous 
updates. 
The Amoeba File Service implements optimistic concurrency control by a ver-
sion mechanism: When a client opens a file for modification, a new version of 
the file is created, which initially behaves like a copy of the file. Then the 
modifications are made, and finally a commit operation makes the modifications 
permanent by replacing the previous current version with the new one. After 
commit, a version becomes immutable. Several uncommitted versions of the 
same file can exist at a time. The Amoeba File Service checks on commit 
whether the modifications to the file constitute a serialisability conflict (see [33]). 
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The current state of a file is contained in the current version. Committed 
versions represent past states of a file; uncommitted versions represent possible 
future states of the file. Files are accessed by their file capability, versions by 
their version capability. Atomic updates on files are bracketed by creating a 
version and committing a version. The current state of a file is always 
represented by the contents of the current version. Committing a version makes 
that version the current one. 
The Amoeba File Service is a distributed service. Several server processes can 
be t".Stablished on one or several physical machines, and each server is capable of 
handling updates on any file. Each version has a manager, the server process 
which created the version. Different versions of a file can have different 
managers. A client will typically direct all requests to the Amoeba File Service 
to a server process that is close to it. New versions will thus tend to be close to 
the clients that ordered their creation. 
A version is represented as a tree of pages. Clients can read or write a page 
at a time. The maximum length of a page is determined by the maximum 
length of an Amoeba message transaction: 32K bytes. This ensures that pages 
can be read and written in one (atomic) action:t' A page may contain both data 
and references to pages further down in the tree. A reference consists of a block 
number and some flag bits that Amoeba File Service uses for concurrency con-
trol. The number of data bytes in a page is variable (per page) up to the max-
imum size of a page. 
Clients have explicit control over the shape of the page tree. Pages within a 
file are referred to by a pathname which is constructed as follows: The root page 
has an empty pathname. The pathname of a page that is not the root is the 
concatenation of the pathname of its parent page with the index of its reference 
in the array of references in the parent page. 
This file representation has been chosen with the express intention of giving 
clients (file systems, data base systems, source code control systems, etc.) as much 
control over the shape of files as possible. Using the file structure provided by 
the Amoeba File Service, objects ranging from linear files to B-trees can easily be 
represented. 
The Amoeba File Service provides a set of commands for the management of 
files and versions. There are commands to read and write the pages of a version 
and commands to manipulate the shape of a version's page tree (split pages into 
two, move subtrees to another part of the tree, etc.). 
Files can be grouped together in 'super.files,' and superfiles can be grouped in 
other superfiles. Such a superfile structure is also a tree structure. A superfile is, 
in fact, almost exactly like an ordinary file: All pages of a superfile may contain 
data, exactly like an ordinary file; the root page of a superfile, however, contains 
• Arbitrarily long pages can be written atomically by writing them back-to-front as a linked list, 
whereby the head block is (over)written last, and the other blocks in the list are allocated from the 
pool of free disk blocks. After writing, the blocks making up the previous linked list can be freed. 
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FIGURE 6.2. A file has the structure of a tree of pages. A superfile can be 
viewed as a tree of files or also as a tree of pages. 
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references to the root pages of other files, superfiles, or both. The Amoeba File 
Server provides atomic update on files, or superfiles. Files or superfiles without 
a common root cannot be updated atomically. 
The top of the tree, that is, the collection of root pages of files, is stored on 
magnetic random-access media, for instance, such as provided by the stable-
storage server, mentioned in the previous section. The lower parts of the tree, 
that is, the collection of non-root pages of files, can be stored either on magnetic 
disk, or write-once media, such as optical disk. As illustrated in FIGURE 6.2, a 
subtree, whose root is in the upper part of the tree, e.g. , file A , can be viewed as 
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a file; it can be modified atomically using the methods described below. 
Amoeba files, unlike files in most file systems, thus form a nested structure: A 
subtree whose root page is inside another subtree may be viewed as a file within 
another file. File A and file B , for instance, are both subfiles of file C . 
6.3.1. File Representation 
A file is a collection of versions, ordered in time. When a new version is created, 
it behaves as if it were a copy of the current version. In fact, when it is created, 
a new version shares its page tree with the current version, and only when a 
page is changed is the page duplicated. The Amoeba File Service file represen-
tation is therefore a differential file representation, similar to that of FELIX. 
Pages are stored by the block server in such a way that they can be read and 
written as atomic actions. A.swciated with each page is a small header area that 
the Amoeba File Service uses for administrative purposes. 
The root of a page tree is referred to as the version page. The client data in 
a page has no predefined structure. Clients are free to write them as they see fit . 
The references in a page to pages further down the tree are for internal use by 
the Amoeba File Service and can only be read and written by servers. 
File capability (version page only) 
version capability (version page only) 
commit reference (version page only) 
top lock ( version page only) 
inner lock (version page only) 
base reference 
nrefs (number of page references) 
dsize (number of data bytes) 
client 
data 
page number CjRjWj S jM 
page number CIRIWI s IM 
FIGURE 6.3. The Amoeba File Service page layout 
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The layout of a version page is shown in FIGURE 6.3. The layout of internal 
pages is the same, with the exception of the first five fields, which are not used. 
Each page is divided in two areas, a header area and the page itself; the separa-
tion is indicated by the double line. The first field in the header area of a ver-
sion page is the file capability . This field gives the capability of the file whose 
root the version page is. The next field is the version capability , the version of the 
file whose root the version page is. The commit reference field is also used in ver-
sion pages only; its use will be explained presently. The top lock and inner lock 
are used to tell whether a page is currently involved in an update of a superfile 
whose root is higher in the page tree; their function will be explained in a later 
section. The fields mentioned just now are only present in a version page. They 
are absent ( or ignored) in other pages. The remaining fields, to be mentioned 
below are present and used in all pages, root pages and internal pages alike. 
The base reference field, present in all pages of a version, is the block number 
of the page that this page was based on ( copied from). The nrifs field holds the 
number of page references this page contains. If this field is zero, the page is a 
leaf page. The dsize field gives the number of data bytes. The page itself con-
tains the reference table, with an entry for each child page, and the data area 
where the client data is kept. 
The reference table is an array of page references, which contain a block number, 
and five flags, C, R , W, S, and M. The page reference points to a page in the 
next level of the page tree, the C flag, when set, indicates that the page was 
copied and is no longer shared with the version it was based on. The R flag 
indicates whether the data of that page has been read (it is needed to decide if 
an uncommitted version may be committed as explained in § 6.3.3), the W flag 
indicates whether the data in the page was written (changed), the S flag tells if 
the references have been used (searched), and the M flag indicates whether the 
references were modified. As we shall see, it is not possible to access a page 
without copying it, nor is it possible to modify the references without looking at 
them. This reduces the number of flag combinations to 13, which allows encod-
ing the flags in four bits. Amoeba uses 28 bits for a block number and four bits 
for the flags. 
Pages are accessed from their parent page by the index in the reference table. 
An arbitrary page in a version can thus be accessed from the root by indexing 
into the reference tables of several pages starting at the root (version page) of the 
page tree. Pages thus have path names consisting of a string of n -bit numbers. 
A file is made up of a sequence of committed versions and possibly a collec-
tion of uncommitted versions. The version pages of the committed versions form 
a doubly linked list. Each committed version's base reference points to the ver-
sion it was based on (its predecessor) and its commit reference points to the next 
committed version. The current version's commit reference and the oldest 
version's base reference are nil. The uncommitted versions are attached to the 
list through their base references, which point to the version they were based on; 
note that this is always a committed version. A typical file could look like the 
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FIGURE 6.4. The Jamily lrtt' of a typical file. Only the version pages are 
shown. The page trees descending from the version pages are not shown. 
one in FIGURE 6.4, where we have just shown the version pages and their base 
and commit references. 
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6.3.2. The Copy-on-write Mechanism 
In the next section we shall discuss the mechanisms that are used to implement 
atomic update and guarantee serialisability, but before we go into that subject, a 
proper understanding of the copy-on-write mechanism and the R, W, S and M 
flags in the page table is needed. 
The R, W, S and M flags are needed primarily for deciding about commit-
ting versions. In order to be able to serialise two simultaneous updates to a file, 
the Amoeba File Service must know which parts of the file were read and which 
parts were changed (written). When set, the R flag indicates that the data in 
the referred-to page was read. The W flag indicates its data was written. The 
two flags operate independently of one another. The S flag tells that the refer-
ences have been searched, the M flag tells that the references have been 
changed. These flags are not independent. When the M flag is on, the S flag 
must also be on; it is not possible to modify the references without consulting 
them. 
When a page is read, the pages on the path to it must be searched. This 
implies that, if a page has not been searched, the subtree of which it is the root 
cannot have been searched or read either. Hence, a cleared S flag indicates that 
the descendants of the referred to page have not yet been accessed. 
For writing pages in a version, a 'copy-on-write' mechanism is used. When a 
page is written, a new block is allocated for it, leaving the old page intact. Then 
the page reference in its parent page is updated to point to the newly allocated 
page and its W flag is set. This changes that page, however, and, if it is still 
shared with another version (i.e., it hasn't been copied-on-write yet), this change 
must also be made by allocating a new block for it and writing the new contents 
of the page to that new block. Every change thus bubbles up from the leaves of 
the page tree to the root page. The root page-the version page-is the only 
page that is always written in place, because it is never shared with another ver-
sion. When a non-root page is thus copied, the C flag is set in the reference to it 
(in the parent page). A page is thus only copied once; after it has been copied 
for writing, it can be written in place when it is written again. 
It is clear now that, when a page has not been copied, its descendants can not 
have been copied either. Hence, a cleared C flag in a page reference indicates 
that the referred to page and all its descendants have not (yet) been copied, but 
a set C flag only indicates that the referred to page was copied. Like the S flag, 
it does not show whether its descendants have been copied. 
A similar mechanism does not exist for the R , W and M flags. When a page 
is written, it and the pages between it and the root of the page tree must be 
copied, but the parent page of a written page is not considered written or 
modified, although, strictly speaking, it has changed. A parent page is only con-
sidered written if it's client data was written, and modified if pages were added 
or deleted. 
Page trees are usually partially shared between versions. This implies that the 
flags indicating access to pages are also shared, even though these pages have 
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been accessed in different ways in different versions. This presents no problem, 
because the serialisability test need not descend shared parts of the page tree 
since they have not been accessed. 
The flags, indicating whether a page has been read, written, modified or 
copied are stored in its parent page in the page tree; the root page is therefore 
the only page that does not have associated C, R , W, S and M flags in the file 
tree to indicate if it was copied, read, written, searched or modified. The 
managing server keeps these flags separate. The root page is always copied, by 
the way. 
When a page is first read, the C, R , W, S and M flags it contains for its 
child pages must be initialised to zero. This requires changing that page. The 
Amoeba File Service must therefore not only shadow pages that were written, 
but also pages whose descendants were read. As we shall see later, once a version 
has successfully committed, the information contained in the R and S flags is no 
longer needed. The Amoeba File Service garbage collector may remove pages 
that were copied but not written or modified and reshare the corresponding page 
from the version on which it was based. 
6.3.3. The Optimistic Concurrency Control Mechanism 
As long as updates are carried out one after the other, commit always succeeds 
and requires virtually no processing at all. When two or more updates proceed 
concurrently, however, the server must check whether commit can be allowed by 
testing whether those updates can be serialised. If so, the commit is allowed; if 
not, failure is reported to the client, and the client must redo the update. 
When there is no concurrency, a new update will not start until the previous 
one has been finished; that is, a new version will not be created until the previ-
ous version has been committed. The next version is thus always based on the 
previous one. Updates are concurrent when a new version is created while 
another, uncommitted version still exists. This implies that concurrent updates 
are based (sometimes indirectly) on a common (committed) version. 
Kung and Robinson in their paper on optimistic concurrency control divide 
file update into three phases: the read phase, the validation phase, and the write 
phase~3 The validation phase checks serial equivalence of transactions T; and ½ 
by testing whether one of the following conditions hold: 
( 1) T; completes its write phase before ½ starts its read phase. 
(2) The write set of T, does not intersect the read set of 7i , and T, completes its 
write phase before ½ starts its write phase. 
(3) The write set of T; does not int_ersect the read set or the write set of 7i , and 
T; completes its read phase before ½ completes its read phase. 
If one of these conditions hold, the effect of updates T; and ½ is the same as 
when T; had finished before ½ started. 
The Amoeba File Service carries out updates in such a way that the critical 
section of the validation phase and the complete write phase are consist of one 
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atomic action. This implies that the write phases of two transactions can never 
overlap and the serialisability test for two updates in the Amoeba File Service 
reduces to 
(1) Version Vi is committed before version V.j is created. 
(2) The write set of version Vi does not intersect the read set of version V:i , and 
Vi is committed before V .j. 
The Amoeba File Service carries out its validation test when a client process 
requests a version to be committed (i.e., when the client process signals the end 
of a transaction). In the test, it is only necessary to check if serialisability 
conflicts will occur with versions that have already committed. In principle, the 
commit mechanism works as follows. 
The check whether condition ( 1) holds, and if it holds, the write phase, are 
carried out as one atomic operation, described below. If condition (1) does not 
hold, a test has to be made whether condition (2) holds. 
When a client requests to commit a version, Vb, that is based on the current 
version, Va , condition obviously (1) holds, because Vb was created after Va 
was committed. Therefore, the Amoeba File Service allows all commits of ver-
sions based on the current version. The mechanism for this is demonstrated in 
FIGURE 6.5. 
Let us assume client C sends a request to commit version Vb , which is based 
on version Va to Vb 's managing server, M .b. Server M .b then proceeds as fol-
lows. First it ascertains that all of Vb 's pages are safely on disk. Then it sends 
a set commit reference request to M .a , the manager of Va , the version that Vb 
was based on. (Va is specified in the base reference field of Vb's version page.) 
M .a must then do the following without allowing other requests to interfere. 
First it must check whether Va is still the current version. If so, there is no 
conflict and the commit is carried out. The check for currentness is simply per-
formed by examining Va 's commit reference. If it is nil, Va is the current ver-
sion, and the commit reference is set to the page number of Vb 's version page. 
This makes Vb the current version, and automatically the updates made to Vb 
are made permanent. 
The test and set the commit reference is the only critical section in version 
commit. In order to make it an indivisible action, only one server may be 
allowed to read the version block, test the commit reference, set it, and write it 
back. If the disk server implements a test-and-set operation, any server can be 
allowed to carry out a commit. 
FIGURE 6.5(a) shows the situation before commit, FIGURE 6.5(b) after the com-
mit has successfully been carried out. M.a returns an acknowledgement to M .b 
and M.b, in turn, returns an acknowledgement to C. 
Let us now examine the case where Va is no longer the current version, which 
means that another update, concurrent with that of Vb , has taken place and 
was committed. Let us assume the situation of FIGURE 6.6; C sends a request to 
M.b to commit Vb . However, Ve is now the current version, also based on Va . 
First, M .b proceeds as before, and sends a set commit request to M .a ; only this 
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Base reference Base reference 
Commit reference Commit reference 
V.a V.a 
Base reference Base reference 
Commit reference Commit reference 
V.b V.b 
(a) (b) 
FIGURE 6.5. V.b succeeds V.a as the current version. (a) shows the situation 
before the commit, (b) shows the situation after the commit. 
time, discovering V.a 's commit reference is already set, M.a does not carry out 
the commit, but returns V.a 's commit reference instead. This is the block 
number of V.c 's version page. 
M.b must now check if the concurrent updates of Vb and V.c are serialisable; 
that is, test whether condition (2) holds. V.c has already committed, so if the 
two updates are serialisable, V.b must come after V.c. This implies that there 
must be no overlap of V.c 's write set (the pages written during the update of V.c) 
and V.b 's read set (the pages read during the update of V.b ). Since M .b 
received the block number of V.c 's version page, it can descend V.c 's and V.b 's 
page trees in parallel to examine if there is a serialisability conflict. This is 
tested using the R, W, S, M, and C flags in the page references. Note that 
unshadowed parts of the tree in either V.b or V.c need not be visited since they 
haven't been accessed. 
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V.b V.c 
FIGURE 6.6. V.b wants to commit, but is no longer a descendant of the 
current version, V.c. 
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While descending the two page trees, checking the serialisability constraint, 
M.b also prepares the new current version, which must combine the updates 
made in V.c with those made in V.b. This is done by replacing unaccessed parts 
in V.b 's page tree by corresponding written parts in V.c 's page tree. 
Both the serialisability test and the combination of the changes made by two 
concurrent updates are made in one pass over the page tree. Unvisited branches 
in either page tree are not descended, which makes the serialisability check quite 
fast when at least one of the concurrent updates is small. 
An important property of the serialisability test is that it can be carried out in 
parallel with other updates of the file. While the routine serialise descends V.b 's 
and V.c 's page tree, other versions are allowed to commit, and other serialisabil-
ity tests can also be carried out. 
If serialise returns TRUE, V.b is ready to become V.c 's successor as the current 
version, and a set commit reference command is sent to V.c 's manager. If V.c is 
still current, this succeeds; if not, the serialisability test is repeated for V.c 's suc-
cessor. This repeats until either the set commit reference command succeeds or 
serialise returns FALSE. 
In the latter case, when serialise returns FALSE, the concurrent updates are not 
serialisable, and V.b is removed, and its owner notified. The update can be 
retried on another version. 
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6.3.4. The Locking Mechanism 
In the previous section we have described the update mechanism for a single file. 
In this section we describe the mechanisms for updating superfiles which may 
contain several smaller files. 
Before continuing, some terms are defined to simplify discussions. The upper 
part of the tree, which contains the version pages for the files in the system, will 
be called the system tree. A file whose root is a leaf of the system tree, i.e., an 
ordinary file, will be called a small file, although a 'small file ' may, of course, be 
arbitrarily large. In FIGURE 2, for instance, file A and file B are small files. A 
file whose root is not a leaf node of the system tree will be called a super-file. In 
FIGURE 2, file C is a super-file. A small file or super-file whose root is contained 
in a super-file will be a sub-file of the super-file. A tree that makes up a small 
file or super-file is a page tree. 
Updates of small files still use the optimistic method for update: Two updates 
on different small files do not interfere with each other since they affect disjoint 
page trees. Two updates of the same small file use optimistic concurrency con-
trol, as described in the previous section, to maintain integrity. 
Updates of super-files, however, must use different rules. Updates on super-
files generally require larger amounts of processing and affect more pages than 
updates on small files. Consequently, the likelyhood of a serialisability conflict is 
greater for updates on super-files. Additionally, the work lost because of a serial-
isability conflict is usually more in the case of super-file updates. 
For these updates locking provides a better form of concurrency control, 
because it warns in advance that two updates are likely to cause a conflict. 
Locking has the drawback, however, that after a crash, locks have to be cleared 
before the system can resume operations. We deemed it a challenge to find a 
locking mechanism that requires no special recovery in case of crashes. Our 
method is described below. 
Each version page contains two lock fields, the top lock field, and the inner lock 
field . A file is considered to be locked if the lock field is non-zero. Locks only 
have meaning in the current version. We assume it is possible to test the two 
lock fields for zero and set one of them in one atomic operation. 
When an update is made to a super-file, the top lock is set in its version block, 
and the inner locks are set in visited internal nodes of the file tree that are version 
blocks of sub-files. When an update is made to a small file, the top lock is also 
set in its version block, but, since small files have no internal version blocks, no 
inner locks have to be set. 
Updates on super-files happen in exactly the same way as updates on small 
files, with the exception that locks have to be checked and set while the update 
is in progress. As in the case of small files, a version must also be created for a 
super-file before updates can be made. Before a version may be created, how-
ever, the version block for the current version must be locked. 
The algorithm for creating a version is the following : If the file is a super-file, 
check the inner lock and top lock fileds, and, if they are both zero, set the top lock . 
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If one of them is non-zero, wait until it is cleared, then try again. (The waiting 
process will be described later; locks contain the name of the locking server, 
which is used to realise an automatic warning mechanism for waiting updates.) 
If the file is a small file, only the inner lock must be tested, but the top lock set. 
Thus, a small file can be subject to more than one update at the same time, 
using the optimistic method of concurrency control. When multiple, concurrent 
updates are allowed on a super-file, this rule can be used on super-files as well. 
~ume, for instance, that an update of file A in FIGURE 2 has to be carried 
out. It is a small file , so only its top lock will be set. Other updates on file A can 
proceed concurrently: the inner lock, which is not set, is tested, and concurrent 
updates can be carried out as described in the previous section. 
If an update, while descending the page tree, discovers a top lock , it must wait 
until the lock is cleared before that subtree can be entered. It is not possible to 
encounter an inner lock while descending the page tree. 
Suppose again that file A is being updated, so its top lock is set. An update 
of file C can proceed, as long as its left subtree, which is file A , is left 
untouched. When C's left subtree is descended, however, A 's top lock will be 
encountered, and C's update must wait until A has been committed and its lock 
has been cleared. 
The use of the inner locks will become clear when we assume an update on 
file C descends A 's page tree. This update will cause A 's inner lock to be set. 
When an attempt is now made to update A , the inner lock will be encountered, 
and the update must wait until it is cleared. 
The commit operation is somewhat more complicated for super-files than for 
small files. Commit on a small file or a super-file works as described in the pre-
vious section. However, commit on a super-file is not finished when the commit 
reference is set. After commit on a super-file, the page tree must be descended to 
commit the sub-files of the super-file, and clear the locks. These commits always 
succeed, because the locks prevent access by other clients during the update to 
the super-file. 
It is not difficult to see that this locking mechanism gives exclusive access to 
any subtree of the file system, and therefore provides a concurrency control 
mechanism. It can also be seen that sub-files, not accessed by an update, are 
not locked and therefore accessible to other updates. Full concurrent update 
remains possible on small files, because simultaneous updates on the same small 
file need not wait for top locks . 
However, it is possible to use top locks on small files as hints which indicate 
that the file is likely to change soon. An update, known to affect large parts of a 
small file, can thus be postponed until the file is 'idle.' In contrast to this so.ft 
locking scheme, it is also possible to allow more concurrency on updates of 
super-files. The rules for creating a version may be relaxed to allow creating a 
version when the version block's top lock is set. The optimistic concurrency con-
trol which still lurks underneath this locking mechanism will see to it that no 
harm is done 'concurrencywise. ' 
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When a server process crashes in the middle of an update, no harm is done to 
the integrity of the file system; the optimistic method underneath sees to that. 
The locks remain, however, rendering some files inaccessible. Fortunately, the 
mechanism described above for waiting on locks also provides a mechanism for 
crash recovery: When the server crashes, the outstanding transactions with the 
server crash as well, telling all servers waiting on locks that the process holding 
the locks has crashed. 
A server, waiting on a top Lock proceeds as follows: If the commit reference is 
off, the lock can be cleared without further ado, and, when the page tree is des-
cended, inner Locks ( containing the same server name, of course) can be cleared 
or ignored. If the commit reference is set, the version it refers to is current. The 
version with the lock, and the current version are traversed simultaneously, and 
the commit references of the sub-files are set, finishing the work of the crashed 
server. A server waiting on an inner Lock ascends the system tree to the first page 
without an inner lock, or a page with a top Lock. If the page thus found has no 
lock at all, the inner Lock that the server was waiting on can be ignored. If the 
page found has a top lock, it is treated as described above. 
6.3.5. Maintaining a Cache 
An important form of optimisation is caching. It is a defect in most distributed 
file systems that it is virtually impossible to keep local copies of remote data 
around, because of the difficulties of keeping the local copies up-to-date. The 
decreasing cost of primary memory makes caching techniques increasingly useful 
both for file servers and their clients. 
The Amoeba File Service-by design-is especially suited for caching. A ver-
sion, from the moment of its creation, behaves like a private copy of a file that 
cannot change without the owners consent. Both Amoeba File Servers and their 
clients can therefore maintain a cache which, for the most recently used versions 
of a set of files, contains collections of pages. When a client requests a server to 
create a new version of a file, the client, the server, or both, examine their cache 
to see if there are any pages of a previous version of the file that can still be 
used. The mechanism for this is simple, as shown below. 
For each file, a client or a server can make a cache entry, consisting of pages 
of the most recent version it has had locally. When a request for a new version 
of the file is made, a serialisability test is made between the version used for the 
cache entry and the current version in order to find out which blocks of the 
cache are still valid. If the serialisability test succeeds, all blocks are still valid; 
if not, the blocks that cause the test to fail must be discarded. Note, that it is 
not necessary to transmit pages while making the serialisability test. If the cache 
holder is a client, the version capability must be sent to one of the Amoeba File 
Servers so the serialisability test can be made, and the server returns a list of 
path names of pages to be discarded. The server responsible for carrying out the 
test can make the test itself, or it can delegate the task to the server holding the 
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most recent version for efficiency. 
If a file is not shared, the cache entry will always be based on the current ver-
sion. The serialisability test for finding out if the cache entry is up-to-date is then 
a null test which always succeeds. Even for shared files the page cache can be 
quite efficient. As shown previously, the serialisability test can be made in time 
proportional to the size of the intersection of the set of pages of the version in the 
cache and the union of the sets of pages in the versions since then. The server 
making the serialisability test likely has parts of the most recent version in its 
cache, reducing the number of disk accesses and the amount of network traffic 
further still. 
It is worth noting that, in contrast to other file systems, the page cache does 
not have to be a 'write through' cache: When a page in a version is written, it 
need not be written to stable storage immediately. This can be postponed until 
just before commit. 
The Amoeba File Servers can also conveniently cache the concurrency control 
administration, the flag bits. This allows serialisability tests without having to 
read the page tree. However, the flags must also be present in the files them-
selves to make crash recovery possible. 
6.4. Conclusions 
The Amoeba File Service combines a number of concepts from the operating 
systems' world, the distributed systems' world, and the database world in a novel 
way. To the best of our knowledge distributed file servers have not been con-
structed using optimistic concurrency control. Yet, it provides a number of 
advantages not often encountered in other file systems. 
With a version mechanism, the file system is always in a consistent state. 
After a crash, there is no necessity for recovery: no rollback is required, no locks 
have to be cleared, no intentions lists have to be carried out. Optimistic con-
currency control allows a maximum of concurrency in accessing files. Some 
updates will have to be redone when concurrent updates are not serialisable, but 
with the unbounded potential of computing power that distributed systems offer, 
redoing an operation now and then is acceptable. 
Still, starvation may occur, especially when a large update must be carried 
out on a heavily shared file. The locking mechanism can be used to lock a file 
when it is known that the update is large, and the probability of a serialisability 
conflict serious. 
The file system should be organised carefully to avoid that updates on super-
files have to occur too frequently. To this end, each small file should be self-
contained as much as possible, so most updates will be on small files. This 
allows a large degree of concurrency. Locking should be the exception rather 
than the rule. 
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Page caches can be maintained, both by end-user processes and Amoeba File 
Server processes. We believe our method is superior to that in XDFS because 
no unsolicited messages are necessary. These cause an unneeded additional 
complexity for client processes. 
The version mechanism and the page tree closely resemble the mechanisms in 
FELIX. However, FELIX uses locking at the file level. The idea behind our sys-
tem of not locking small files is that many updates, even on the same file, do not 
affect the same parts of the file. For example, changes in an airline reservation 
system for flights from San Fransisco to Los Angeles do not conflict with changes 
to reservations on flights from Amsterdam to London. 
The Amoeba File Service provides mechanisms that allow both sophisticated 
and simple applications to use its services efficiently. We have discussed the 
methods for concurrency control at some length, perhaps creating the impression 
that simple-minded applications-such as the example, mentioned in the intro-
duction, of a compiler that needs to make temporary files-must once again pay 
the price of all that complicated machinery for guaranteeing serialisability. This 
need not be the case at all. Since pages of 32K bytes can be written, one such 
page is often large enough to contain a whole file. Writing these one-page files 
is efficient; no concurrency control mechanisms slow it down. 
A last advantage of the Amoeba File Service is that it is eminently suitable for 
a file system on write-once media, such as optical disks. Optical disks show 
great promise for the future, because of low cost and huge capacity. Traditional 
file systems are not suitable for these media, because files cannot be overwritten 
on a write-once device. The version mechanism, coupled with a cache in which 
uncommitted files are kept until just before commit seems an ideal file store for 
optical disks. 
7 
SERVICE ACCOUNTING AND 
CONTROL 
fil" computer system provides to its users a set of services: executing programs, 
storing files, printing listings, typesetting Ph.D. theses, etc. Each of these services 
make demands on the system's resources: computer time, disk space, paper, film, 
etc. This chapter deals with the registration of the use of services, and how this 
can be controlled in a distributed environment. 
Accounting is the registration of the use of services. Such registration is 
needed, not only in commercial computer systems for billing clients for services 
rendered, but also in non-commercial systems for dividing available resources 
evenly over competing users. 
Resource control is the mechanism for enforcing resource management poli-
cies. Generally, a client (which can be a human user, a process, or a service) is 
not allowed an unlimited supply of any resource. Some resources are expensive 
(e.g., phototypesetter pages), most are available only in limited supply (e.g., disk 
blocks). Policies for resource management dictate when and how much a client 
may use of a resource. Resource control mechanisms realise these policies. 
Resource control, however, is just a special area of service control: in the 
Amoeba distributed operating system all resources are made available through 
services, defining the allowed operations on the resource, but also defining the 
rules for its accessibility. The traditional operating system view of accounting 
resources is limited, because more abstract entities, such as the expert knowledge, 
embedded in a particular program, are not viewed as resources, and hence not 
accountable. The more general view of building mechanisms to account for the 
use of services, rather than resources, is obviously preferable. 
Accounting and service control are closely related. Service control is not pos-
sible without accounting mechanisms; therefore accounting mechanisms must be 
designed with regard to both existing service management policies and desirable, 
171 
172 SERVICE ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL 7. 
not-yet-existing resource management policies. Both accounting and service con-
trol mechanisms must be designed with great flexibility to allow them to be used 
for carrying out a variety of existing policies, but also for many as yet unthought 
of policies of the future. 
7 .1. Accounting and Service Control 
In this section we show the differences between accounting and resource control 
mechanisms used in traditional centralised operating systems, and those neces-
sary for open distributed operating systems as we envision them. 
7 .1.1. Closed Centralised Systems 
Until a few years ago, a typical computer centre had one or two huge computers 
with many peripherals attached to them. Running the computer was expensive, 
and everything was oriented towards using it as efficiently as possible. This way 
of thinking is clearly illustrated by the accounting mechanisms used by most 
computer centres: the unit of accounting is a 'system second.' As the name sug-
gests, a system second indicates one second of CPU time, although it is not solely 
used as a unit of CPU time consumed, it is also used to account for ii o done, as a 
measure for printed pages, for the use of tape drives, etc. 
Resource control policies consist mostly of giving users a budget, an amount of 
system seconds with which a user buys cpu seconds, disk space, etc. Periodically, 
an amount can be added to the budget, the amount often based on past use and 
estimated needs. Additionally, for each type of resource there will be a max-
imum, independent of the current budget: time limits on processes, quota on disk 
space, so many pages of output, etc. 
More instructive than summing up what traditional accounting mechanisms 
can do is, perhaps, to look at some of the things traditional accounting mechan-
isms do not do. There is no seftware accounting, accounting of who uses how 
much of which software. In the past this was not necessary. The programs used 
by clients of the computer centre would either be owned by the computer centre 
or by the clients themselves. The computer centre could obtain the development 
cost of the software, or the cost of buying it out of the system seconds income. 
Software was cheap compared to hardware in the early days of computing, and 
this is reflected in the accounting and resource control mechanisms of many 
computer centres to this day. 
Another useful feature lacking in the accounting mechanisms of traditional 
systems is a mechanism that one user of the system can use for accounting ser-
vices rendered to another user. The traditional view has always been of one pro-
ducer of service, 'the system,' and many consumers, 'the users.' This view, by 
the way, is not only visible in the structure of accounting mechanisms, but also 
in the structure of other facilities, such as the file system, which often prevents 
users from sharing files, or from running each other's programs. 
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7.1.2. Open Distributed Systems 
There are important differences between traditional closed centralised systems 
and modern open distributed systems that affect the mechanisms needed for 
accounting and resource control. Whereas in traditional systems accounting was 
primarily done to register consumption of resources , in modern open systems it is 
done to register the consumption of services. The distinction is moot, perhaps, 
but it illustrates a change of view of operating systems, away from just disk 
blocks, cpu seconds and phototypesetter pages, towards an integrated view of 
services in a much wider sense of the word. A service is not just the provision of 
disk space or computing power, but it is these things, combined with the 
research effort, the development, the maintenance of the service. 
To illustrate how this integrated view leads to fairer accounting policies, con-
sider two compilers, a good one and a bad one. The latter will be slower, will 
produce worse code, and it will produce less comprehensible error messages. 
Traditional accounting methods, however, will register more resource consump-
tion using the bad (slow) compiler, hence the users of the system will be charged 
more for using the worse service. This is not necessary when accounting policies 
are not based on consumption of resources, but on both quantity and quality of 
service, rather than just quantity of resources. 
Another development in open distributed system is that services are no longer 
exclusively provided by 'the system.' The notion of one central authority pro-
viding service to many users no longer applies in distributed systems, consisting 
of a mixture of collectively owned and privately owned processors. But even 
when 'the system' as a whole is owned by one administration, it may still be 
desirable to allow ordinary users to provide services in return for financial gain 
or other services. 
A third major change is in the structure of services. In traditional systems 
accounting was done at one level only, basic resources, such as disk blocks and 
CPU seconds. Modern, service-oriented systems have a hierarchy of services. 
One service makes use of other services in order to function. This is clearly illus-
trated in the file service of the previous chapter, which needs disk service and 
stable storage service, but also of process service to execute the server processes, 
boot service to guard against crashes, etc. The accounting mechanisms must 
provide the tools for accounting in hierarchies of services. 
7 .1.3. Accounting 
Accounting is the registration of service consumption by clients. The problem is 
to determine how much of a service clients use. There are several aspects to this 
problem. First, the amount of mutual trust needed between service producer 
and service consumer: can a service claim it gave service to a client, while the 
client denies having received it? Second, the way in which service consumption 
is measured: is compiling a ten line program half as cheap as compiling a 
twenty line program? Third, the relation between different services: how does 
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file service compare to phototypesetter service? 
In solving these problems, an important aspect is the relation between the 
security required and mutual trust needed on one hand, and the cost in effort 
and complexity of realising such security on the other. At one end of the spec-
trum, one can imagine a system where clients are trusted to register their 
resource consumption themselves; a system, thus, that works only through a high 
degree of mutual trust. At the other end of the spectrum, a system can be ima-
gined, where there is no trust between clients and servers whatever. Clients and 
servers negotiate contracts, perhaps, establishing a mutually verifyable computa-
tion of cost, making transaction logs adorned with digital signatures for examina-
tion by an impartial referee, in case of dispute. In most cases, neither approach 
is acceptable, the first, because it assumes more honesty on the part of clients 
than can reasonably be expected, the second, because its realisation is far too 
costly in terms of complexity and speed. A reasonable middle course has to be 
found, accepted as trustworthy enough for clients and servers to use, and accept-
able in cost. 
In traditional accounting mechanisms, all service is provided by the 'system,' 
including accounting. Clients must thus trust the 'system' completely, since it 
both provides the service and does the accounting. In a distributed system, with 
many users providing service to others this strategy is not possible: it depends on 
one central authority providing service and accounting. 
In an open system, where every user may decide to set up service for other 
users, an 'open market' of services is likely to arise. Services will compete in 
quality and cost, which leads to improved and cheaper service. In such an open 
market, services set the price of their product. 
We have chosen for an accounting mechanism where the service computes the 
cost of the operations it carries out on behalf of its clients. The reason for this is 
twofold. First, the provider of the service (e.g., a human being, or an organisa-
tion) decides on the cost of the service: 'My files cost such-and-such per block, 
take it or leave it.' Second, the service is in the most practical position to carry 
out the computation of costs. This implies that clients have to trust services to 
'keep their word,' they have to trust services to compute any costs according to 
the rules, published in advance. 
Because, in an open system, clients can choose the service for carrying out 
their work, it can be expected that clients also choose a service they trust do the 
work properly and securely. A client, using file server X, trusts X not to reveal 
any files to other clients, for example. We therefore believe that it is acceptable 
that clients have to trust the services they use to some degree. If possible, how-
ever, clients should only have to _have limited faith in the honesty of a service, 
that is, clients should not be forced to entrust their whole budget to a service; it 
would be too easy for a malicious user to set up a service to rob one or two 
clients of their budget. The accounting mechanisms must make it possible that 
clients entrust a limited amount to the service, an amount that covers the cost of 
the service exactly. A malicious service can still cheat in this set-up, but only by 
7 .1. ACCOUNTING AND SERVICE CONTROL 175 
collecting the price of one unit of service without carrying it out. A client, 
robbed in this way, will never use any of the services offered by that user again, 
so the malicious user's gain will be negligible compared to the loss of trust of its 
clients. 
Disk blocks cannot be compared to CPU seconds. Although the consumption 
of both is often expressed in the same unit, and sometimes must be expressed in 
money, we believe that the different nature of different resources and services 
requires a possibility to account for them in different ways, using different units 
and combinations of units. This allows much more freedom for resource 
management services to control access to different types of services indepen-
dently. 
7.1.4. Resource Control 
Resource control mechanisms-or, perhaps, service control mechanisms-have 
the task of adjusting client's and service's budgets as services are provided, and 
of enforcing policies for fair distribution of resources and services in limited sup-
ply. These mechanisms should be general enough to be applicable to a wide 
class of services and resource management policies. 
One area of resource control, resource allocation , is related to scheduling. 
Scheduling is the allocation of a resource to a number of competing processes, 
where the resource should be used optimally (maximise throughput) and each 
competitor receives an equal share of the resource (ensure fairness). Resource 
allocation mechanisms serve the same purpose, although often in a different time 
scale. CPU scheduling usually requires split-second decision making, while 
deciding about disk space allocation, in comparison, can be done at leisure. 
We consider scheduling, which requires very rapid allocation decisions outside 
the scope of a resource control service. The delays alone, incurred by involving 
an extra service, are usually in excess of the time allowed for making scheduling 
decisions. In this chapter we concentrate on those services whose scheduling is 
possible on time scales that allow keeping records on file of past consumption 
and current allowances. 
Records of service consumption must be kept in order to carry out any 
resource control and accounting. As stated in the previous section, a service pro-
vides the information about services consumed by its clients. In return, resource 
control mechanisms must provide services with information about clients' 'credit-
worthiness' -whether clients have a right for more service. 
In principle, before carrying out a request, a service must check if the client is 
credit-worthy, that is, whether the client has any budget left or used up his fair 
share of service already. After carrying out the request, a service must register 
the consumption of service with a bookkeeping service. If the service-control ser-
vice must be consulted before each request and informed after each request, net-
work traffic will triplicate, and simple transactions will take more than three 
times longer. Clearly, this is unacceptable. Caching strategies are required with 
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which services can avoid having to consult an accounting service for every tran-
saction. 
7.1.5. The Triangle Relation of Client, Service and Bank 
When people go shopping, they make transactions: a service is rendered in 
return for money. These transactions between people and shops (clients and ser-
vices) nearly always take place without need of a mutually trusted third party. 
One of the reasons for this is that shopkeepers trust that the money they receive 
is genuine. Money cannot easily be forged, so a person can only spend it once. 
In transactions between computers, where the equivalent of money must be 
represented electronically, copying money is the easiest thing. Electronic tran-
sactions must therefore be handled differently. If money is represented by an 
(authenticated) bit pattern, nothing prevents a client from giving it to a number 
of different services in payment for services rendered ( or to be rendered). Money 
would have no value as it could be copied without limit. Even sequence 
numbers on banknotes would not help: On each payment, the recipient would 
have to check whether the received money had already been spent somewhere 
else. 
Instead of electronic money, electronic cheques could be used in payment. 
However, the use of these suffers from the same drawback as using electronic 
banknotes: the service must always check with the bank whether the cheque is 
covered; one cannot squeeze water out of stone. In The Netherlands, and possi-
bly in many other countries as well, a guaranteed cheque exists. Banks have 
agreed to honour these cheques up to some maximum amount whether it is 
covered or not. By limiting the number of blank cheques in possession of an 
account holder, the banks limit their risk. Again, this system fails if clients can 
copy cheques at will : The risk to the banks will become too great. 
The concepts of banknotes and of cheques can be combined to yield a better 
method of payment. A bank can hand out numbered banknotes payable to one 
service only. When a client presents such a banknote to the correct service, the 
service checks if it has not received a note with that number on it before; if this 
is indeed not the case, the note is genuine and it can be put in the bank at a 
later time. To prevent forgery, such notes could consist of the text "This is bank-
note number thingumajig, with a value ef thingumabob, intended for service what's-its-name" 
signed by the bank server; that is, encrypted with the bank server's secret key. 
This method does not require that a client or a server have to check with the 
bank on every transaction: a client can order a large number of banknotes at 
once, and a server can collect a large number of them before going to the bank. 
The method does require that the server keep a list of received banknote 
numbers; and, unless measures are taken, this list can become very long indeed. 
To restrict the size of the list, it is possible to require clients to hand over bank-
notes in order of increasing serial numbers. Two disadvantages remain, how-
ever, the least of which is that the amounts on the banknotes are fixed , so it is 
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possible that quite a few banknotes must change hands to pay for one transac-
tion; it is even possible that services must give change. The most important 
disadvantage is that the public key encryption required-to protect banknotes 
from forgery and to allow services to inspect the authenticity of received 
banknotes-makes banknotes inconveniently large ( on the order of a thousand 
bytes) and therefore not very useful in applications. 
In the next sections we shall examine a bank server structure that does not 
have these drawbacks. The basic idea is to have clients deposit a sufficient 
amount in the service's account before requesting it to do work. Naturally, the 
service must know which client deposits which amount, and later, when the 
client makes a request, it should be able to tell the request came from the same 
client that deposited the money. One method is to have each client pass some 
sort of identifying capability along with each request and each deposit, but the 
Amoeba distributed system has a signature mechanism that is ideal for just this 
purpose: When a client deposits money for a server at the bank, it provides a 
signature. The money received will then be labelled with that signature. When 
the client later makes a transaction with a service, it again includes its signature 
with the request. The service can then tell it is the same client that made the 
deposit. 
7 .2. Bank Service 
As an example of a service for accounting and resource control, the Bank Service 
is described in this section. This service manages accounting information in a 
way that resembles the way a bank handles money. Different accounting units 
(e.g., units representing disk blocks, cpu seconds) are represented by virtual 
money in different currencies, analogous to real money. Clients and services 
maintain accounts between which amounts of virtual money can be transferred. 
7.2.1. Bank Accounts 
The objects, managed by the Bank Service are bank accounts. There are two 
types, private and business. Both types of account can contain virtual money, 
and various requests are available to transfer virtual money from one account to 
another. 
Bank accounts are protected by capabilities. There are rights that control 
withdrawal from an account, examination of an account, deposits into an 
account, etc. Services must know the identity of their clients in order to do 
accounting. Signatures* are used for client authentication. 
Private accounts are much like regular bank accounts: After an account is 
created, virtual money can be deposited into it and withdrawn from it. Usually 
*See§ 2.3.2 
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a private account is manipulated solely by its owner. Business accounts are 
different. In contrast to private accounts, whose contents can be thought of as 
an amount of virtual money, a business account can be thought of as many 
amounts of virtual money, one for-or rather, from-each client that deposited 
virtual money into the account. With bank accounts in the real world, the 
holder is notified who deposits into it; with our business accounts this is not 
necessary, because deposited virtual money is automatically tagged with its 
source. The owner of a business account must specify a source when manipulat-
ing the account; otherwise, business accounts are little different from private 
accounts. 
Business accounts are especially intended for services. Before a client can use 
a service that requires payment in the form of virtual money, a deposit must be 
made into the service's business account. Then requests can be sent to the ser-
vice. The service, before carrying out a request, makes sure there is enough in 
its business account to pay for the request, then carries out the request, and 
finally transfers the cost of the request from the business account to a private 
account. 
Although, in principle, the Bank Service is used as just described, it is rather 
inefficient when used exactly in this way. However, the design of the Bank Ser-
vice allows some simple optimisations that make it quite efficient. When a client 
deposits into a service's business account, the amount will usually be sufficient to 
pay for a large number of requests-enough for a whole day's file service, for 
instance. The service, before honouring the first request, must examine the 
account, but once the amount in it is known, the service may carry out requests 
until that amount is consumed without further examining it ; the client cannot 
secretly withdraw from the account behind the service's back, because the virtual 
money is already in the service's business account. The service can adjust its 
business account periodically; it is not necessary to make a transfer from the 
business account to a private account after each request. 
Client crashes do not affect the Bank Service mechanisms at all. Server 
crashes do have consequences, if a server crashes after a request has been carried 
out, but before the business account has been adjusted. Server crashes are infre-
quent, however, and the damage is limited to the cost of a few transactions. The 
frequency with which services adjust their business accounts must be low to 
reduce network traffic, but an order of magnitude higher than the frequency of 
server crashes. 
7 .2.2. Capabilities and Signatures 
Accounts are protected by capabilities. Authentication is done through the use 
of signatures. In this section we shall describe how capabilities and signatures 
are used for protection. 
When a client creates a private account, two capabilities are returned, an 
owner capability with all rights on, and a deposit capability with only the right to 
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deposit into the account. The client keeps the owner capability to himself, of 
course, but the deposit capability is usually given away to the service providing 
the virtual money (e.g., a system manager). 
When a business account is created, the Bank Server also returns two capabil-
ities, an owner capability, and a client capability. The owner capability is kept 
carefully secret, but the client capability is published to the service's potential 
clients. This capability allows a client to deposit into the business account, and 
to read the balance of its own deposits into it. Once deposited, a client capabil-
ity gives no right to withdraw from a business account. 
Before explaining how signatures are used to authenticate clients, it is perhaps 
useful to quickly recall the signature mechanism presented in chapter 2, since it 
is used to provide authentication of requests sent to a service. A packet may 
contain a signature, a bit string that can be used as proof of the identity of the 
sender. A process, wishing to send a signed packet, puts his signature, S, in the 
signature field of the packet. Before the packet arrives, the F-boxes replace S by 
F(X), where Fis a one-way cipher. Scan be viewed as a capability for produc-
ing F(S). The mechanism is used as a means of proving 'This message comes 
from the same source as a previous one.' 
Before depositing into a service's business account, a client chooses a signature, 
S, for identification. F(S) is included in the request to the Bank Server to 
transfer an amount from its private account into the business account. This 
request contains two capabilities, a capability with a withdraw right for the 
client's private account and a capability with the deposit right for the service's 
business account; furthermore, the request contains F(S) for identification in 
later requests to the service. The Bank Server, receiving this request, withdraws 
the amount from the client's account, and deposits it into the business account, 
tagged with F(S). 
Subsequently, the client sends requests to the service, each of which contains 
signature Sin the signature field. Before the services receives the request, an F-
box has converted S to F(S). When a service receives the first request from a 
client, it sends a request to the Bank Server to read the balance of its business 
account tagged with F(S). This request contains a capability for the business 
account with the inspect right and F(S). If the amount read is sufficient, the 
request is carried out and an appropriate amount is transferred from the business 
account to a private account. 
7.2.3. Maintainance of a Cache 
Each service can maintain a cache, an entry consisting of a triple (s, b, c) of a 
client's signature, a balance, and the amount of service consumed. When a 
request is received, the cache is searched for an entry with the correct signature. 
If an entry is found, and the balance, b, is sufficient, the request is carried out, 
and the cost of the request is subtracted from b and added to c. If there is no 
entry for that client in the cache, a request is sent to the Bank Server to read the 
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client's account. Then an entry is made with b set to the client's balance and c 
set to zero. 
Periodically, the cache is examined, and for all cache entries with non-zero c, 
a request is sent to the Bani<: Server to transfer an amount c, tagged withs in its 
business account to a private account. The Bani<: Server returns the new bal-
ance (which is b or a larger amount, if the client deposited in the mean time) 
that the service uses to update the cache. 
If, upon reception of a request, a service finds insufficient funds in its cache, it 
first updates the cache as described above to see if the client has made a deposit 
in the mean time. If the amount there is also insufficient, the request is not car-
ried out, and a reply is sent in stead, requesting more funds. 
7 .2.4. Currencies 
In a previous section the problem of comparing different kinds of service was 
broached. If only one accounting unit is used, it is difficult to exercise precise 
control over a number of different resources and services. What to do, for 
instance, if there is an ample supply of CPU cycles, but disk blocks are in scarce 
supply? Clearly, accounting mechanisms can be made more versatile if different 
units of accounting can be used for different kinds of resources. 
Different units of accounting are represented by virtual money in different 
currencies. It is thus possible, for instance, to do accounting of disk blocks in vir-
tual guilders , accounting of compilations in virtual dinars, and accounting of CPU 
seconds in virtual yen . New currencies can be created and removed dynamically, 
and conversion between currencies is possible. There is also the possibility of 
minting more virtual money in some currency, if that is useful. 
Different currencies will be applied in different ways to obtain different types 
of accounting. This is illustrated by two simple examples. Suppose, the 
manager of a computer centre wants to set a maximum to the number of disk 
blocks that each user may occupy at any moment. This is implemented by 
creating a currency-say, virtual roubles-that represents disk blocks. When a 
user enters the system, he or she receives an amount of virtual roubles . When a 
disk block is allocated, an amount must be paid; when a block is released, the 
amount is returned. Suppose now that our manager wants to set a maximum 
number of CPU seconds per week that each user may consume. This is done by 
creating a currency- say, virtual dollars-that is used to pay each user a weekly 
salary to buy CPU seconds with. Several policies may be adapted for allowing 
users to take virtual dollars saved up into the next week, by making the salary 
depend on the amount left over at the end of the week. 
These examples serve to illustrate that the provider of some services will wish 
to create a virtual currency to control the use of that service. For this reason, 
the Bani<: Service itself does not decide to create new currencies and the amounts 
to be minted, but the providers of the services in the system. Naturally, the 
Bani<: Server itself- being a provider of a service also-may create some 
7 .2. BANK SERVICE 181 
currency that controls the creation of other currencies, for instance, to prevent 
any one user from creating too many currencies. 
Services can ask to be paid in combinations of currencies. A phototypesetter 
service, for instance, may adopt the policy to demand payment in real money 
(represented by some virtual currency) to cover the cost of photographic 
material (paper, developer), in addition to payment in another virtual currency 
that prevents a (rich) user from occupying the phototypesetter too long at a 
time. 
7.2.5. Bank Server Requests 
The commands to the Bank Server can be divided into two categories: those that 
manage accounts, and those that manage currencies. Not all requests will be 
discussed here, but a subset that amply illustrates how Bank Service is used. 
Before the Bank Service requests are described in detail, however, a few remarks 
on notation are necessary. Some requests, such as the request to transfer an 
amount from one account to another, operate on two objects. In these cases, one 
object (e.g., the account from which the withdrawal is made) will be the primary 
object, that is, the object indicated by the capability of the request, while the 
second object will be the secondary object, that is, the object whose capability is 
contained in the request's data. In the notation used, the first parameter of each 
request is special; it indicates the capability field of the request. Although the 
Bank Service does require signatures in some of its requests, the signature field is 
not needed in requests to the Bank Service; only public signatures have to be sent 
to it. Note that this allows Bank Service to use its own accounting mechanisms 
on its clients. When a capability refers to an object, and no confusion results, 
the same names will be used for the capability for the object and the name of 
the object. 
CreateBusinessAccount( BankService); 
returns: OwnerCapability , DepositCapability 
The BankService capability in this request is the public capability that 
allows all clients to the Bank Service to create new objects. The Bank 
Service will create an empty business account and return two capabili-
ties for it, an owner capability and a capability to give to clients to 
deposit into the account. 
CreatePrivateAccount( BankService); 
returns: OwnerCapability, DepositCapability 
This request creates an empty private account and, like the 
CreateBusinessAccount request, returns two capabilities for it. 
Transfer(FromAccount, FromSignature, ToAccount, ToSignature, Amount); 
returns: Balance of FromAccount 
This request is used to transfer amounts from one account (business or 
private) to another (business or private). The signature parameters are 
only needed for transfers from and to business accounts; when referring 
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to a private account, the signatures can be dummy parameters. Note, 
that the signatures need not be in the request's signature field, the public 
signature suffices. Amount represents a list of one or more virtual 
currencies and amounts. 
lnspect(Account, signature); 
returns: Balance of Account 
The Bank Server inspects the account indicated by Account, and returns 
its balance. If it is a business account, signature can be used to tell the 
Bank Server to consider only the balance of the account, deposited 
under that signature. 
RemoveAccount(Account); 
returns: Acknowledgement 
The Bank Server removes the account (business or private) after making 
sure it is empty. If this is not the case, the account is not removed, and 
an error reply is generated. 
CreateCurrency(BankServer, Account, Amount); 
returns: MintCapability, Name 
A new currency is generated, of which Amount is minted and put in 
Account. A capability for controlling the currency is returned, plus a 
small integer which functions as the name of the new currency. 
Mint(MintCapability, Account, Amount); 
returns: Acknowledgement 
Amount is minted of the currency to which MintCapability refers; it 1s 
deposited into Account. 
RemoveCurrency(MintCapability); 
returns: Acknowledgement 
A currency is removed. All amounts of the currency in all accounts are 
deleted. 
7 .3. Accounting Policies 
The Bank Service mechanisms, presented in the previous section, can only be 
useful if they serve an efficient implementation of a wide variety of accounting 
policies. In this section some of the existing accounting policies will be reviewed, 
and it will be shown how they can be realised. 
7.3.1. Payment for Services 
An important application of accounting is in computing the cost of services con-
sumed. This is not only useful in commercial computer centres that must bill 
their clients in accordance with their service consumption, but also for educa-
tional institutes, where it is useful, for example, to charge students for excessive 
use of expensive resources (e.g., line printer paper, phototypesetter pages). 
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Accounting for cost of services is one of the simplest applications of Bank Ser-
vice. In principle, each user (periodically) receives an amount in some currency, 
representing a budget or salary . This currency is used to pay for services con-
sumed, as described earlier. At any time, the difference between the sum given 
to the user and the amount left over in the user's account represents the amount 
consumed. 
For accounting purposes, a service is considered to let its resources to clients 
and carry out operations for clients. In principle, charges can be levied on the 
operations, and hire on the consumption of resources. The charge on execution 
of requests is a function of the cost of carrying them out, the hire of resources is a 
function of the type, amount and time the resource is consumed. 
A file server, for instance, stores files and carries out operations on them. It 
can charge an amount for each operation carried out, plus an additional sum 
per day for the consumed file space. Several policies can be adopted when 
clients have insufficient funds to pay for file service. It can start to refuse to 
carry out operations for its clients, it can also make client files inaccessible until 
sufficient budget is once again available, and, in extreme cases, it can altogether 
remove unpaid for client files. 
The charges levied on execution of requests are collected after each request. 
Charges on resource hire can be collected in several ways. They can be col-
lected when the resource is returned, but this may result in clients keeping a 
resource past the point where their budget runs out. The charges can be col-
lected periodically-say, every hour, or minute, depending on the resource. But 
they can also be collected whenever a client requests an operation on the 
resource; charges are collected then, anyway. 
7.3.2. Quota, Budgets and Salaries 
To prevent a user from using too much of a resource at once, quota are usually 
established. A quoturn is a maximum amount that a user may consume of a 
resource. Examples of quota are n disk blocks, m magnetic tapes, p CPU seconds 
per day, q line printer pages per week. Quota can be separated into two kinds: 
absolute and per unit ef time. Absolute quota are used for reallocable resources, 
resources that a client uses for some time, and then gives back so they can be 
used by another. Quota per unit of time are used for allocate-once resources, 
resources that a client uses up and can not be returned to be used by another. 
Disk blocks and mag tapes are examples of reallocable resources, CPU seconds 
and phototypesetter pages are examples of allocate-once resources. 
Quota for reallocable resources are simple to implement. Every user, when 
given access to the system receives a budget, amounts of virtual currency 
representing maxima on resources that may be used. Whenever the user 
requests more resources, they must be paid for from the budget. Whenever the 
user returns resources, the payment is returned. 
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When more of a resource becomes available, or fewer users have to share the 
resource, budgets may be increased; when more users have to share a resource, 
or the resource becomes scarcer, budgets must be decreased. It is a simple 
matter to increase users' budgets, but it is harder to decrease them: the complete 
budget may be invested, so there may not be enough budget left to take away. 
An approach to accomplish decreasing budgets can be to devaluate the currency 
representing the resource, that is, make the resource more expensive. However, 
this will favour users that obtained their resources at the old price, and they will 
not be willing to return any of their resources, because they will not be able to 
obtain the same amount later. In most cases, it is not possible to take away 
resources from users by pure mechanical means, anyway: when more users have 
to share the same disk space, for instance, the old users must make room for the 
new; however, the old users will have valuable information stored in their disk 
space, and the 'system' cannot just take away some of the old users' disk blocks. 
For allocate-once resources a slightly different approach can be used, based on 
salaries. Every user receives an hourly, daily, monthly (or whatever is appropri-
ate) salary with which to pay for consumption of allocate-once resources. The 
salary can be independent of the amount left over in the users' accounts, which 
makes it possible for users to save up for future use. The salary can also be 
made dependent of the left-over amount, to restrict saving, or to prevent it alto-
gether. 
Often, it will be useful to combine budgets and salaries. For instance, a user 
could be given a budget to restrict the number of tape drives used simultane-
ously, and a salary to restrict the time the tape drives are allocated. 
8 
SAMENV ATIING 
SDit proefschrift beschrijft principes voor het ontwerp van gespreide besturings-
systemen. Met behulp van deze principes is het de bedoeling gebruik te maken 
van de mogelijkheden die gespreide systemen kunnen bieden: In een gespreid 
systeem zijn meerdere processoren zodanig opgesteld dat ze informatie kunnen 
uitwisselen door middel van een computernetwerk, maar dat bij een storing in 
een willekeurige processor de andere processoren kunnen blijven functioneren. 
Een van de belangrijkste doelstellingen van het hier beschreven onderzoek is 
om van deze eigenschap gebruik te maken door een besturingssysteem te ontwer-
pen dat, indien een willekeurige component uitvalt ( apparatuur of program-
matuur ), de gebruikersprogrammatuur zo veel mogelijk ongestoord blijft door-
werken, iets langzamer wellicht. De technieken om deze doelstelling te bereiken 
zijn het ontwerpen van fout-tolerante programmatuur-programmatuur waarin 
rekening wordt gehouden met de mogelijkheid dat er fouten optreden- , en 
replicatie van apparatuur, programmatuur en gegevens. 
Een andere belangrijke doelstelling is te verwezenlijken dat de capaciteit van 
een gespreid systeem de som van de capaciteiten van zijn onderdelen zoveel 
mogelijk benadert; de extra betrouwbaarheid van een gespreid systeem moet zo 
min mogelijk kosten. Dit betekent dat in het systeem een hoge graad van 
parallellisme moet worden nagestreefd en een derde belangrijke doelstelling is de 
consequenties van dit parallellisme te beheersen, zodat, wanneer bijvoorbeeld 
twee gebruikers van het systeem gelijktijdig eenzelfde bestand veranderen, er 
geen onverwachte gevolgen optreden. 
Hoofdstuk 1 is een inleiding in de problematiek van gespreide systemen en bevat 
een overzicht van relevant onderzoekswerk elders. 
In Hoofdstuk 2 worden de interproces communicatie mechanismen 
beschreven. Verschillende methoden om communicerende partijen te benoemen 
worden opgesomd en het mechanisme wordt beschreven om communicerende 
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proc~n elkanders identiteit te laten vaststellen. Met behulp van dit mecha-
nisme ontstaat de mogelijkheid onbevoegde proc~n de toegang tot bepaalde 
services onmogelijk te maken. Dit mechanismne maakt gebruik van zogenaamde 
F-boxes, die zowel in hardware als seftware kunnen worden gerealiseerd. Het 
protectiemechanisme maakt gebruik van de aanname dat tussen elk tweetal 
communicerende proc~n een F-box aanwezig is die niet omzeild lean worden. 
Hiertoe kunnen software F-boxes in de operating system lcemel worden opgenomen, 
of in een switching node van het netwerk; hardware F-boxes kunnen op de network 
interfaces worden aangebracht. 
Het slot van Hoofdstuk 2 beschrijft methoden om objecten in een computer 
netwerk te localiseren. Voor een bepaalde klasse van locate algoritmen wordt een 
ondergrens voor het aantal boodschappen bewezen. 
Hoofdstuk 3 gaat over het beheer van objecten door services . Als een client pro-
ces een operatie op een object (bijv. eenjile) wil uitvoeren, dan wordt een request 
naar de service gestuurd die het object beheert. Een van de server proc~n voor 
de betreffende service voert het verzoek uit en retourneert een rep{y . Om het 
recht aan te tonen om een operatie op een object uit te voeren moet de client 
een capability overleggen, een soort toegangskaartje voor een object. Deze 
capability wordt tevens gebruikt als rniddel het object te adr~ren. Het beheer 
van capabilities in een gespreid systeem komt uitgebreid aan de orde. Methoden 
worden beschreven om operaties op capabilities uit te voeren en om ze op een 
practische, <loch veilige manier te kunnen bewaren. 
Een ander onderwerp dat in Hoofdstuk 3 behandeld wordt is het mechanisme 
om op snelle, betrouwbare en veilige manier requests en replies tussen clients en 
servers over te brengen. Dit mechanisme is gellllplementeerd en blijkt een 
bijzonder efficient interprocescommunicatiemechanisme op te leveren. 
Het beheer van proc~n komt in Hoofdstuk 4 aan de orde. Proc~n kun-
nen worden opgesplitst in tasks , die vrij onafhankelijk van elkaar in shared 
memory draaien. Een proces wordt geladen, verhuisd, checkpointed of debugged met 
behulp van de Process Descriptor , waarmee de toestand van een proces wordt 
beschreven. 
Een aantal services worden benut bij het beheer van proc~n. De Process Ser-
ver beheert een Processor Pool waaruit processoren worden toegwezen om een 
programma te draaien. De Loader Service wordt gebruikt voor opslag van binaries 
en de Bootstrap Service detecteert storingen en repareert services die er de dupe 
van worden. 
In Hoofdstuk 5 wordt een techniek beschreven voor process scheduling , waarbij 
de looptijd tot dusver gebruikt wordt om een schatting te maken van de 
resterende looptijd. De schattingsfunctie die in dit hoofdstuk wordt afgeleid is 
gebaseerd op metingen aan proces looptijden in het UNIX systeem. Het gedrag 
van de ontwikkelde algoritme wordt gei1lustreerd door rniddel van simulatie. 
File Service is het onderwerp van Hoofdstuk 6. De hier beschreven Amoeba 
File Server heeft een gelaagde structuur en realiseert mechanismen voor 
replicatie, concurrency control en version management . De Amoeba File Server wordt 
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gekarakteriseerd door zijn toepasbaarheid op optische disks, door het gebruik 
van optimistic concurrency control en door de manier waarop op alle mveaus 
efficient caches kunnen worden bijgehouden. 
Centraal in Hoofdstuk 7 staat de Bank Service die dient om clients en services 
in staat te stellen accounting en resource control te doen. Traditionele accounting 
mechanismen registreren slechts het gebruik van processor, 
(achtergrond)geheugen en 1/ 0; de Bank Server is ontworpen om alle gebruikers 
van een systeem in staat te stellen services aan te bieden in ruil voor 'betaling,' 
hetzij in de vorm van geld, hetzij in de vorm van tegen-services. 
Hoofdstuk 8 bevat een nederlandstalige samenvatting en Hoofdstuk 9 een 
bibiografie. 
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